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ABSTRACT 
This study exammes whether the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
performance of the target firms influences the acquisition premiums paid by the 
acquirers. Using U.S. public merger and acquisition (M&A) deals, I fmd that acquisition 
premiums increase in the targets' perceived CSR quality, an effect incremental to 
previously documented drivers of such premiums. These findings are robust to (1) using 
four proxies for CSR measures, and (2) using three proxies for acquisition premiums. 
Greater value-enhancing and synergistic capabilities of targets with superior quality CSR, 
acquirers' environmental, social and reputational risk protection needs, and market 
imperfections- related incorrect valuation of CSR activities are possible explanations for 
this observed positive association between targets' CSR and acquisition premiums. 
Analysis specific to each CSR attribute reveals that targets' environmental 
performance has positive and the strongest effects on acquisition premiums. In addition, 
superior-quality community and diversity influence acquisition premiums significantly 
and positively. However, this analysis does not indicate any consistent association 
between target firms' product attributes and acquisition premiums. Additionally and 
perhaps more strikingly, this investigation reports a significant negative association 
vi 
between targets' employee relations and acquisition premiums. Additional tests document 
that the positive association between target firms' perceived CSR quality and acquisition 
premiums is stronger for acquirers with high quality CSR and large targets. Overall, in 
this study, I combine the CSR and M&A literature by demonstrating that superior quality 
CSR performance affects acquisition premiums positively. Thus, this study expands our 
understanding of the value-enhancing role of CSR by studying the M&A market. 
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THE IMPACT OF TARGETS' SOCIAL PERFORMANCE ON 
ACQUISITION PREMIUMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has 
garnered the attention of the business press and given rise to a substantial body of 
diversified literature surrounding the subject. Dramatic increases in CSR investments, the 
issuance of CSR reports, and researchers' in-depth analyses signify the importance of 
CSR activities. The objective of this study is to measure the value ofCSR activities in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Specifically, in this study, I examine 
whether target firms' CSR performance influences the acquisition premiums paid by 
acquirers during M&As. 
Although the cost-benefit analysis of CSR has long been contested, prior literature 
largely acknowledges the value-enhancing role of CSR. This includes firms' enhanced 
operating efficiency (Porter & Kramer, 2002; Brammer & Millington, 2005), product 
market gains (Menon & Kahn, 2003; Bloom et al., 2006), improved employee 
productivity (Tuzzolino & Armandi, 1981; Valentine & Fleischman, 2008), capital 
market benefits (Godfrey, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2012), lowering of risks (Richardson & 
Welker, 2001; Cheng et al., 2012; Husted, 2005), and enhanced earnings quality (Chih et 
al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012). Despite the broad range of potential benefits, prior research 
has rarely examined the link between CSR performance and M&As. Specifically, the 
impacts of target firms' CSR performance on acquisition premiums have not been 
addressed in the literature. 
1 
Harper (2013) finds that high-quality social and environmental performance of a 
finn is positively related to the propensity to be a target in M&A markets. Potential 
explanations for this finding are that firms with superior quality CSR performance are 
more attractive to the acquirers because of their CSR-related value-enhancing 
capabilities. Acquisitions serve as opportunities to increase finn value by attaining 
different synergistic benefits through competitive capabilities from targets (Zollo & Sing, 
2004; Berchicci et al., 2012). The value-enhancing capabilities of CSR provide greater 
competitive advantages to a target finn to achieve higher synergistic benefits and increase 
combined-finn value in the post-M&A period. As a result, a target finn with superior 
quality CSR performance (high-CSR-target) should receive higher acquisition premiums 
than a target with inferior quality CSR (low-CSR-target). 
Acquirers conduct social and environmental due diligence, which has become an 
integral part of the M&A process in recent years. 1 During the social and environmental 
due diligence procedure, acquirers hire experts to quantify and assess the target finn's 
social and environmental reputation and risk and incorporate these assessments into their 
valuation process (Deloitte, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that acquirers, rather 
1 
"Social and environmental due diligence" a relatively new term in M&A process, was 
rarely heard few years ago. But nowadays several acquirers consider it as an integral part 
of the merger transaction to minimize the post-M&A risks. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that M&A deals are often renegotiated, restructured, or even 
withdrawn based on the assessment of target fmns' social and environmental 
performance, implying that target firms' CSR quality is significantly associated with 
acquisition decisions, including acquisition price and premiums. For example, see 
http://www. phannafield.co. uk/features/2004/07 /Mergers-and-Acquisitions-deals-
impacted-by-Corporate-Social-Responsibility-risks 
2 
than the general shareholders, will impose extra emphasis on target firms' CSR activities 
while valuing the f1rm. As a result, it is more likely that a high-CSR-target will receive 
larger premiums than a low-CSR-target in M&A markets.2 
If the market price of the target firm's shares reflects its CSR performance in an 
efficient manner, then acquirers may not pay an additional premium for it. However, it is 
possible that market may devalue the CSR performance because of its non-financial and 
intangible nature. 3 Even if targets' CSR performance is properly priced in the market, 
2 Several professional white-papers have highlighted the importance of target firms' 
social and environmental performance in deal valuation. For example, 
"CSR issues have traveled from their roots in community and environmental activism 
into the forefront of regulations and, ultimately, the valuation of M&A deals. . .. 
Companies are willing to pay a premium for companies because of their sustainability 
leadership." How green is the deal? The growing role of sustainability in M&A, Deloitte 
LLP (2009). 
"Companies are improving their processes for valuing social issues, in part so they are 
properly priced in an M&A deal." Does sustainability add value to M&A deals? Kathryn 
Pavlovsky, Principal, Deloitte LLP (2010). 
3 CSR performance usually results in nonfinancial and intangible benefits, such as brand 
value, employee productivity, customer satisfaction, and firm reputation. Nonfmancial 
measures I intangibles are not usually quantified in financial statements (Lev & Zarowin, 
1999), nor concurrently reflected in stock market price (Banker et al., 2000; Campbell, 
2008). In addition, there is lack of consistent evidence in existing CSR literature about 
the association between CSR and current market value. Several researchers document 
that the stock market does not price CSR performance (Renneboog et al., 2008; Clacher 
& Hagendorff, 2012; Belkaoui, 1980; Chan & Milne, 1999; Wang et al., 2011). 
Prior research also argues that firms' CSR performance is not fully incorporated into 
traditional valuation methodologies, due either to a lack of public information or a lack of 
understanding about the positive effects of CSR activities (Edmans, 2011). According to 
the fundamental assumption of investors' misvaluation theory in M&A literature, 
acquirers are more sophisticated than the general shareholders, and take the advantage of 
market misvaluations, which significantly affect deal characteristics and bid premiums 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 2003; Dong et al., 2006). Since CSR-related benefits are nonfinancial 
3 
acquirers may pay an additional premium for them because of acquirers' unique interest 
in risk-diversification options. Unlike the shareholder, who can easily construct a risk-
diversified portfolio and liquidate risky stock at a minimal cost, acquirers face a number 
of difficulties and high costs to divest any part of their acquired business once they are 
locked in. 4 As a result, acquirers are more conscious than general shareholders of the 
potential risks when they make an investment in M&A markets. 
Anecdotes show that acquirers are concerned about environmental, social, health, 
and safety risks that may translate into financial and reputationalliabilities in post-M&A 
periods. Legal compliance, historical pollution, and the presence of hazardous materials 
in targets' estates, for example, have become essential considerations in recent M&A 
transactions. 5 Acquirers' information advantage through due diligence procedures helps 
them in evaluating targets' CSR risk and reputation related information efficiently and 
incorporating this information into a proffered acquisition price. Therefore, acquirers are 
expected to impose extra value, over and above the market value, on targets' CSR and be 
willing to pay more to acquire a high-CSR-target and less to acquire a low-CSR-target. 
and intangible, superior-quality CSR targets may not be correctly valued in the market. 
Therefore, acquirers will take advantage of acquiring targets with superior-quality CSR 
performance even at a higher premium. 
4 For example, Daimler acquired Chrysler in 1998 in a $35 billion deal. However, the 
automaker failed to create its intended value. In 2006, Daimler sold Chrysler to a private 
equity firm for a mere $7.4 billion. 
s Stephen Oxley, Head of Pharmaceuticals at KPMG, UK, mentions in a recent media 
interview that "[ e ]nvironmental risks can have a huge impact on deals ... The companies 
which are incorporating these critical issues during the M&As are the ones suffering the 
least from post deal problems - and in the long run more likely to be successful in their 
M&A transactions." 
4 
The potential excess premiums for a high-CSR-target can be intended not only for 
avoiding future risks and contingent liabilities, but also for reducing acquirers' existing 
CSR disputes. Theory suggests that target firms' superior CSR performance plays a 
significant role as a complementary resource for low-CSR-acquirers. If acquirers have 
inferior-quality CSR, the acquisition of a high-CSR-target will facilitate the distribution 
of CSR capabilities and benefits from the target to the acquirer (Berchicci et al., 2012).6 
Motivated by the prevalence of anecdotal stories, and the potential contributions to the 
CSR and M&A literature, in this paper, I investigate the effects of target firms' social 
responsibilities on M&A deals. 
In this study, I hypothesize that observed acquisition premiums (on average) 
increase in target firms' perceived CSR quality. Consistent with prior research (Cheng & 
Chan, 1995; Shawky et al., 1996; Ayers et al., 2003), I use three proxies for acquisition 
premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price per share 30 days prior 
to the first acquisition announcement, (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book 
value per share, and (3) acquisition price per share to targets' average market price per 
share 35 to 25 days prior to the first acquisition announcement. 
6 In 2007, Clorox Company, as part of its green strategy, acquired Burt's Bees, a leader in 
the natural personal care category. 
Trevear Thomas, Principal, M&A Consultative Services, Deloitte Consulting LLP, 
mentions in a professional white paper, "Our client, a mining organization, recognizes 
that carbon-based regulations could have an impact on profits. We helped them develop 
an M&A strategy that focuses on an approach to buy alternative energy companies that 
complement their existing business. The client's goal is to reduce their carbon footprint 
and provide sustainable ways of adding value to their customers." 
5 
I estimate four measures for my variable of interest, target firms' CSR 
performance, using data from the MSCI Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
STATS, formerly known as the MSCI Kinder, Lynderberg, Domini Research and 
Analytics, Inc. (KLD) database: (1) the target firm's most recent net CSR score reported 
prior to the merger announcement, (2) the average of the target firm's net CSR score for 
the two years prior to the M&A announcement, (3) changes in target firms' CSR score 
prior to the M&A announcement, and (4) target firms industry-adjusted (industry is 
defined by a one-digit SIC code) net CSR score prior to the merger announcement. In 
accordance with prior CSR literature (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Kim et al., 2012), I 
calculate the net CSR scores as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG 
STATS's five main social rating areas: community, diversity, employees, environment, 
and product. 7 
My sample consists of 419 M&A deals for the period from 1992 to 2013. I restrict 
the sample deals to public U.S. acquirers and targets to ensure my access to CSR, 
financial, and stock price data in MSCI ESG STATS, Compustat, and CSRP databases. 
7 MSCI ESG STATS (previously known as KLD Inc. database) is an annual data set of 
environmental [E], social [S], and governance [G] ratings of the largest 3,000 publicly 
traded U.S. companies. MSCI ESG provides more than 60 indicators organized in seven 
attributes of three ESG categories. These seven attributes are: (i) environment [E], (ii) 
community, (iii) diversity, (iv) employee, (v) product and (vi) human rights (attributes ii 
to vi are in the social [S] category), and (vii) governance [G]. 
By following the literature that uses MSCI ESG social rating data (Waddock & Graves, 
1997; Kim et al., 2012), I focus on five major CSR attributes (environment, community, 
diversity, product, and employee) and exclude corporate governance and human rights. 
The human rights attribute includes only a few indicators, which seem to have 
insignificant impacts, and several CSR researchers perceive corporate governance as a 
different issue than social and environmental constructs. 
6 
My research design incorporates four groups of control variables shown to affect 
acquisition premiums in the extant literature: (1) target-specific factors, (2) acquirer-
specific factors, (3) deal-specific factors, and (4) macro-economic and other factors. My 
cross-sectional regression model also includes year and acquirers' industry fixed effect. 
The main empirical results of my study suggest that target firms' perceived CSR 
quality increases their acquisition premiums, an effect incremental to previously 
documented drivers of such premiums. This occurs for all three proxies for acquisition 
premiums and four proxies for CSR estimates. Since CSR is a vast and multidimensional 
issue, it renders the need for further investigation of which attribute of CSR has the 
strongest effect on acquisition premiums. To investigate the attribute-specific impacts on 
acquisition premiums, instead of considering the net CSR score, ·1 use the decomposed 
scores (net scores in each of five attributes: environment, community, diversity, product, 
and employee) in the main regression model. 
This attribute-specific analysis reveals that targets' environmental attribute has 
the strongest impact on acquisition premiums. This finding is completely consistent with 
anecdotes and professional inferences, which suggests that assessment of targets' 
environmental risk and reputation is the main objective of acquirers' due diligence 
procedure. Environmental attribute is prioritized in acquirers' assessment lists, not only 
because of potential legal liabilities but also because of future reputational risks that may 
arise from pressure from social activists, the media, and other stakeholders. 
The attribute-specific analysis also documents that superior-quality community 
and diversity attributes influence acquisition premiums significantly and positively. 
7 
However, I fail to document a consistent association between targets' product attributes 
and acquisition premiums. Most strikingly, CSR attribute-specific investigations reveal a 
significant negative association between targets' employee attributes and acquisition 
premiums. One major indicator of high-quality employee attributes in the MSCI ESG 
database is the labor union relationship. Acquirers' fear of targets' unionized labor may 
explain this negative association. Meeting targets' unionized labor demand in the post-
M&A period may make a target less attractive to acquirers. As a result, acquirers may 
look for less unionized targets and discount targets' labor union strengths. 
To develop further insights into the results of this study, I also investigate whether 
the acquisition premium for a high-CSR-target is conditioned on the existing CSR quality 
of the acquirer. As argued in Berchicci et al. (2012), if acquirers have inferior CSR 
performance, they may prefer a target with superior quality CSR, because the acquisition 
will facilitate the transfer of CSR capabilities from the target to the acquirer. Contrary to 
this argument, it is also possible that high-CSR-acquirers (low-CSR-acquirers) will prefer 
high-CSR-targets (low-CSR-targets), because their ethical and cultural alignment, and 
similar perceptions toward CSR risks will make the acquisition process smoother (Deng 
et al., 2013). To investigate the influence of acquirers' existing CSR performance, I 
partition the sample into two groups based on acquirers' CSR quality. Results 
demonstrate that the association is significantly stronger for high-CSR-acquirers. 
Additional analysis also reveals that the association between acquisition premiums and 
targets' CSR quality is stronger for large target firms than small target firms. Overall, 
evidence from this study validates the insight that target firms' superior social and 
8 
environmental performance has a significant, positive influence on acquisition premiums 
during the M&A process. 
The finding of this study, that the CSR quality of target firms explains the 
variability in acquisition premiums contributes to existing CSR and M&A literature in 
three ways. First, it provides novel insights into the CSR literature because the value-
driven aspect of CSR has not been investigated in terms of its role in influencing 
acquisition premiums. Thus, this study contributes to the CSR literature by introducing a 
unique context of the public M&A market and new a method of assessing the value of 
CSR performance in terms of premiums. Second, this study complements the narrowly 
focused pre-acquisition and targets' gain-related M&A research. The existing M&A 
literature, although vast, is populated primarily by post-M&A acquirer-specific analyses. 
Third, this is one of very few studies that bridge the two distinct research areas of CSR 
and M&As. Two recent studies document that CSR qualities add value to acquirers 
during the post-merger period (Deng et al., 2013; Hawn, 2013). These two studies focus 
on the gains achieved by acquiring firms with high CSR performance. In contrast, in this 
study, I have established a previously untested theory that target firms can also achieve 
gains in the M&A market in form of higher acquisition premiums as a direct result of 
their superior CSR performance. 
Finally, the findings of this study are important for managers and dealmakers too. 
I provide insightful information by validating not only the significance of CSR, but also 
the ultimate decision faced by practitioners regarding whether to create CSR or acquire it 
through strategic M&As. Business professionals document that in arriving at M&A 
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decisions, buyers discern how advanced the target company's CSR issues are, as well as 
whether to renegotiate the deal based on assessment of the target firm's CSR quality 
(Deloitte, 2009). The empirical fmdings of this study supplement these professional 
views regarding the increasingly important role of CSR in M&A deals. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant 
literature on CSR benefits and M&A motives. Section 3 presents the hypotheses. Section 
4 outlines the sample selection, research design, variable definition and regression model. 
Section 5 documents the empirical fmdings of the two hypotheses. Section 6 provides 
additional analysis and their results. Section 7 presents the robustness tests of the two 
hypotheses. Section 8 offers concluding remarks, limitations of this study and some 
directions for future works. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Value-Enhancing Capabilities of CSR 
There is little argument that corporations have some responsibility to society. 
However, there is considerable debate as to whether a firm's socially responsible 
behavior is consistent with the wealth-maximizing interests of its stockholders. One 
group of scholars claims that CSR generates additional costs that could put a firm at an 
economic disadvantage (Aupperle et al., 1985). Another group of researchers 
demonstrates that these costs are relatively small compared to the potential benefits 
(Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). 
CSR-related benefits may take different forms, such as product market 
advantages, improved employee productivity, enhanced stock market benefits, increased 
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operating efficiency, corporate branding, and improved relation with regulators, society, 
and other stakeholders. Prior research demonstrates that CSR enables a firm to expand its 
product market, differentiate a product from its competitors, and build a brand reputation 
(Menon & Kahn, 2003; Bloom et al., 2006). Enhanced brand equity and improved 
customer satisfaction driven by CSR quality provide competitive advantages to the firms, 
which in tum results in increased sales as well as increased profitability (Brown & Dacin, 
1997; Lev et al., 2010). 
In addition to product market benefits, researchers document that CSR activities 
improve employee morale (Soloman & Hansen, 1985). Various CSR provisions, such as 
meeting labor union demands, providing better health care and retirement benefits, and 
paying wages above market level help firms to increase employee productivity. These 
help firms to build reputations as good employers, which attracts better talent and 
motivates personnel (Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Valentine & Fleischman, 2008; Edmans, 
2011). Improved employee productivity and job satisfaction lead to better operating 
performance (Banker & Mashruwala, 2007). 
CSR also enables firms to avoid costly government-imposed fmes. Particularly in 
highly regulated industries, CSR promotes better relations with regulators (Freedman & 
Stagliano, 1991; Shane & Spicer, 1983).8 High-CSR firms are more likely to receive 
positive media coverage and favorable treatment from policymakers (Brown et al., 2006). 
8 For example, by altering the meaning of BP to stand for 'Beyond Petroleum' and 
successfully aiming to reduce gas emissions by 10% between 1990 and 2010, British 
Petroleum (BP) has significantly influenced the European Commission's Energy and 
Climate Change Policy and the Greenhouse Gas Policy adopted by the European Union. 
(http://www.escpeurope.eu/uploads/media/G8. BP Lobbying Europe.pdt) 
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A large number of studies document positive associations between CSR and 
firms' operating performance (Roman et al., 1999; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Socially 
responsible firms outperform less socially responsible firms in terms of various 
accounting measures, including return on investment (ROD, return on assets (ROA), and 
return on sales (ROS) (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Nehrt, 1996; Porter & van der Linde, 
1995). Positive associations also exist between CSR and stock market performance, 
which is measured in terms of stock returns, firm value, and market to book (Anderson & 
Frankel, 1980; Freedman & Stagliano, 1991; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996). 9 
The benefits of CSR, such as employee productivity, enhanced brand value and 
corporate reputation, and increased regulatory support carry over into future periods. As a 
result, firms benefit from CSR quality not only in the short run, but also in the long run 
(McGuire et al., 1988; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2009; Eccles et 
al., 2013). Researchers also document that high-CSR firms are more likely to experience 
other capital market benefits, such as lowered cost of capital (Richardson & Welker, 
2001; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Albuquerque et al. 2013), and cost of debt (Goss & Roberts, 
2009; Ye & Zhang, 2011), and better acceptance from creditors (Cheng et al., 2012). 
CSR reduces not only social risks, but also litigation, product and technology-related 
risks (Starks, 2009). 
9 However, the association between CSR performance and stock return is not conclusive. 
After compiling 127 studies that investigate CSR and market returns, Margolis and 
Walsh (2003) recommend that the overall association is marginally positive, with several 
evidence of negative or no association. Researchers argue that the ambiguity of the CSR 
definition, the complex nature of CSR construes, the misspecification of econometric 
models, and differences in market-perceptions about CSR are the reasons for these 
inconclusive findings (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Lin et al., 2008; Taneja et al., 2011). 
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Ethical theories suggest that socially responsible firms also behave in a more 
responsible manner in the preparation of their financial statements. Chih et al. (2008) 
document that a strong commitment to CSR activities reduces firms' earnings smoothing 
and loss avoidance behavior. Kim et al. (2012) fmd that socially responsible firms are 
less likely not only to manage earnings through accruals and real activities, but are also 
less likely to be the subject of SEC investigations for misreporting. Overall, CSR 
performance is considered as a form of a reputation-building approach, which provides a 
positive signal to the stock market and to all stakeholders of the firm (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Grow et al., 2005; Verschoor, 2005; Linthicum et al., 2010). 
In recent years, significant numbers of companies have invested millions of 
dollars in CSR activities and proclaimed their CSR credentials by producing stand-alone 
CSR reports (KPMG, 2011). 10 lfCSR activities have a negative impact or no impact on a 
fum's value, then firms would not be interested in investing in them or in reporting their 
actions in such a vigorous manner. The dramatic increase in social investments and 
reporting implies that managers are encouraged to pursue CSR in order to reap benefits 
from it. Both theoretical and empirical findings suggest that firms use CSR as a strategic 
value-maximization tool by aligning social goals with corporate goals. 
Though the extant literature reasonably establishes the value-enhancing 
capabilities of CSR, few researchers document the evidence on economic disadvantages 
10 In 2011, 70% oflisted companies, 50% of state-owned companies, 55% of companies 
owned by private equities, and 45% of family-owned, cooperative, and private companies 
issued stand-alone CSR reports. The overall rate doubled in five years (Source: KPMG 
Intl. Corporate Responsibility Reporting Survey 2011). 
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of CSR activities. Aupperle et al., 1985 show that CSR generates value-destroying 
additional costs. Prior research also find that spending on CSR initiatives may negatively 
affect firm performance (Friedman 1970, Griffm and Mahon 1997). Bird and Smucker 
(2007) find evidence that managers taking a wider stakeholder perspective jeopardize the 
interest of stockholders. Becker-Olsen et al. (2006) document that CSR initiatives may 
negatively impact consumer beliefs, attitudes, and intentions no matter what the firm's 
motivation is. Sen and Bhattachrya (200 1) show that CSR initiatives can, under certain 
conditions, decrease consumers' intentions to buy a company's products. Bamea and 
Rubin (2010) argue that a firm's insiders (managers and large blockholders) may seek to 
over- invest in CSR for their private benefits. 
2.2 Motives behind M&As 
2.2.1 Value Maximization as a Motive for M&As 
The choice of value maximization as a corporate goal has its roots in 200 years of 
research in business, fmance, and economics (Jensen, 2001). Firms use different business 
strategies in order to maximize their values. In this globalized and competitive world, 
M&A is considered one of the dominant tools for increasing firm value. Researchers 
argue that M&As are driven by a complex pattern of motives (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 
1987). Among all of the theories that explain firms' M&A motives, value maximization 
is the most dominant (Nielsen & Melicher, 1973; Lubatkin, 1987; Bradley et al., 1988; 
Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Seth, 1990; Capron, 2002; Bruner, 2002). 11 
11In the M&A literature, the value maximization theory is also referred to as the 
efficiency theory, investment hypothesis, expectation hypothesis, or synergy hypothesis 
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Research that focuses on value maximization identifies different sources of 
synergy that firms stand to gain through M&As. 12 The word synergy entered the merger 
lexicon during the 1960s merger wave to describe gains from conglomerate mergers that 
could not be readily identified, but were presumed to be present to explain why the 
mergers occurred (Mueller & Sirower, 2003). Merger participants firmly believe that 
M&A procedures will result in synergistic gains, which will increase the combined value 
of the firm in the post-M&A periods.B 
The most common sources of synergy include financial, operational, managerial, 
and product market synergies. Financial synergy results in lower cost of capital, better 
access to creditors, and lower systematic risks through diversification (Higgins & Schall, 
1975; Fluck & Lynch, 1999). Operational synergy, which is derived from economies of 
scale and scope, results in improved combined operations of the acquirer and the target 
(Malatesta, 1983; Eun et al., 1996; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). The underlying 
assumption of all of these theories is the same, which is that mergers and acquisitions are 
planned and executed to maximize firm value by achieving different synergic benefits. 
12 Albeit in post-M&A literature it is considered controversial as to whether M&As 
improve long-run firm performance and firm value (Langetieg, 1978; Asquith, 1983; 
Seth, 1990), pre-M&A literature largely concurs that value maximization is the major 
motive for firms' M&A decisions. 
Several researchers argue that if mergers do not create positive value during the post-
M&A period, this may be the result of integration or agency problems (Malatesta, 1983; 
Roll, 1986). In most cases, pre-merger motive is considered as a different construct than 
the reasons identified by researchers for unsuccessful M&As. Some meta-analytic 
reviews of post-M&A performance studies suggest that an extant investigation is limited 
to a subset of variables upon which researchers routinely rely, and other factors not 
specified in existing research may explain significant variances in post-acquisition 
· performance (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004). 
13 Appendix A gives some examples of press release with M&A participants' insiders' 
forecasts about synergistic benefits that they expect through mergers. 
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firm (Porter, 1985; Walter & Barney, 1990; Healy et al., 1992; Powell & Stark, 2005). 
Product market synergy stems from offering unique products and services through 
extending existing markets or through other competitive advantages, which enables the 
combined firms to increase their value (Srivastava et al., 1998; Weber, 1996). Managerial 
synergies are realized when either party involved in the M&A have managers with 
superior planning and strategic abilities that benefit the combined value of the firms 
during the post-M&A periods (Manne, 1965; Sudarsanam et al., 1996). In addition to 
these findings, several survey studies supplement the evidence that suggests that 
acquirers' primary motive for an M&A is to increase the combined firm value during the 
post-M&A periods (Mohan et al., 1991; Ingham et al., 1992; Mukherjee et al., 2003). 
Thus, it is accepted in the literature that value-maximization is the main motive behind 
firms' M&A decisions. 
2.2.2 Other Motives for M&As 
Value-maximization through synergistic benefits is considered to be the main 
reason for firms' M&A decisions; however, merger motives can be explained with other 
phenomena as well. One of the plausible reasons that explain acquisition phenomenon is 
the "managerial hubris hypothesis" (Roll, 1986; Morek et al., 1990; Walter & Barney, 
1990; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). According to this hubris hypothesis, managers in 
acquiring firms are prone to overconfidence, and they believe that they can manage the 
target more efficiently than the target's current management. The concept of "winner's 
curses" in this theory suggests that the manager with the most optimistic forecast wins the 
bidding process and pays too much of a premium for target (Roll, 1986; Hayward & 
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Hambrick, 1997; Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983; Mueller & Sirower, 2003). Another 
opportunistic managerial behavior behind M&A is explained by the "empire-building 
theory." According to this theory, mergers are executed to increase firm size in order to 
showcase an individual's or organization's power and influence. This type of acquisition 
maximizes managers' own-utility rather than firm-value or shareholders' benefits 
(Trautwein, 1990; Schoenberg & Reeves, 1999). 
Acquiring firm managers may also be involved in M&As to meet their personal or 
opportunistic goals. In this type of "agency-problem driven merger" (also known as 
"managerial discretion/entrancement hypothesis"), acquiring managers overpay their 
targets to complete the deal quickly; but the high premium, however, does not reflect an 
expected gain for the acquiring firms' shareholders (Mueller & Sirower, 2003; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989). All of these types of motives behind acquisitions are value-
destroying, rather than value-maximizing, for the acquiring firms. However, these 
acquisitions facilitate benefits to the targets, as targets are always overpaid and premiums 
are usually high. Opportunistic acquiring firm managers may prefer a high CSR-target, as 
acquisition· of a socially responsible firm may protect the reputationalloss they may face 
for pursuing a merger for their own benefits. 
2.3 CSR Performance and Strategic M&A Deals 
Although the M&A literature is vast and multidimensional and a significant 
volume of CSR literature is emerging, only a few studies attempt to bridge the research 
literature that addresses these important business trends. In a recent study, Deng et al. 
(2013) investigate whether CSR creates value for acquiring firms during the post-merger 
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period. They document that high-CSR acquirers realize higher announcement returns and 
higher long-term stock returns during the post-merger period. Hawn (2013) investigates 
the role of CSR in the international expansion of multinational firms through M&As. 
This study demonstrates that an acquirer's positive CSR leads to faster deal completion, 
thereby overcoming home country disadvantages. 
By using the environmental and social rating of the Intangible Value Assessment 
(IV A) score, Aktas et al. (2011) report that targets' CSR performance relates positively to 
an acquirer' s potential for gain. Their fmdings suggest that not only the stock market 
rewards the acquirer for making socially and environmentally responsible investments, 
but also acquirers' CSR performance increases following the acquisition of a socially and 
environmentally aware target. In another empirical study, Berchicci et al. (20 12) examine 
whether firms' environmental performance, a major dimension of CSR, influences their 
strategic decisions in M&As. By using the U.S. government's Toxic Release Inventory 
data, these researchers demonstrate that high-CSR acquirers are more likely to acquire 
targets with inferior CSR quality. 
W addock & Graves (2006) argue that acquiring firms have fewer CSR strengths 
and more concerns than their targets and therefore seek to improve their stakeholder-
related practices through M&A. Studies demonstrating links between CSR and M&A 
focus primarily on the role of the acquirers' CSR and the gains achieved by acquiring 
firms. In contrast, this study investigates the role of target firms' CSR on acquirers' 
strategic M&A decisions and argues that CSR adds value to target firms in the M&A 
market through higher acquisition premiums. 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 The Role of Targets' Aggregate CSR Performance on Acquisition Premiums 
Since the primary motive for an M&A is to increase value, a target firm with 
potential value-enhancing capabilities will attract an acquirer. Acquirers want to realize 
various synergistic benefits to increase the value of the combined firm in post-merger 
periods. Compared to low-CSR-targets, high-CSR-targets have greater potential to offer 
synergistic benefits through operational efficiencies, managerial skills, capital market 
· advantages, and product market competitiveness. Thus, superior CSR performance makes 
a target more attractive due to its greater value-enhancing synergistic capabilities, and an 
acquirer may be willing to pay more for such a fum. 
In a recent study, Harper (2013) finds that superior CSR performers are more 
likely to be targeted in the M&A market. Based on the resource-based view of CSR, the 
author argues that CSR performance is positively associated with the propensity of a firm 
to become an M&A target because of its value-creating capabilities. 14 According to this 
study, another possible explanation for the attractiveness of a high CSR performer in the 
M&A market is its undervaluation. 15 Undervaluation of a firm represents highly 
14 In accordance with the resource-based view of CSR, high-quality CSR practices 
provide non-substitutable competitive advantages and facilitate firms in enhancing value 
(Waddock & Graves, 2006). 
15 Harper (2013) identifies mixed CSR performance and the difficulties inherent in 
measuring mixed CSR as the main reasons for misvaluation. Mixed CSR quality means 
that firms are involved in social responsibility and social irresponsibility at the same time, 
as these are not mutually exclusive. For example, a firm may earn a good reputation by 
spending on employee benefits or promoting workforce diversity, but at the same time it 
may also be embroiled in a scandal involving environmental pollution. Thus, it is 
19 
beneficial acquisition opportunities for acquirers, and acquirers are more likely to pay 
high premiums to win those bids (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003; Dong et al., 2006). 16 
Prior research also suggests that the reason for misvaluation of CSR is investors' 
lack of understanding about the consequences of CSR effects. Investors may believe that 
while CSR involves ethics and social philanthropy, it does not create opportunity for risk 
reduction (Edmans, 2011 ). Acquirers, however, have a unique interest in collecting and 
assessing all sorts of information about a target firm's CSR because targets' poor CSR 
performance can lead to scrutiny and increased social and litigation risks in the post-
acquisition period. Anecdotal evidence shows that acquirers expend considerable effort 
and a great deal of money to quantify and evaluate information related to a target firm's 
CSR quality through extensive social and environmental due diligence (KPMG 2011). 
Professional white papers report that the trend toward considering CSR issues in M&A 
continues to gain momentum (Deloitte, 2009, 2010). Because they are concerned about 
possible for mixed CSR performance to mislead the market, and CSR qualities may not 
be correctly valued in a timely and effective manner. 
16 Another argument for the devaluation of high-CSR-firms is that CSR benefits are 
intangible and non-financial. Common CSR benefits include enhanced corporate 
branding, increased employee productivity, improved customer satisfaction, and 
sustainable firm reputation. However, the current accounting and financial reporting 
method fails to reflect the actual value of these intangibles (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). 
Researchers report that a time lag exists in reflecting the impacts of intangibles and 
nonfinancial measures in stock prices (Banker et al., 2000; Campbell, 2008). Therefore, 
the nonfinancial benefits of CSR performance may not concurrently be reflected in 
targets' market price. 
Prior research is still inconclusive and inconsistent while analyzing the market valuation 
of CSR performance (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Harrison & 
Freeman, 1999; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis & Walsh, 
2003). 
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the future environmental, social, and reputational risks, acquirers are more likely to 
incorporate targets' CSR performance into the deal price, and designate a higher value for 
targets with superior quality CSR performance. 
Researchers argue that the acquirers are always concerned about the post-M&A 
disruptive surprises. Therefore, while evaluating a target, acquirers not only focus on 
where the value will be created, but also identify what are the primary risks involved in a 
deal (Perry and Herd, 2004). Unlike the shareholders', acquirers' risk-reduction options 
are limited and costly.17 As a result, the acquirers are more likely to pay a higher price for 
the acquisition of a target that may appear to be less risky in the post-M&A period. Thus, 
acquiring a high-CSR target, and paying higher premiums for it can be a risk-mitigation 
plan for the acquirers. Paying higher premiums for a high-CSR target is not only for 
mitigating the future risks but also for reducing the potential litigation costs that may 
arise from targets' inferior social and environmental performance. Therefore, the 
acquisition of a high-CSR target at a higher premium is also expected to deliver future 
cost reduction strategy to an acquirer. 
The above anecdotal and theoretical discussion leads to the following hypothesis 
regarding the association between target firms' CSR performance and acquisition 
prennums: 
Hl: High-CSR-targets are more likely to receive greater acquisition premiums than low-
CSR-targets. 
17 For example, a shareholder can easily diversify her portfolio by investing in different 
stocks, and can liquidate any risky stock at a nominal cost. However, it is very expensive 
for an acquirer to divest a risky project, or liquidate any part of the business. 
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3.2 Targets' Component-Specific CSR Performance and Acquisition Premiums 
3.2.1 Target Firms' Environmental Performance and Acquisition Premiums 
CSR is a complex and multidimensional issue that involves the challenges of 
identifying and defining each dimension (Campbell, 2007; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; 
Roberts, 2003; Rowley & Berman, 2000). The analysis of corporate stand-alone CSR 
reports, press releases, surveys, financial statements, and business and regulatory reports 
focus on environmental issues, corporate governance, community involvement, employee 
relations, product attributes, and supply chain management-related issues. 
By using the MSCI ESG ST ATS data, in this study, I have estimated the CSR 
performance in these major areas: environment, community, diversity, employees, and 
products. In accordance with previous literature (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Kim et al., 
2012), I have calculated the net CSR score as companies' total strengths minus their total 
concerns in these five main social areas. However, all of these attributes of CSR may not 
be equally important during an acquisition. Since acquirers are mostly concerned about 
post-merger reputation and litigation risks, which arise from the targets' environmental 
disputes, they put the most priority on the targets' environmental performance. 
Environmental risks and reputation are always especially important to the media, 
business press, professionals, regulators, social workers, and activists. Researchers pay 
special attention to companies' environmental strategies, the quality of their 
environmental disclosures, and the various impacts on the companies' operational and 
financial issues (Ilinitch et al., 1998; Rupley et al., 2012; Cho et al., 2012; DesJardins, 
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1998; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Ingram & Frazier, 1983; Chan & Milne, 1999; 
Cho et al., 2010; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Wiseman, 1982). 
Environmental issues are also increasingly important to investors, consumers, and 
employees. For instance, a company's stock price suffers severely when it pays penalties 
due to its environmental violations (Min ow & Deal, 1991 ). Consumers will pay a 
premium of up to 50% for environmentally friendly products (Oliff & Vandermerwe, 
1990). Companies at a high environmental risk face difficulties in attracting competent 
personnel (Clark, 1990). The significant association between environmental performance 
and companies' operating performance is well documented in several studies (Spicer, 
1978, AI-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). 
Environmental management literature documents that companies' maJor 
environmental strategies are related to pollution control and prevention (Christmann, 
2000; Hart, 1995; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Russo & Fouts, 1997). These days, firms 
are more concerned about their carbon footprint and pollution prevention strategies as 
these are necessary to be in compliance. Due to these regulatory requirements, firms must 
maintain certain levels of environmental responsibilities. 18 To minimize their litigation 
18 The most common U.S. environmental regulation is the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), which is also known as the 
Superfund Act. The objective of CERCLA is to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste 
disposal sites and to hold parties responsible for the costs incurred during cleanup. The 
act created the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which 
provides the mechanisms for federal and state responses to the releases of toxic 
substances according to the Toxic Substances Control Act (ToSCA). 
The SEC requires listed companies to disclose the material effects that the compliance 
with environmental laws may have on their businesses. The Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) requires corporate reporting and disclosure 
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risks and reduce the pressure from social activists and the media, several companies, 
especially those in eco-sensitive industries such as large manufacturers of chemical and 
allied products, electric equipment, metal products, mining, oil, gas, petroleum refining, 
rubber and plastic products, appoint environmental consultants who determine whether 
these companies are complying with federal and state environmental acts. On this issue, 
the literature has examined the external forces that have influenced, or pressured, 
companies to adopt environmental management systems and practices (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Zondorak, 1991; Barney, 1991; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1995; Stead & Stead, 1995; Hart, 
1995; Shrivastava, 1995; Christmann, 2000; Florida & Davidson, 2001). 
Nowadays, acquirers consider Environmental Due Diligence (EDD) as an integral 
part of the merger transaction. 19 This special type of due diligence procedure helps the 
acquirers to identify the target firms' environmental attributes and to assess and 
incorporate those into the deal's value.20 In a recent survey, researchers interviewed the 
that provide useful information for public awareness when corporations are using 
hazardous chemicals in a community. The other environmental laws that companies have 
to comply with are the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Fungicide and Rodenticide (FIFRA), and 
others. 
19 In a recent interview, Peter Baty, project director at Sanborn & Associates Inc., an 
environmental consulting firm, cited the following: 
"Environmental due diligence in M&A has expanded beyond just looking for 
liabilities .... Today's dealmakers also see the potential for leveraging sustainability 
initiatives to increase value .... A buyer might not be able to negotiate the best possible 
purchase price for the business that they are buying. And a buyer might inadvertently 
acquire a major liability that could significantly alter the value of the business they have 
bought." 
20 Private equity perspective: Environmental due diligence creates opportunities. Flynn, 
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executives from the top 500 largest UK companies that have taken part in at least one 
M&A transaction in last three years. 21 In this survey, the majority of the companies 
recognized that environmental issues affect the basic rationale of these M&A 
transactions. 22 The respondents mentioned that EDDs can identify the situations where 
the target company's environmental performance might have a material impact on the 
acquirers ' brand and reputation. EDDs' outputs help the acquirers to assess the targets' 
environmental risks and to determine the ultimate value of the deal. EDDs not only 
identify environmental risk issues but also help to evaluate the environmental reputation, 
which affects the deal price positively. 23 The acquisition of a target firm with a superior 
quality environmental performance is a future cost-saving strategy as it reduces potential 
legal, environmental, and reputational risks. 
Mary Kathleen, Merger & Acquisition Report, 6/11/2012, Vol. 25 Issue 24, p. 3. 
21 Environmental due diligence: A survey of major UK companies 
http://www.kpmg.co.uk/pubs/208251.pdf 
22 The survey participants stated, for example: 
"Their safety records on environment and emission were worse than ours so, at the end, 
when the time comes to put the figures together, it was going to make our figures look 
too bad." 
"An acquisition was cancelled because it seemed too risky in the long term. An example 
ofthis would be the risk of endless scandal for our group." 
"Soil pollution was so high that we pulled out of the transaction." 
23 Several participants in KPMG UK survey mention that they found unexpected bonuses 
that made the deal more attractive. This is the case when the targets' environmental 
performance helped improve market demand, customer relationships, and social 
. reputation. 
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Thus it is expected that target's environmental quality will be positively related to 
the acquisition premium and, among all CSR attributes, the environmental attributes will 
have the strongest effect on premiums. Based on these theoretical and anecdotal 
discussions, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H2(a): Target firms' environmental performance is positively associated with acquisition 
premiums, and has the strongest effects on acquisition premiums relative to targets' other 
CSR attributes. 
3.2.2 Target Firms' Community Relations and Acquisition Premiums 
One of the CSR attributes in the MSCI ESG (previously known as KLD) database 
is firms' community engagement. In MSCI ESG, the community attribute is measured 
by focusing on corporations' charitable giving to their communities in support of 
housing, health care, education, and relieving hunger, as well as in the aftermath of 
natural disasters and their engagement in other innovative community programs. 
Prior research documents the value-increasing capacities of corporate 
philanthropic activities. Brown et al. (2006) document that firms' charitable giving to the 
communities enhances shareholders' value, and companies with more charitable practices 
are also more likely to receive positive media coverage and favorable treatment from the 
policymak:ers. Boatsman & Gupta (1996) argue that charitable contributions to 
communities go beyond what would be profit maximizing. Wang & Qian (20 11) argue 
and find that coi:porate philanthropic activity positively affects a firm's financial 
performance, because it helps the firms to gain sociopolitical legitimacy, producing more 
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positive responses from different stakeholders. Brammer & Millington (2005) 
documents that companies, which make higher philanthropic expenditures have better 
corporate reputations. In another study, Williams & Barrett (2000) show that corporate 
giving significantly moderates the negative link between corporate crimes and reputation. 
Godfrey (2005) strongly argues that corporate philanthropic engagements can 
generate positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders. Moral capital can 
provide shareholders with insurance-like protection for a firm's relationship-based 
intangible assets, and this protection contributes to shareholder wealth. However, several 
researchers fail to document any significant benefits of firms' giving and community 
engagement to firm value and reputation. For example, Seifert et al. (2004) state that 
firms' monetary donations to different community activities do not affect fmancial 
performance and firm reputation. Bartkus et al. (2002) provide evidence that active, 
powerful investors may perceive corporate giving as excessive and act to curtail it. 
Porter & Kramer (2002) discuss this haziness surrounding corporate philanthropic 
activities. They argue that the majority of corporate community contribution programs 
are diffuse and unfocused. Only a convergence of shareholders' and communities' 
interests can create competitive advantages and maximize social and economic benefits. 24 
Given the assumptions that targets' community contributions are well-tied to 
corporate objectives, rather than for executives' opportunistic benefits, it appears that 
firms' superior quality and strategic community engagement through philanthropic 
24 Porter and Kramer (2002) also mention that rather than being tied to well-thought-out 
social and business objectives, community contributions often reflect the personal 
benefits oftop executives. 
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activities have the potential to increase firm value, in addition to providing social 
benefits. As discussed earlier that acquirers pay premiums for targets' value-enhancing 
capabilities, a target firm with high-quality community attributes will make itself 
attractive to the acquirers through its community relation-related value-increasing 
· capabilities, and acquirers will pay high premiums for it. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
H2(b): Target firms' perceived quality of community relationship is positively associated 
with acquisition premiums paid by the acquirers. 
3.2.3 Target Firms' Diversity Quality and Acquisition Premiums 
Several researchers focus on diversity and its impact on firm value and 
performance (Richard, 2000; Carteret al. 2003; Roberson and Park, 2007). In this study, 
target firms' diversity quality is measured by using the MSCI ESG's diversity ratings 
criteria. The most common criteria to quantify firms' diversity are based on engaging 
and promoting women, minorities, underrepresented groups in their workforce, as well as 
representation of women and minorities on the board, with adjustment for nation-specific 
demographic conditions, and purchasing or contracting with women- and/or minority-
owned businesses. Extant literature firmly documents the positive effects of employee 
diversity and board diversity on firm value, operating performance, and reputation. 
Carter et al., (2003), Nguyen and Faff, (2007) and Bear et al. (2010) find 
significant positive relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the 
board and firm value. Diversity improves the quality of the board monitoring process. 
Erhardt et al. (2003) shows that board diversity improves firms' operating (return on 
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assets) and investment (return on investments) performance. Miller & Triana (2009) 
document a positive relationship between the boards' racial diversity and both finn 
reputation and innovation. 
Not only board diversity but also work force diversity impacts firm value and 
reputation. Using a resource-based framework, Richard (2000) documents that cultural 
and racial diversity in the work force improves firms' productivity, return on equity, and 
market performance. Overall, his research suggests that diversity does in fact add value 
and contributes to a firm's competitive advantage. Focusing on corporate leaders' racial 
diversity, Roberson & Park (2007) show a positive relationship between diversity 
reputation and revenues, net income, and book-to-market equity. Their analyses also 
suggest that economic benefits generated from diversity reputation may primarily derive 
from capital rather than product markets. In a survey study, Ostergaard et al. (20 11) 
reveal a positive relation between employee diversity in education and gender on the 
likelihood of firms' introducing an innovation. 
Overall, diversity has value-increasing impacts. A target that is more diversified 
(in terms of employee and board), compared with a less diversified one, have the quality 
to earn a better social reputation and higher economic performance. Thus a highly-
diversified target should be more attractive to the acquirers for its value-enhancing 
capabilities, and acquirers may pay higher premiums to acquirer a target of that quality. 
The above possibilities result in the following hypothesis: 
H2(C): Target firms' perceived diversity quality is positively associated with acquisition 
premiums paid by the acquirers. 
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3.2.4 Target Firms' Employee Relations and Acquisition Premiums 
The quality of employee relations can be measured by considering uruon 
strengths, firms' profit-sharing policies and employees' health and safety issues, 
according to MSCI ESG rating criteria. Superior-quality employee attributes can result in 
several employee benefits (Tuzzolino & Armandi, 1981; Trevino & Nelson, 2004; 
Valentine & Fleischman, 2008). Researchers have documented that firms' ethical 
employee practices improve employee morale (Solomon and Hanson, 1985). Various 
employee benefits, such as meeting labor union demands, providing better health care 
and retirement benefits, and paying wages above the market level, help to increase 
employee productivity. This in turn helps a firm build a reputation as a good employer, 
which attracts better talent and motivates personnel (Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Edmans, 
2011). Improved employee productivity, job satisfaction, and employee motivation lead 
to better operating performance (Banker and Mashruwala, 2007). Thus, a target firm's 
superior employee relationship can play a significant role in increasing its profit- and 
value-enhancing capabilities, which ultimately should affect deal price positively. 
One major indicator of high-quality employee attributes in the MSCI ESG 
database is the labor union relationship and union strengths. Labor economics literature 
documents that shareholders' risks decline with the strength of labor unions, and that 
ultimately should have favorable impact on firm value (Hirsch and Morgan, 1994). 
Becker ( 1996) fmds that, during the acquisition boom of the 1980s, the average returns 
from takeover activities were higher in unionized target firms than in nonunionized target 
firms. He argues that the substantial gains enjoyed by the shareholders of a unionized 
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target firm are due to the wage premmms and constraints on managerial authority. 
Accordingly, these findings imply that labor union strength increases a targets' 
bargaining power, which could result in higher acquisition premiums. 
However, it is also possible that meeting targets' (strongly) unionized labor 
demands, along with potential fear about the cost of disagreements with labor unions in 
the post-M&A period, may make a target less attractive, specifically to less- or non-
unionized acquirers. As a result, acquirers may look for less unionized targets and 
discount targets' labor-union strengths. These aforementioned discussions result in the 
following hypothesis: 
H2(d): Target firms' perceived employee relationship 1s positively associated with 
acquisition premiums paid by the acquirers. 
3.2.5 Target Firms' Product Attributes and Acquisition Premiums 
As mentioned in MSCI ESG product rating criteria, product quality is captured by 
focusing on a firm's efforts to improve the safety and health effects of its products and 
services, marketing ethics, antitrust business practices and consumer relationships. Prior 
research has discussed different product attributers and their various capital market and 
product market impacts (Murray & Vogel, 1997; Brown & Dacin, 1997; Ogden & 
Watson, 1999; Manaktola & Jauhari, 2007; Singh et al., 2008). 
Extant literature document that consumers are willing to pay a high price for 
environment-friendly products (Oliff & Vandermerwe, 1990; Roe et al. 2001; Ferraro et 
al. 2005). Superior-quality product attributes also enable a firm to expand its product 
market, differentiate a product from its competitors, and build unique brand reputation 
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(Menon & Kahn, 2003; Bloom et al., 2006). Brand equity ·and improved customer 
satisfaction driven by environment-friendly, safe and healthy product initiatives give 
competitive benefits to the firms, which results in increased sales as well as increased 
profitability (Brown & Dacin, 1997; Lev et al., 2010). Thus, product quality, through its 
different competitive advantages, can play a significant role in increasing a target's 
attractiveness in the M&A market. Compared with a target that offers inferior-quality 
products or services, a target that offers superior-quality products or services has greater 
value-enhancing capabilities. Therefore, acquirers will be willing to pay higher premiums 
for targets that offer superior products or services as these targets have a higher potential 
for value maximization in the post-M&A period. Based on these discussions, I develop 
the following hypothesis: 
H2(e): Target firms' perceived product quality is positively associated with acquisition 
premiums paid by the acquirers. 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
I begin my data collection with the M&A information from the Thomson 
Financial's Securities Data Commission (SDC) Platinum© database. I focus on the deals 
from 1992 to 20 13. Sample deals are restricted to both the acquirers and target firms that 
are publicly traded in the United States. This sample excludes the deals that do not 
disclose their value. The initial sample consists of 5,932 public deals in the United States. 
I then collect the CSR information from the MSCI ESG STATS, which compiles the U.S. 
public companies' CSR data beginning in 1991. I restrict the sample deals to the targets 
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and the acquiring firms that have their CSR information on the MSCI ESG database, 
which results in a significant reduction in my sample size. After matching the MSCI ESG 
STATS data with the 5,932 M&A deals, I have to exclude 5,374 deals due to the 
unavailability of their CSR information. 
Next I collect fmancial statement variables and stock price information from the 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases, respectively. I exclude 18 more deals due to the 
unavailability of the financial and stock price information and another 121 deals due to 
the unavailability ofthe required M&A-related information. These exclusions result in a 
final sample of 419 deals. In my sample, I do not exclude the deals in the fmancial and 
regulated industries due to the small size of my sample. Table 1 summarizes the sample 
selection procedure of this study. 
4.2 Variable Definition 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
[Table 1] 
I estimate the acquisition premiums, which is the dependent variable of my study, 
by using two measures. The first measure is the acquisition price per share to the target's 
stock price per share (Cheng & Chan, 1995; Raad 2012). The second measure is the 
acquisition price per share to the target's book value per share (Shawky et al., 1996; 
Henderson & Gart, 1999). Studies that investigate the determinants of the premiums 
invariably use one of these two commonly accepted measures. One challenge in the first 
measure is to select a date to consider the target's stock price. This price should be far 
from the M&A announcement so that the price is not contaminated with the M&A rumor. 
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On the other hand, the stock price should be close enough to the announcement date so 
that it reflects a more precise and timely valuation, which has a bearing on the proposed 
transaction.25 Following Ayers et al. (2003) and Cotter et al. (1997), I consider the 
targets' stock prices 30 days prior to the first announcement. 
4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Prior literature identifies several economic factors that determine the acquisition 
premiums. These factors include the targets' and the acquirers' fmn-specific criteria. 
Therefore, in addition to the variable of interest, which is the targets' CSR quality, I 
consider four groups of control variables: (1) target-specific criteria, (b) acquirer-specific 
criteria, (c) deal-specific criteria, and (4) other controls. 
4.2.2.1 Measures of CSR Performance 
Researchers fmd it challenging to define the construct of CSR (Ramanathan, 
1976; Wiseman, 1982; Wood & Jones, 1995; Ilinitch et al., 1998; McWilliams et al., 
2006; Barnett, 2007). Some researchers consider CSR as a function of a fmn's behavior 
toward its different stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, regulators, employees, 
investors, and communities (Cooper, 2004; Campbell, 2007). Another group of 
researchers defmes CSR as the companies' discretionary activities, which include social, 
political, environmental, economic, and ethical actions (Carroll, 1999; Devinney, 2009).26 
25 There is no consensus regarding the time consideration for selecting the targets' stock 
prices. Analysis from several M&A studies reveals that the timing varies from .two days 
(Wickramanayake & Wood, 2009) to three months (Nielsen & Melicher, 1973) prior to 
the first takeover announcement. 
26 Carroll (1999) discusses the ambiguity and evolution of the definition ofCSR: 
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Given the challenges of defining CSR, empirical researchers seek to quantify 
relevant categories that may help to build a link between CSR and its outcomes. 
Researchers conduct surveys to measure CSR performance (Hung, 2011). But the surveys 
have problems due to the low return rate and inconsistencies among the raters. 
Researchers also perform content analysis of firms' 10-Ks or stand-alone CSR reports 
(Abbott & Monsenn, 1979; Webb et al., 2009). However, this may not produce 
comparable information across firms due to the inconsistent contents of CSR information 
in those disclosures. Researchers also conduct experiments or field studies (W okutch & 
McKinney, 1991; O'Dwyer, 2011). However, these methods could suffer from a lack of 
generalizability and participant biases. 
CSR should be measured uniformly and consistently across a wide range of firms. 
The MSCI ESG ST ATS provides a good opportunity to make these measurements. Based 
on an extensive analysis of surveys, financial statements, CSR reports, business press, 
and government reports, MSCI ESG provides CSR information for 3,000 U.S. public 
firms that account for 98% of the total market value of the U.S. public firms. Several 
numbers of scholarly works, in a variety of academic fields (including fmance, 
economics, management, accounting, law, ethics, and sociology) have used the MSCI 
ESG data (Turban & Greening, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Cai et al., 2011; Padgett 
"The term [social responsibility] is a brilliant one; it means something, but not always the 
same thing, to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or liability; 
to others, it means socially responsible behavior in an ethical sense; to still others, the 
meaning transmitted is that of "responsible for," in a causal mode; many simply equate it 
with a charitable contribution; some take it to mean socially conscious; many of those 
who embrace it most fervently see it as a mere synonym for "legitimacy," in the context 
of "belonging" or being proper or valid; a few see it as a sort of fiduciary duty imposing 
higher standards ofbehavior on businessmen than on citizens at large." 
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& Galan, 2010; Huseynov & Klamm, 2011; Bird & Smucker, 2007). Researchers 
consider MSCI ESG as the most influential database of firms' social and environmental 
activities (Szwajkowski & Figlewicz, 1999; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Chatterji et al., 
2009; Barnea & Rubin, 2010). 
MSCI ESG assesses different CSR issues by rating them as either "strengths" or 
"concerns."27 The major CSR dimensions in the MSCI ESG database are corporate 
governance, community relations, diversity, employee relations, environment, and 
product. By following the literature (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Johnson & Greening, 
1999; Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Linthicum et al., 2010), for each firm, I construct a net 
CSR score that indicates the total strengths minus the total concerns in the five main 
social rating areas within MSCI ESG database: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product.28 I exclude corporate governance, since it is perceived as a 
different construct in the literature, as suggested by Kim et al. (2012). 
27 MSCI ESG STATS is an annual data set of environmental [E], social [S], and 
governance [G] ratings of the largest 3,000 publicly traded U.S. companies. MSCI ESG 
covers approximately 80 indicators in seven major areas: community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product. 
MSCI ESG also provides exclusionary screening information for involvement in the 
following controversial business issues: alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear 
power, and tobacco. 
The qualitative indicators include positive and negative ratings (strengths and concerns), 
while the controversial business indicators include only the negative ratings. The data 
presented in the MSCI ESG is a binary summary of the positive and negative ratings 
within the MSCI ESG. In each case, if the MSCI ESG assigned a rating in a particular 
issue (either positive or negative), then the MSCI ESG indicates this with a 1 in the 
corresponding cell. If the company did not have a strength or concern in that issue, this is 
indicated with a 0 (MSCI ESG STATS Research & Analytics, Inc. 2006). 
28 Please see Appendix B for the detailed of the MSCI ESG rating attributes in the five 
social areas: environment, community, diversity, employees, and product. 
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In this study, I use four measures of CSR scores: (1) the target firm's most recent 
net CSR score reported prior to the merger announcement, (2) the average of the target 
firm's net CSR score for the two years prior to the announcement, (3) changes in target 
firms' CSR score prior to the M&A announcement, and (4) target firms' industry-
adjusted (industry is defined by a one-digit SIC code) net CSR score prior to the merger 
announcement. According to Hr, I predict a positive association between target firms ' net 
CSR scores and their acquisition premium. 
4.2.2.2 Target-Specific Factors 
In this study, I consider vanous target-specific factors that are commonly 
recognized as the determinants of the acquisition premium in the M&A literature. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the target's size is related to its acquisition premium. A 
big target potentially has significant product market share and more propensities to have 
greater value. The high value at stake associated with buying large firms can result in a 
higher offer price. A big target also has stronger negotiation power, which may enable it 
to extract a greater price from the acquirers. However, the unobserved complexity 
inherent in the large targets makes the acquisition and integration process more difficult, 
which could make the expected synergies from the combined firms more uncertain 
(Alexandridis et al. , 2012). Also, it is more likely that acquirers will experience losses 
when they buy large targets (Loderer & Martin, 1992; Moeller et al., 2004). Due to these 
conflicting arguments, I do not make any specific conjectures regarding the association 
between target firms' size and acquisition premium. 
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Target firms' leverage ratio also influences the offer price. Low-leveraged targets 
increase the debt capacity of the combined firm in post-merger periods. Prior research 
finds that value-maximizing bidders are willing to pay more for low-leveraged targets 
(Kim & McConnell, 1977; Raad, 2012). Accordingly, I predict a negative association 
between the acquisition premium and the targets' leverage. 
The targets' financial condition is a significant factor that influences the M&A 
deals. Profitable targets are attractive, and so the acquirers are willing to pay more for 
them (Shawver, 2002). However, the targets' poor operating performances, which 
represent inefficient managements, can also make firms attractive to the acquirers 
(Palepu, 1986). The managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that inefficiently managed 
targets are more likely to do better in post-merger periods. Though there are two 
competing views regarding the association between targets' operating performance 
(profitability) and acquisition premium, I predict a positive association between them. 
High-growth targets have better capabilities to generate larger synergistic 
benefits. I consider the target firms' growth variable as another control variable, and 
based on the fmdings in prior literature (Rhoades, 1987), I predict a positive association 
between acquisition premiums and the targets' growth. 
4.2.2.3 Acquirer-Specific Factors 
To avoid the effects of correlated omitted variables, I also consider several 
acquirer-specific factors, such as the acquirer's size. Large acquirers may have greater 
bargaining power to offer a lower price. However, it is also possible that large acquirers 
have more resources to pay more. Large acquirers make overpayments since empire 
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building (the tendency of a manager attempting to increase the size and scope to show 
greater power and influence) and managerial hubris (the bidding firm managers' 
overconfidence that they could manage the target firm more efficiently than the targets' 
current management) are more common for larger firms (Moeller et al., 2004; 
Alexandridis et al., 2012). To control for these potential effects, I consider the acquirer's 
size as another explanatory variable and predict that positive relationship exists between 
acquisition premium and acquirer size. 
Another acquirer-specific characteristics that can affect acquisition premium is 
the acquirer's current profitability. If an acquirer is profitable, which could result in large 
amount of free cash flow for the acquirer, then the bidder has a tendency to pay a high 
premium. Researchers document that the acquiring firms' recent operating performance 
(prior to acquisition) influence managerial hubris positively and that increases the 
acquisition premium as well (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). In this study, I predict a 
positive association between the acquisition premium and the acquirer's profitability. 
In addition, I consider the acquirer's growth as a significant factor that can 
influence the acquisition premium. If an acquirer is at its early growth stage and has lots 
of scope to grow by itself, then the acquisition may not be an attractive option for it. As a 
result, the acquirer would be willing to pay a lower premium in any case it entered into 
the M&A market. On the other hand, an acquirer at its maturated or declining stage may 
be willing to pay a high premium as the acquisition would serve as an excellent 
opportunity for it to expand the market as well as its operational scope. However, I have 
no prior regarding the association between acquirer's growth and acquisition premium. 
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I consider the acquirer's CSR performance as another control variable. Wealth-
distribution theory in the M&A literature suggests that firms with any type of superior 
quality are more likely to acquire targets with inferior capabilities of that quality so that 
the acquirer can transfer their capabilities to the inferior target and can extract the 
complementary benefits from the target in post-M&A periods. According to this theory, 
acquirers with high-CSR performance may look for targets that can best benefit from the 
transfer ofthe acquirer's capabilities (Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Berchicci et al., 2012). 
However, ethical and cultural matching theory suggests that high-CSR-acquirers will 
prefer acquiring a high-CSR-target, since the ethical and cultural alignment and similar 
type of social risk perception will make the acquisition process smoother (Deng et al., 
2013). Because of these two different arguments (wealth -distribution theory and ethical-
matching theory), I do not have any prediction regarding the association between the 
acquisition premiums and the acquirer' s CSR quality. 
4.2.2.4 Deal-Specific Factors 
One common motive for M&A is diversification, which reduces acquirers' 
operating risks, and the acquirers are more likely to pay a higher premium for intra-
industry mergers (Officer, 2003). Therefore, I control for the diversification motive. I 
predict a positive association between diversification motives and acquisition premiums. 
The medium of payment has effects on M&A deals. According to the bidder-
overvaluation hypothesis, if the bidder's stock is overvalued (undervalued), then it is 
more likely to offer a stock-fmanced (cash-financed) acquisition (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
The market may consider stock fmancing as a negative signal. To overcome this effect, 
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the acquirer offers a higher premium during the stock-financed transaction. However, 
prior research also documents that the acquisition premium is greater if the takeover is 
financed with cash (Huang & Walkling, 1987; Savor & Lu, 2009). According to the 
differential-tax-implication hypothesis, cash financing results in immediate capital-gain 
tax implications for the target's shareholders. To offset the target shareholders' tax 
burden, the acquirer offers a higher premium during a cash purchase (Brown & Ryngaert, 
1991). Cash acquisition also gives tax benefits to the acquirer. Cash offers allow the 
acquirer to record the acquired assets at market value, which increases depreciation tax 
shields (Hansen, 1987; Shawky et al., 1996). However, there is no tax benefit associated 
with stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson & Wang, 2007). Therefore, it is more likely 
that, if the bidder's offer is in cash, the acquisition premium will be relatively higher. In 
spite of the conflicting views (bidder-overvaluation and differential tax-implication 
hypothesis), I expect a positive association between a cash payment and the acquisition 
premium, as suggested by the tax-implication hypothesis. 
Takeover hostility affects M&A deals (Jennings & Mazzeo, 1993). If a target fum 
rejects a takeover offer, the acquirer has to pay more to make the target's stockholders 
accept the offer (Schwert, 2000). I predict a positive association between the acquisition 
premium and hostility between the target and the acquirer. 
It is documented that competing bids significantly affect the acquisition premium 
(Bradley et al., 1988; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989). I control for the effects of the number of 
bidders in the deals on the acquisition premium. My prediction is that the acquisition 
premium will be increasing with the number ofbidder involved in a deal. 
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4.2.2.5 Other Macro-Economic Controls 
In addition to the aforementioned criteria of the M&A participants, 
macroeconomic factors and industry-specific characteristics can also explain the 
variability in the acquisition premium. Prior research documents that merger waves exist 
and the waves cluster within industries (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). In my analysis, I 
control for merger-wave years, acquirers' industry effects, and year fixed effects. 
4.3 Empirical Model Specifications 
4.3.1 Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 1 
To investigate the first hypothesis of this study, I estimate the following cross-
sectional multiple regression model:29 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_CSR + {31 T_Size + {32 T_Leverage + {33 T_ROA + 
{34 T _Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA + {37 A_ Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + 
{310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave + LYj Year_Dummy + 
L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et (1) 
Acq_Premium is the scaled acquisition premium per share paid by the acquirer 
to a target firm. It is scaled first by the target's stock price per share 30 days prior to the 
first formal M&A announcement (Acq_Price_ to_MV), and alternatively by the target's 
book value per share (Acq_Price_ to_BV). The interest variable of this model is T _CSR, 
the estimated net CSR scores (total strengths minus total concerns in five CSR areas: 
environment, community, diversity, employees, and product) for the target firms. 
According to my first hypothesis, I expect a significant positive sign for a 1 . 
29 Please see Appendix B and Appendix C for the definitions and estimations of variables. 
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T _Size (natural logarithm of targets' market value of equity) controls for the 
effects of target size. T _Leverage (target firms' total liabilities divided by target firms' 
total assets), T _ROA (target firms' net income divided by target firms' total assets), and 
T_Growth (target firms' market to book ratio) are used to proxy for targets' unused debt 
capacity, profitability (managerial efficiency), and growth potential, respectively. I 
predict positive signs for ~4 and ~ 5 and a negative sign for ~2 . However, I do not make 
predictions for ~1 . All financial variables and CSR scores are selected from target firms' 
most recently reported (prior to the M&A announcements) .fmancial statements and 
MSCI ESG database. 
To minimize the acquirer-specific effects on acquisition premium, I include 
A_Size (natural logarithm of acquirers' market value of equity), A_ROA (acquirers' net 
income divided by acquirers' total assets), A_Growth (acquirers' market to book ratio), 
and A_CSR (acquirers' estimated net CSR score) in the model. I predict a positive sign 
for ~5 and ~6 and no specific sign for ~7 and ~8 . Acquirer-specific variables are collected 
from acquirers' most recently reported, prior to the acquisition announcements, financial 
statements, and MSCI ESG database. 
Motive (a value of one, if the acquirer has diversification motive, specifically, if 
the acquirer and the target have different 2-digit SIC codes, and zero otherwise) controls 
for the effects of the acquirers' diversification intentions. I expect a positive sign for ~9 • 
In order to control for the potential influences of payment methods and a hostile takeover 
on acquisition premium, I include two other deal-specific variables in the model. These 
are Pay_Method (a value of one, ifit is a cash-fmanced acquisition and zero otherwise) 
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and Hostile (a value of one, ifit is hostile takeover and zero otherwise). The predictions 
for both ~10 and ~11 are positive. The variable Comp_Bid (natural logarithm of number 
of bidders) controls the effects of competitive bidding on the acquisition premium. I 
expect ~12 to be positive. 
In addition to the above mentioned control variables, I include Wave (four-year 
indicator variables for 1997 to 2000 and 2005 to 2008) to minimize the influences of 
economy and world-wide merger waves on acquisition premium, as in Schwert (2000). 
The expected sign for ~13 is positive. In addition, L Yj Year _Dummies and 
LYj lndustry_Dummies (acquirer's one-digit SIC code) are considered to control for 
other potential industry and macro-economic effects. Appendix C offers a summary of 
the variable definitions, predicted relationship, and the data sources used for this study. 
4.3.2 Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 2 
To test hypotheses H2 (a) to H2 (e), I estimate the following cross-sectional 
multiple regression model: 
Acq_Premium = a 0 + a 1 T _Community + a 2 T _Diversity + a 3 T _Employee + 
a 4 T _Environment + a 5 T _Product + {31 T _Size + {32 T _Leverage + {33 T _ROA + 
{34 T _Growth+ {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA + {37 A_ Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + 
{310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + /312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave + LYi Year_Dummy + 
L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et (2) 
In this model, instead of taking target firms' net aggregated CSR scores, I 
consider the decomposed scores of targets' different CSR attributes (net scores in each of 
44 
these five areas: environment, community, diversity, product, and employee). 
T _Community is net CSR scores in community attributes of a target firm (total strengths 
minus total concerns in the community rating area). T _Diversity, T _Employees, 
T _Environment and T _Product are the net scores (total strengths minus total concerns) 
in targets' diversity, employees, environment and product related attributes. All other 
control variables remain same as those are in modell. According to H2 (a), I predict that 
a 4 will be significantly positive, and (statistically and economically) greater than a 1 , a 2 , 
a3 , and as. Based on H2 (b), (c), (d) and (e), I expect significant positive signs for a11 
a 2 , a3 , and as,. However, for a 3 , I predict a significant positive coefficient, recognized 
earlier that there are reasons to have negative sign as well. 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Sample Distribution 
Table 2 presents the sample distribution by year, and by industry as defmed by 
two-digit SIC codes. Panel A in Table 2 shows the number of sample deals per year. The 
first half of the sample period (from 1992 to 2001) represents less than 20% of the 
distribution. This small representation is due to the unavailability of the target firms' CSR 
data in the MSCI ESG database. From 1991 to 2000, the MSCI ESG covers the social 
rating information only for the S&P 500 firms and firms in the MSCI ESG Social Index 
(previously known as the Domini 400 Social Index). It is less likely for a large public 
firm to be a target. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect fewer numbers of deals in the 
earlier periods. Most of the target firms from 1991 to 2001 are social index firms. The 
second half of the sample period (from 2002 to 2013) covers more than 80% of the deal 
45 
observations. In 2011, the MSCI ESG starts reporting the CSR rating for the 1,000 largest 
U.S. public companies and later expands its coverage by including 3,000 U.S. public 
companies. Thus the CSR data availability of the target firms in the MSCI ESG database 
helps increase the observations in later periods. Consistent with the merger-wave trend 
from 1997 to 2000, and from 2006 to 2008, I observe relative increases in the number of 
deals for these periods. 
Panel B in Table 2 reports the sample distribution based on the targets' industries, 
as defined by two-digit SIC codes. The most heavily represented industry is 
manufacturing (33.65%, SIC codes 20-39), followed by fmance, insurance, and real 
estate (27.68%, SIC codes 60-67), services (14.08%, SIC codes 70-89) and 
transportation, communication, and utility (12.17%, SIC codes 40-49). Consistent with 
the targets' industry composition, in Panel C, I observe manufacturing (33.17%) as the 
largest sector for the acquirers, followed by finance, insurance, and real estate (22.91 %). 
However, the acquirer-industry breakdown shows transportation and public utility as the 
third-largest sector (15.99%), followed by services (13.13%). The observed differences 
between the target firms' and the acquirers' industry composition is due to the 
diversification motive of M&A. 
Panel D comparers between the sample target firms and the Compustat universal 
firms. Sample target firms are fmancially healthier firms than the average Compustat 
firms. Sample target firms are comparatively larger, less leveraged, more profitable and 
more growth oriented than the average firms. 
[Table 2] 
46 
5.2 Univariate Analysis 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1.1 Target Firms' Aggregate and Component-Specific CSR Scores 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the target firms' different measures 
for CSR performance. Panel A reveals the information about T_CSR (targets' latest net 
CSR score prior to the acquisition), and T_Average_CSR (the average of the target firms' 
CSR score for the past two years prior to the acquisition). The mean value of T_CSR and 
T_Average_CSR are 0.003 and -0.035, respectively. The difference between these two 
means implies that firms' CSR performance is not static. Standard deviations for T _ CSR 
and T_Average_CSR are 2.012 and 2.061. CSR scores can vary from -8 to 11. Both 
measures of the targets' CSR quality have a 0 median. Overall, both measures for CSR 
performance show a similar pattern of distribution. 
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for the decomposed scores. The target 
firms have positive means for T_Community and T_Diversity (0.134 and 0.263), whereas 
the other CSR attributes show negative mean values. T _Diversity has the largest standard 
deviation among the five CSR attributes, and the T_Environment score had the largest 
range from -5 to 5. Panel C reports the year-wise mean distribution of the decomposed 
CSR scores. T _Community and T _Diversity have positive scores for most of the periods, 
but the other attributes (employee, environment, and product) have mostly negative 
scores throughout all sample periods. 
Panel D provides industry-wise (2-dig SIC) distributions of the decomposed CSR 
scores. In Panel D (a), the net CSR scores, T_ CSR, are negative for all industries, except 
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wholesale and retail trade, and the financial industry. Consistent with the component-
wise means for the whole sample, industry-specific means show an overall positive 
performance for community and diversity attributes and a negative performance for 
employee, environment, and product attributes. 
A closer look at the mean values in Panel D (a) shows that the performance of 
different CSR attributes may depend on industry-specific criteria. For example, the 
environmental performance (T_Environment) for the mining, manufacturing, and 
transportation industries, which are more prone to the risks of environmental hazards and 
pollution, is much worse than that for the wholesale, finance, and service industries.30 
The score for T _Community is positive for all industries, except the mining industry (SIC 
codes from 10 to 14), which includes coal, oil, gas, metallic and nonmetallic explorations 
and well drilling and mining operations. These types of entities are more likely to be 
involved in community conflicts. Mining companies need to overcome the widespread 
hurdles of the active pressure from local communities to integrate more sustainable 
practices into their operations (Gunningham et al., 2004). For each mining project, the 
entity must obtain a Social License to Operate (SLO), in addition to its normal regulatory 
permits.31 Observations from Panel D (a) also show that the mean scores for T_CSR and 
30 Panel D (a) also shows that the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries have a high 
negative T_Environment score (-0.50). Though this sector is not exposed to high 
environmental risks, this negative score could be the result of a selection bias from the 
small number of sample observations in that sector. 
31 The Social License to Operate (SLO) refers to the acceptance within local communities 
of both mining companies and their projects. Social acceptance is granted by the 
stakeholders that are or can be affected by mining projects (e.g., Io'cal communities, 
indigenous people) and other groups of interests (e.g., local governments, NGOs) 
(Boutilier & Thomson, 2009). An SLO is based on the degree to which a corporation and 
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T_Environment across industries are same in terms of their (negative or positive) signs. 
This implies that T _Environment could have the strongest influence on the overall CSR 
performance of a target. Panel D (b) reports that the manufacturing, wholesale, and 
transportation industries have the largest variations in terms of their CSR performance. 
The standard deviations for these three industries are 2.459, 2.425, and 2.081, 
respectively. The ranges for the T_ CSR scores in these industries are -5 to 10, -4 to 9, and 
-6 to 7, respectively. 
Panel E shows the distributions of the component and industry-wise CSR scores 
for the entire firm-year observations (31,489) in the MSCI ESG database. A comparison 
between Panel D and Panel E reveals that the means values of different CSR components 
for the sample target firms used in this study are, overall, greater than the universal firms 
in MSCI ESG database. This is consistent with the findings documented in Harper (2013) 
that firms with high-quality CSR performance are more likely to ~e a target in M&A 
markets. Panels D and E also show that both the sample target firms and the universal 
firms have similar patterns for mean-distributions across CSR attributes and industries. 
[Table 3] 
5.2.1.2 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Table 4 presents the summary statistic of the all variables for the full sample 
(n=419). I winsorize the dependent variables and the financial variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their distributions. The mean value of the first proxy for the acquisition 
its activities meet the expectations of local communities, the wider society, and various 
constituent groups (Gunningham et al., 2004). 
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premium, Acq_Price _ to_ MV, is 1.438, which implies that, on average, the acquirers are 
willing to pay 40% more than the market price of the target. The mean value for the 
second proxy, Acq_Price_ to_BV, is 4.156. The standard deviations for the two proxies 
for acquisition premiums, Acq_Price_ to_MV and Acq_Price_ to_BV, are 1.833 and 
11.739, respectively. 
Acq_Price_ to_BV is more likely to be a noisy proxy for measUring acquisition 
premiums as the book value of a firm contains lots of distortion. For example, the book 
value could be negative or it may under-represent the true economic value of a firm due 
to historical cost accounting. In spite of its noisiness, the acquisition premium estimated 
on the basis on book value is widely used in the literature measure (Shawky et al., 1996; 
Henderson & Gart, 1999). Book value could be considered as the floor price that an 
acquirer may ask for when purchasing a target. 
In terms of size, acquirers are, on average, larger than their targets. The mean 
values of T_Size and A_Size are 8.350 and 10.254, respectively. In terms of CSR 
performance, acquirers are doing better and are more heterogeneous than the target firm 
group. The mean values ofT_ CSR and A_ CSR are 0.003 and 0.950, respectively, and the 
standard deviations are 2.012 and 3.163, respectively. However, both acquirers and 
targets have 0 as their median value of CSR performance. Table 4 also reports that the 
targets are less profitable than the acquirers (T_ROA = 0.018 and A_ROA = 0.038), but 
the growth rates are higher for the target firm than for the acquiring firms ( T _Growth = 
3.055 and A_ Growth= 1.297). 
[Table 4] 
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5.2.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 reports the Pearson correlation matrix. Panel A in Table 5 shows the 
correlation coefficients among the different CSR attributes. All CSR attributes are highly 
and significantly (statistical significances are less than 0.001) correlated with each other. 
Most of these univariate associations are positive. However, the targets' perceived 
product quality is negatively related with its community, diversity, and employee 
attributes. The correlation between T_Diversity and T_Employee is negative as well. 
Panel B presents the correlation coefficients among all key variables. Consistent 
with H1, both proxies for acquisition premiums, Acq_Price_ to_MV and Acq_Price_ 
to_BV, are significantly and positively correlated with the T_CSR; correlations of 0.113 
and 0.221, respectively. T_Size is significantly and positively related with both proxies 
for the acquisition premiums, and the correlations are 0.101 and 0.163, respectively. A 
significant positive correlation is also observed between T_CSR and A_CSR (0.067). 
T_CSR is significantly and negatively correlated with T_!..everage (-0.091). Previous 
literature documents that large firms are more likely to have superior quality CSR 
performance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Brammer & Millington, 2005; Udayasankar, 
2008). This fmding is also profound in Table 5 Panel B. The correlation coefficient 
between T_CSR and T_Size is 0.153 and between A_CSR and A_flize is 0.189, and both 
correlations are highly significant. Panel B also reports that T_Size is positively 
correlated with T_Leverage (0.186) and T_ROA (0.126). The correlation between T_Size 
and A _Size is significantly positive (0.131) as well. 
[Table 5] 
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5.3 Regression Analysis 
5.3.1 Results for Hypothesis 1 
Target Firms' Aggregate CSR Performance and Acquisition Premiums 
Table 6 reports the empirical results of the tests of the first hypothesis that 
examines the impacts of the targets' CSR quality on the acquisition premiums. The test 
statistics and the significance levels, as reported in Table 6, are calculated based on the 
standard errors adjusted by a cluster at the industry level. The dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2 is Acq_Price _ to_ MV. After including the four groups of control 
variables, I find that the variable of interest, the target firms' CSR performance, is 
significantly and positively associated with the acquisition premiums. In column 1, the 
coefficient estimate ofT_ CSR, a1 is 0.051 (t-stat = 2.97). Descriptive statistics in Table 4 
show that the standard deviation of T_CSR is 2.012 and the mean value of Acq_Price_ 
to_ MV is 1.438. Therefore, the regression coefficient for T_ CSR, a 1 = 0.051 implies that 
the acquirers pay around 7.1% more in premiums (0.051 * 2.012 I 1.438) if the target 
firm's CSR score increases by one standard deviation. The other variable of interest, 
T_Average_CSR, shows a similar finding in column 2. The coefficient for this variable is 
0.055 (t-stat = 3.51). The fmdings from both columns suggest that target firms perceived 
CSR quality to be positively associated with acquisition premiums, which supports H1. 
In accordance with my predictions, I find that the acquisition premium is 
significantly and positively associated with T_ROA. The coefficients are 0.438 and 0.376, 
and t-stats are 1. 79 and 1.92 in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Further, the first two 
columns in Table 6 show a significant positive association between T Growth and 
52 
premiums, as I predict. The coefficients for T_Growth are 0.124 and 0.116, and t-stats are 
4.29 and 4.27, respectively. In accordance with my prediction, T_Leverage is 
significantly and negatively associated with acquisition premiums. The coefficients · for 
T Leverage in columns 1 and 2 are -0.861 and -0.821, and t-stats are -3.75 and -3.47, 
respectively. T_Size is positively related with acquisition premiums. Columns 1 and 2 
also reveal that large and high-growth acquirers are willing to pay lower premiums. The 
coefficients for A_Size and A_Growth are -0.036 (t-stat = -1.94) and -0.033 (t-stat = -
3.34) in column 1, and -0.023 (t-stat = -1.74) and -0.052 (t-stat = -2.71) in column 2. 
A ROA and A CSR, are both positively associated with the acquisition premiums in both 
- -
columns. Analysis of deal-specific control variables suggests that the acquirers are 
willing to pay more premiums when they have a diversification motive, but they are more 
likely to pay less for cash-financed acquisitions. The coefficients for Motive and 
Pay _Method are 0.161 (t-stat = 1.91) and -0.063 (t-stat = -4.55) in column 1 and 0.221 (t-
stat= 2.36) and -0.062 (t-stat = -3.41) in column 2. The other two deal-specific control 
variables, Hostile and Camp _Bid are not significant. The adjusted R2 in column 1 is 
8.32%, which is slightly lower than that in column 2 (adj.R2 = 9.18%). 
In Table 6, in columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is Acq_Price_ to_BV. In 
both columns, the interest variables T_CSR and t_Average_CSR have significant positive 
coefficients, suggesting that the acquisition premiums increase in the target firms' social 
performances. In column 3, the coefficient estimate on T_ CSR, a1 is 0.862 (t-stat = 3.56), 
and in column 4, the coefficient estimate for T_Average_CSR, a1 is 0.912 (t-stat = 4.31). 
The last two columns also reveal that the acquisition premium is positively related with 
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T_Size. The coefficients for T_Size are 0.821 (t-stat = 2.49) and 0.817 (t-stat = 2.46) in 
columns 3 and 4, respectively. There is also a positive association between the 
acquisition premiums and T_ROA. The coefficients for T_ROA are 3.565 (t-stat = 3.45) 
and 2.657 (t-stat = 4.12) in columns 3 and 4, respectively. The association between the 
premiums and T_Leverage is negative as predicted. The analysis of deal-specific 
variables in columns 3 and 4 show that Motive is negatively related and Pay_ Method is 
positively related to the premiums, which is inconsistent with the findings in columns 1 
and 2. The adjusted R2 of the regression models in columns 3 and 4 are 11.50% and 
12.16%, respectively. 
Table 6 also reports that the magnitudes of a1 in columns 3 and 4 (0.862 and 
0.912) are remarkably larger than those in columns 1 and 2 (0.051 and 0.055). This 
difference suggests that either the market value of the targets captures a large portion of 
the value of CSR, whereas the book value does not, or the larger coefficients in columns 
3 and 4 could be driven by the distorted measures of the premiums based on book value. 
Section 7.1 provides the results for the robustness tests of Hypothesis 1. 
Robustness analysis documents that the findings reported in Table 6 are not biased by the 
targets' market price selection date when estimating the acquisition premiums. These 
results also hold for considering targets' industry-adjusted CSR performance and changes 
in CSR performance. Robustness tests also document similar results, while taking into 
consideration the additional control variables, and considering the targets' strengths and 
concerns separately. Other tests show that the results do not vary during the pre- to post-
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SOX periods. The exclusion of the deals in the financial, insurance, and real estate 
industries does not affect the main findings as well. 
[Table 6] 
5.3.2 Results for Hypothesis 2 
Target Firms' Component-Specific CSR Performance and Acquisition Premiums 
Table 7 presents the results ofhypothesis 2. The experimental variables in Table 7 
are the decomposed scores of different CSR attributes of the target firms. In column 1, 
the dependent variable is Acq_Price_to_MV, and the adjusted R2 ofthe model is 11.57%. 
Column 1 shows that T _finvironment is significantly and positively related with 
acquisition premiums. The coefficient estimate for T _Environment is 0.112 (t-stat = 
3.89). Descriptive statistics in Table 3, Panel B indicate that the standard deviation of 
T_Environment is 0.773, and the mean value of Acq_Price_ to_MVin Table 4 is 1.438. 
Taken together, this implies that the acquirers pay, on average, 6% additional premiums 
(0.112 * 0.773 I 1.438), if a target firm's environmental score increases by one standard 
deviation. A comparative analysis among the all interest-variables' coefficients reveals 
that the magnitude, statistical significance, as well as economic significance of the 
coefficient of T_Environment is reasonably greater than those for other CSR attributes 
(T_Community, T_Diversity, T_Employee and T_Product) . These fmdings suggest that, 
among all CSR attributes, the targets' environmental factors have the strongest impact on 
the acquisition premiums as suggested in H2(a). 
Column 1 in Table 7 also suggests that T_Community and T_Diversity are 
significantly and positively related to acquisition premiums, which provides support for 
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H2(b) and H2(c). The coefficient estimates for T_Community and T_Diversity are 0.063 
(t-stat = 1.67) and 0.027 (t-stat = 1.85), respectively. However, this analysis does not find 
any significant association between the targets' product attributes and the acquisition 
premiums. Additionally, and perhaps more strikingly, this investigation reports a 
significant negative association between the targets' employee attributes and acquisition 
premiums. The coefficient estimate of T_Employee is -0.012 (t-stat = -1.98). According 
to the variable's definition, T_ftmployee (employee attribute qualities) is measured on the 
basis of the strengths of labor union and employee relations. It is possible that acquirers' 
are less willing to acquire, as well as to pay premiums, for a firm with strong employee 
relations. Acquirers may find it difficult to restructure the acquired firms' management or 
to downsize employees in the post-M&A period when the targets' have strong employee 
and labor union relations. Meeting strongly unionized labor demands might also be costly 
to the acquirers. As a result, the acquirers may pay lower premiums for targets with 
superior-quality employee relations. The associations between acquisition premiums and 
the control variables in column 1 are fairly similar, as are those in Table 6 columns 1. 
In Table 7, column 2, in which the dependent variable is Acq_Price_to_BV, 
provides similar findings. The coefficient estimate of T_Environment in column 2 is 
0.609 (t-stat = 4.66). Comparisons among the coefficients of interest document that the 
targets' environmental attributes have the strongest effects on the acquisition premium, 
which supports H2(a). According to H2(b) and H2(c), T_Community and T_Diversity are 
significantly and positively associated with acquisition premiums as their coefficients are 
0.573 (t-stat = 3.96) and 0.493 (t-stat = 1.87), respectively. However, the coefficients for 
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T_Employee and T_Product are not significant in column 2. The control variables show 
similar findings as those documented previously. The adjusted R 2 of the model in column 
2 is 13.78%, which is greater than in column 1. 
Section 7.2 provides the results for the robustness tests of Hypothesis 2. 
Robustness tests for the component-specific analysis supports the fmdings reported in 
Table 7, and confirms that they are not biased by the targets' market price selection date 
for estimating the acquisition premiums. The results also hold true when considering the 
targets' industry-adjusted, component-specific CSR performance. 
[Table 7] 
6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 Role ofthe Acquirers' CSR Performance 
Prior research identifies distinct, although not mutually exclusive, M&A theories 
that can be categorized according to whether value is created (value-maximization) or 
redistributed (wealth-distribution) among M&A participants (De Bondt & Thompson, 
1992). According to the wealth-distribution theory, the target firms' superior CSR 
performances play a significant role as a complementary resource for the low-CSR 
acquirers. If the acquirers have inferior-quality CSR, then the acquisition of a high-CSR 
target will facilitate the distribution of CSR capabilities (Berchicci et al., 2012). Low-
CSR acquirers may have other capabilities, such as unused cash resources that can be 
spent on the target firm 's high-CSR capabilities to gain greater benefits. 
In contrast, an acquirer with superior CSR capabilities may look for targets that 
can best benefit from the transfer of that acquirer' s capabilities (Banaszak-Holl et al., 
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2002; Berchicci et al., 2012). High-CSR acquirers likely believe that transferring their 
superior CSR capacity to a low-CSR target will generate greater benefits from the target 
firm's improved CSR quality during the post-M&A period. 
In contrast to the wealth-distribution theory, the ethical- and cultural-matching 
theories suggest that acquirers that have high-quality CSR prefer targets with superior 
social performance. The compatibility of business, ethical, and cultural principles makes 
the acquisition process smoother and enhances the integration harmony during the post-
merger period (Deng et al., 2013).32 Therefore, for high-CSR acquirers, targeting a 
socially irresponsible firm is considered risky and has the potential to destroy value. The 
discussion thus far suggests that the CSR quality of acquirers may influence the observed 
positive association between acquisition premiums and the targets' CSR quality. 
To investigate the effects of acquirers CSR quality, I partition the sample into two 
groups based on the acquirers' CSR scores. Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics for 
these two groups: high-CSR acquirers (n = 194) and low-CSR acquirers (n = 225).33 
Univariate analysis reveals that these two groups differ significantly in terms of all key 
32 Appelbaum et al. (2009) argue that while strategic, cost, revenue, and legal issues drive 
most deals, cultural and ethical issues determine the success or failure of mergers and 
acquisitions. They analyze six successful M&A cases (Ace-Care, Renault-Nissan, 
Deutsche Bank-Bankers Trust, Cisco-StrataCom and Cerent, Volkswagen-Skoda, and 
British Petroleum-Amoco) and four failed cases (Daimler-Chrysler, Ford-Volvo, 
Southern Pacific Rail-Union Pacific Corporation, and Dollar-Thrifty) and show that 
ethical and cultural matches/mismatches play a critical role in whether a deal is 
successful or not. 
33 A high-CSR acquirer is defmed as one who has a CSR score above the median CSR 
score or who has a positive net CSR score. A low-CSR acquirer is defined as an acquirer 
with a CSR score equal to or below the median CSR score of the sample acquirers or who 
has a zero or negative score. The median CSR score for the sample acquirers is zero as 
reported in Table 4. 
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variables, except T_Growth and A_ROA. Descriptive statistics reported in Table 8 also 
show that high-CSR acquirers are more likely to pay higher premiums and prefer high-
CSR targets. 
[Table 8] 
Table 9 reports the results, in which I re-estimate the first regression model (using 
the both proxies for their acquisition premiums) separately for these two groups of 
acquirers. Contrary to the wealth-distribution theory and consistent with ethical-matching 
(business-philosophical matching) theory, the analysis finds that the positive association 
between the acquisition premiums and targets' CSR performance is stronger for the 
acquirers that have high quality CSR performance. For high-CSR acquirers, reported in 
Table 9, Panel A, columns 1 and 2, the values of a 1 are 0.074 and 0.446 (t-stats are 3.19 
and 4.87, respectively). Columns 3 and 4 show low-CSR acquirers with coefficients of 
interests of 0.015 and 0.351 (t-stat = 1.82 and 1.71, respectively). The F-test for the 
equality of the coefficients ofT_ CSR indicates that the coefficients for these two groups 
of acquirers differ significantly. For the dependent variable Acq_Price _to_ MV, the p-
value is <0.00 1 (differences in columns 1 and 3), and for Acq_ Price _to _B V the p-value is 
<0.027 (differences in columns 2 and 4). The findings from this analysis imply that high-
CSR targets are more concerned about their social reputation than the low-CSR targets, 
and more likely to pay high premium for the targets with similar ethical or business-
philosophical principles. 
Table 9, Panel B provides additional supports that the association between 
acquisition premiums and the targets' CSR quality is stronger for high-CSR acquirers. In 
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Panel B, instead of splitting the sample, I use a dummy variable (High_ CSR _A is a value 
of one if the acquirer's CSR score is above the median CSR score of the sample 
acquirers, zero otherwise) indicating whether the acquirers themselves have superior 
quality CSR performance. The interest variable is the interaction terms of T _ CSR and 
High_CSR_A. Both in columns 1 and 2, in Table 9 Panel B, the interest variable, 
T _ CSRXHigh _ CSR _A is significantly and positively associated with acquisition 
premiums (coefficient= 0.059 and t-stat = 2.48), implying that the acquirers pay more 
premiums for target firms ' superior quality CSR performance if the acquirers' existing 
CSR quality is also high. 
[Table 9] 
Next, I re-estimate the second regression model for the two groups of acquirers. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 10 show the component-specific analysis for high-CSR 
acquirers. Consistent with the previous findings, column 1 shows that T_ Community, 
T_Diversity, and T_Environment are positively, and T_Employee is negatively associated 
with acquisition premiums (Acq_Price_to_MV}. However, in column 2, where the 
dependent variable is Acq_Price_to_BV, T_Employee is not significant. For both columns 
1 and 2, the coefficient for T _Environment has the strongest impact on the acquisition 
premiums. Columns 3 and 4 show the regression results for low-CSR acquirers. The 
direction of the associations between the acquisition premiums and the key variables are 
similar to those documented for high-CSR acquirers. However, the findings are stronger 
for the high-CSR acquirers. 
[Table 10] 
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6.2 Role of the Targets' Size 
The positive association between the targets' perceived CSR quality and 
acquisition premiums may also be influenced by certain target-specific criteria, such as 
target size. Compared to the large targets, the smaller targets may have more information 
asymmetry, and therefore it is more likely that investors will devalue a small target due to 
its lesser volume of CSR information available in the market. However, the acquirers 
obtain more sophisticated information through their social and environmental due 
diligence procedures. Thus, the acquirers will have greater information-gap advantages 
for their smaller targets. This indicates that the association between CSR performance 
and acquisition premiums should be stronger for the smaller target firms. 
Whether target size matters in the CSR/acquisition premium relationship reflects 
on the issue of the target firms' industry composition. For example, the targets in the 
manufacturing industries, which are usually larger targets, are more prone to 
environmental risks. Social and reputational risks are also high for large targets because 
of large-size effects. On the other hand, the targets in the service, agriculture, and fmance 
industries, all of which are generally smaller, are less likely to be environmentally risky. 
These industry-specific criteria suggest that CSR issues are more crucial for larger targets 
than for smaller targets. Accordingly, the CSR/acquisition premium relationship could be 
stronger for larger targets. To investigate the effects of target size, I split the sample 
based on the target firms' mean size. Table 11 provides the descriptive statistics for these 
two groups of targets and the differences in the mean of the key variables for large and 
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small targets. 34 The acquisition premiums received by the large target firms are greater 
than for small targets when the premium is measured based on the targets' market value. 
However, there is no significant difference in the premiums when it is measured by book 
value. Another key difference is that the large targets have better CSR performance than 
the small targets. 
[Table 11] 
To analyze the impact of the targets' size on the observed association between 
their CSR quality and acquisition premiums, I re-estimate separately the fust regression 
model for the large and small target groups. The results of these regressions, reported in 
Table 12, Panel A, show that the positive association between the targets' CSR quality 
and acquisition premium is significantly stronger for the large targets. Columns 1 and 2 
show that for large targets the coefficients on T_CSR are positive and significant. In 
column 1, a 1 is 0.062 (t-stat = 2.30), and in column 2, a 1 is 0.895 (t-stat = 3.14). 
Compared with columns 1 and 2, the magnitudes of the coefficients for T _ CSR ( a 1 ) in 
columns 3 and 4 are remarkably smaller. More strikingly, a 1 is not significant in column 
3, where the dependent variable is Acq_Price _to_ MV. The potential explanations for 
these findings are either that the acquirers may not critically evaluate their targets' CSR 
performance when they attempt to buy a small firm or, due to the industry-specific 
criteria that smaller targets are less prone to environmental and social issues. 
34 Target firms' size is measured as the natural logarithm ofthe total assets of the targets 
prior to the announcement of an acquisition. A large target is defmed as a target firm that 
falls above the mean or is equal to the mean size of the targets. Similarly, a small target is 
defined as a target firm that falls below the mean size. 
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Table 12, Panel B confirms the finding that the positive association between 
targets' CSR performance and acquisition premium is stronger for large targets. In Panel 
B, a dummy variable (a value of one if the target firm falls above the mean size of the 
sample targets, zero otherwise) is used for indicating large target firins, and the interest 
variable, T _ CSRX.Large _Targets is used to show the incremental effects of targets' size 
on the association between acquisition premiums and T _ CSR. The coefficients for the 
interest variables, T _ CSRX.Large _Targets, are significant and positive in both columns. 
[Table 12] 
To take a closer look into this analysis, I report separately on the component-wise 
descriptive statistics of the targets' CSR performance for large and small targets. Panel A 
in Table 13 shows that, except for T_ Community, the other four CSR attributes differ 
significantly across the targets' size. The mean values for T_Diversity and T_Employee 
are significantly higher for large targets, whereas small targets do better in terms of 
employee (T_Product) and environmental (T_Environment) performance. Panels Band C 
in Table 13 probe more deeply into the factors that could explain these mean differences. 
Panel B shows the· industry composition for large and small targets. The column 
for the large target group shows that the largest sector is the manufacturing industry ( 41% 
of the subsample [n = 210]). Manufacturing firms are more prone to environmental risk 
and reputation, and their acquirers are more concerned about the targets' environmental 
performance. Moreover, fmancial and service industries, which are less exposed to 
environmental issues, account for 38% of the subsample of large target group. For the 
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small target group (n = 209), fmancial and service industries account for more than 45%, 
and the manufacturing industry accounts for 25% of the sample. 
Previous analysis of this study shows that environment is the most influencing 
factor among all CSR attributes. Additionally, all these statistics in Table 13, taken 
together, suggest that for the small target group, due to the industry's criteria, the targets' 
environmental attributes, as well as overall net CSR performance, may not be a 
significant factor for the acquirers. Panel C shows the component-specific mean values 
for large and small targets across industries. 
[Table 13] 
For further investigation, I re-estimate separately the second regression equation 
for large and small targets. In Table 14, this subsample analysis shows that for the large 
target group the findings are fairly consistent with the main results. For the large target 
group, column 1 shows that T_Environment, T_Community, and T_Diversity are 
positively and T _Employee is negatively associated with acquisition premiums 
(Acq_Price_to_MV). The coefficients are 0.656 (t-stat = 3.40), 0.128 (t-stat = 1.99), 
0.076 (t-stat = 1.67), and -0.138 (t-stat = -2.45), respectively. Column 2 reveals a similar 
finding that acquisition premiums (Acq_Price _to_ MV) are significantly and positively 
associated with T_Environment, T_Community, and T_Diversity. However, T_Employee 
is not significant in column 2, and T _Product is not significant in either column. In 
general, T _Environment has the strongest impact on the acquisition premiums. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the fmdings for the small target group. For the dependent 
variable, Acq_Price_to_MV in column 3, T_Diversity is positively and T_Employee is 
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negatively associated with the acquisition premiums. The coefficients are 0.077 (t-stat = 
1.87) and -0.066 (t-stat = -1.65), respectively. Column 4 shows that T_Community and 
T_Diversity have significant positive associations with Acq_Price_to_BV. The 
coefficients are 0.288 (t-stat = 2.05) and 0.186 (t-stat = 1.80), respectively. However, and 
interestingly, T _ftnvironment is not significant in either column. Industry-composition 
criteria for the small targets could be a potential explanation for these inconsistent 
fmdings. In addition, T_Product is not significant in columns 3 and 4. 
[Table 14] 
7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
7.1 Hypothesis 1: Targets' Aggregate CSR Performance and Acquisition Premiums 
7.1.1 Target Firms' Market Price Selection Bias 
The first proxy for the acquisition premium, Acq_Price _ to_ MV, considers the 
market price of the target firms' stock 30 days prior to the first acquisition 
announcement. However, the findings of this study could be biased if the date of the 
stock price selection is either too far from the announcement or too close and possibly 
contaminated by the merger rumor. One way to minimize these undue influences is to 
consider an average of the target's stock price within a certain window prior to the 
announcement date. To ensure that the results are not driven by the date selection of the 
stock price, I estimate a different measure of the dependent variable, which is the ratio of 
the acquisition price per share to the 10-day (-35,-25) average of the target's stock price 
per share. By using the proxy, Acq_Price _to_ Average_ MV, I re-estimate the first model. 
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Column 1 in Table 15 reports the fmdings of the regression model, in which the 
interest variable is T _ CSR. The coefficient on the regression variable is positively 
significant (a1 =0.038 and t-stat = 2.37), which provides an additional support for Hl. 
Furthermore, I perform the same test by using the other proxy for the interest variable. In 
column 2, the interest variable, T_Average_CSR also shows a significant positive 
association between the acquisition premium and the target's perceived CSR 
performance. The coefficient estimate is 0.053 (t-stat = 3.61). The adjusted R2 in columns 
1 and 2 are 12.30% and 11.07%, respectively. The control variables show a similar 
association with the acquisition premium as reported in Table 6 columns 1 and 2. 
[Table 15] 
7.1.2 Target Firms' Industry-Adjusted CSR Performance 
Researchers have documented that industry-specific characteristics influence 
firms' CSR performance and CSR disclosure behaviors (Boutin-Dufresne & Sacaris, 
2004; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Moreover, different industries may emphasize different 
CSR attributes. For example, firms in the financial and services industries focus on 
customers and employees as primary stakeholders (Hamid, 2004), whereas environmental 
issues are likely to be paramount for the oil and gas industries (Moore, 2001 ). 
To mitigate the industry-specific effects on the target firms' net CSR scores, I 
constructed another proxy variable, Ind_Adjusted_T_CSR, to measure the targets' CSR 
performance. Ind_Adjusted_T_CSR is the difference between a target firm's most recent 
CSR score before the M&A announcement date and the target's industry-average CSR 
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scores. Industry is defined on the basis of the one-digit Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) of the target firms. 
Table 16 reports the fmdings for the impact of the targets' industry-adjusted CSR 
performance on their acquisition premiums. Both· coefficients for Ind _Adjusted _T _ CSR in 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 16 are significantly positive, providing additional supports for 
the first hypohtesis. The coefficient in column 1 is 0.043 (t-stat = 3.39) and in column 2 
is 0.773 (t-stat = 2.70). For both columns, the associations between the acquisition 
premium and the control variable are similar to that documented in previous tables. The 
adjusted R 2 in column 1 (dependent variable is Acq_Price _to MV) is 9.11% and in 
column 2 (dependent variable is Acq_Price_to BV) is 10.06%. 
[Table 16] 
7.1.3 Pre- and Post-SOX Analysis 
Researchers argue that the increased attention to governance in the post-SOX era 
also influences the perspectives of the CSR initiatives (May et al., 2007). Rodgers et al. 
(2008) shows that the impact of CSR on firm value increases in the post-SOX period. 
Fairfax (2008) fmds that many corporations for the first time began preparing social 
responsibility reports in the post-SOX period. Therefore, the significance of targets' CSR 
quality to the acquirers may vary from the pre-SOX to the post-SOX era, and the timing 
of acquisitions (pre- or post-SOX periods) can also influence the positive association 
between the acquisition premiums and the targets' CSR quality. 
Moreover, in this study, the sample deals in pre- and post-SOX periods are not 
evenly distributed. As reported in Table 2, Panel A, the first half of the sample period 
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(pre-SOX periods), from 1992 to 2001, represents less than 20% of the total distribution, 
whereas the second half (post-SOX periods), from 2002 to 2013, represents more than 
80% of the deal observations.35 This uneven distribution of the sample may bias the 
findings of this study, and the results could be driven only by the post-2001 deals. 
To test whether the timing of an acquisition in the pre- vs. post-SOX period can 
influence my finding, I create a dummy variable, Post_2001, for each deal. The value of 
this dummy variable is one if the time period of the deal is from 2002 to 2013, whereas 
the value is zero if the deal took place before 2002. My interest variable in this analysis is 
T_CSRXPost_2001, which is the interaction term of T_CSR and the dummy variable 
Post_ 2001. Table 17 provides the results for this analysis. 
Both columns 1 and 2 in Table 17 report that the coefficient estimate for T_ CSR is 
significantly positive, thereby providing additional support for H1. Additionally, the 
dummy variable Post_2001 has significant positive coefficients in both columns, 
implying that overall, the acquisition premiums are higher in the post-SOX periods. 
However, the interaction variable T_CSRXPost_2001 is not significantly associated with 
acquisition premiums, which means that the timing of an acquisition, whether it takes 
place in the pre- or post-SOX period, does not affect the association between the 
acquisition premiums and the targets' CSR performance. 
[Table 17] 
35 The unequal distribution of the sample deal between pre- and post-SOX years is due to 
the CSR data unavailability in MSCI ESG's database, which focuses only on S&P 500 
and social firms in the pre-SOX periods. 
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7.1.4 Other Robustness Tests 
The sample deals of this study includes the M&A deals conducted in the fmance, 
insurance, and real estate industries. However, several research papers exclude the 
financial industries from their analysis as those industries have different financial 
reporting policies and those industries are subject to different rules and regulations. To 
show that the inclusion of the financial, insurance and real estate industries in my sample 
does not influence the results, I exclude the deals from the fmancial industries, and re-
estimate the regression model one for testing the first hypothesis. 36 Table 18 reports the 
findings of the regression results for this analysis. The exclusion of the financial 
industries reduces the sample size by 96. However, the findings are similar as those are 
reported in previous tables. All four columns in Table 18 show a significant positive 
association between the acquisition premiums and the target firms' perceived CSR 
performance, which supports hypothesis 1. 
[Table 18] 
Prior research argues that if the bidding firm already holds a portion of the 
target's common stock before the takeover announcement, it increases the bidder's 
bargaining power, and subsequently, the acquirers offer a lower price (Eckbo & Langohr, 
1989; Betton & Eckbo, 2000). This strategy is commonly known as the acquirer's 
toehold. In my main regression model, I consider another acquisition-specific control 
variable, Toehold, and re-estimate the regression coefficients. Toehold is measured as 
the number of the target's shares held by the acquirer divided by the target's total shares 
36 A deal ' s industry is defined on the basis of the acquirer's industry (2 digit SIC codes). 
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outstanding during the M&A. Table 19 reports that the inclusion of this additional control 
does not change the findings, and the variable Toehold itself is not significant. 
[Table 19] 
Table 20 considers a different proxy for the target firms' CSR quality. Instead of 
considering the unit CSR scores, I estimate my interest variable as the changes in the 
targets' CSR scores prior to the M&A announcements. Table 20 shows that, in both 
columns, the coefficient estimates for LJ _ T _ CSR are significant and positive. The 
coefficient estimate is 0.075 (t-stat = 3.21) in column 1 and 0.961 (t-stat = 3.96) in 
column 2. These fmdings provide further support for H1. 
[Table 20] 
The CSR rating criteria used for the MSCI ESG database changes over time. The 
latest rating criteria consider 90 attributes (strengths and concerns) in five major areas: 
community, diversity, employee, environment and product. However, 79 out of these 90 
criteria have been used since the beginning of the sample period, and 11 criteria have 
been added in later periods at different points of time. Table 21 reports the regression 
results where the T_ CSR is estimated excluding those 11 criteria. All four columns in 
Table 21 show that the results are consistent with the main findings reported in Table 6. 
[Table 21] 
One of the major ESG rating components in MSCI database is governance. 
However, while estimating the targets' CSR score, this study excludes the governance 
criteria. The reasons for this exclusion is to investigate the pure social and environmental 
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impacts as governance is considered as different construct which is more closely related 
with firms' economic entity. To investigate whether targets' governance can influence the . 
findings, I consider another control variable T_Governance (total number of strengths 
minus total number of concerns in targets' governance quality in MSCI ESG database), 
and re-estimate the regression. Table 22, Panel A shows the distribution for the variable 
T_Governance. The mean, median and standard deviation values are -0.354, 0 and 0.776, 
respectively. Panel B in Table 22 shows that the variable T_ Governance is not 
significant, and the inclusion of targets' governance quality as a control variable in the 
main regression model does not change the main findings. 
[Table 22] 
Table 23 reports the regression results in which the interest variables are 
T _ CSR _Strengths and T _ CSR _Concerns. Instead of considering targets' net (strengths 
minus concerns) CSR scores, the regression model in this Table considers the total 
numbers of CSR strengths (T_CSR_Strengths) and total numbers of concerns 
(T_CSR_Concerns) separately. Column 1 in Table 23 shows that T_CSR_Strengths is 
positively, and T _ CSR _Concerns is negatively associated with Acq_Price _to_ MV. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on T_CSR_Concerns is greater than T_CSR_Strengths. This 
fmding establishes the evidence that acquirers not only pay premiums for CSR 
reputations, but also they consider to discount the price if the targets have CSR related 
disputes. In addition, acquirers are much more concerned about the CSR disputes than 
CSR reputations, and give more emphasis on CSR disputes than the additional value they 
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impose on CSR reputations. Table 23, column 2 reports the similar findings regarding the 
target firms' CSR strengths and CSR concerns, and their association with acquisition 
premiums estimated based on the book value of the target firms. 
[Table 23] 
7.2 Hypothesis 2: Component-Specific CSR Performance and Acquisition Premiums 
7.2.1 Market Price Selection Bias 
To investigate if the target firms' market price selection dates for premium 
estimations influence the component-specific analysis in H2, I re-estimate the second 
regression model by using another proxy for the acquisition premiums. The dependent 
variable for this analysis is Acq_Price _ to_ Average_ MV, which is the ratio of the 
acquisition price per share to the 10-day (-35, -25) average of the target's stock price per 
share prior to the M&A announcement. 
Table 24 shows the results of this analysis. The adjusted R 2 of the model is 
13.22%, which is greater than the main model reported in Table 7, column 1 (adjusted R2 
is 11.57%). Consistent with the main results reported in Table 7, Table 24 also shows that 
T_Environment is significantly and positively related with the acquisition premiums. The 
coefficient estimate for T_Environment is 0.162 (t-stat = 4.17), which is remarkably 
larger than the coefficients for other CSR attributes (T_Community, T_Diversity, 
T_Employee and T_Product). Comparisons among the coefficients of interests 
supplement the evidence for H2(a) that the targets' environmental factors have the most 
significant impacts on the acquisition premiums among all CSR attributes. In addition, 
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the economic and statistical significance for the fmdings reported in Table 24 regarding 
the H2(a) is stronger than that reported in Table 7. 
Table 24 also shows that T_Community and T_Diversity are significantly and 
positively related to acquisition premiums as predicted in H2(b) and H2(c). The 
coefficient estimates for T_Community and T_Diversity are 0.043 (t-stat = 1.81) and 
0.010 (t-stat = 1.66), respectively. Consistent with these main findings, Table 24 does not 
show any significant association between the targets' product attributes and the 
acquisition premiums. Furthermore, as reported in Table 7, the association between the 
targets' employee attributes and acquisition premiums is significantly negative. The 
coefficient estimate of T___ftmployee is -0.022 (t-stat = -1.81), and the control variables 
show the consistent findings as documented previously. 
[Table 24] 
7.2.2 Target Firms' Industry-Adjusted, Component-Specific CSR Performance 
Prior research documents that different industries emphasize different CSR 
attributes (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Moore, 2001; Hamid, 2004; Boutin-Dufresne & 
Sacaris, 2004). In this analysis, I estimate the scores for the target firms' different CSR 
components adjusted for the average industry performance. For each component, the 
industry performance is estimated based on a target-industry's (one-digit SIC codes) 
average score for that specific component. Table 25 presents the findings for the impact 
of the targets' industry-adjusted, component-specific CSR performance on their 
acquisition premiums. The adjusted R2 in column 1 (dependent variable of Acq_Price_to 
MV) is 14.08% and in column 2 (dependent variable of Acq_Price_to BV) is 15.02%. 
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Column 1 in Table 25 shows that Ind_Adjust_T_Environment is significantly and 
positively related with the acquisition premiums. The coefficient is 0.156 (t-stat = 3.41), 
and Ind _Adjust_ T _Environment has the strongest association with the acquisition 
premiums among all industry-adjusted CSR components. Consistent with the previous 
fmdings, column 1 in Table 25 also reports that Ind _Adjust_ T _Community and 
Ind _Adjust_ T _Diversity are significantly and positively related to the acquisition 
premiums, and the Ind_Adjust_T_Employee has a significant negative association. The 
coefficients for the interest variables, Ind _Adjust_ T _Community, 
Ind_Adjust_T_Diversity, and Ind_Adjust_T_Employee, are 0.093 (t-stat = 1.79), 0.047 (t-
stat = 1.65), and -0.028 (t-stat = -2.69), respectively. 
However, contrary to the results documented in Tables 7 and 24, Table 25 shows 
a significant positive association between Acq_Price_to MV and Ind_Adjust_T_Product. 
The coefficient estimate is 0.141 (t-stat = -2.24). These fmdings provide the only support 
for H2( e) that target firms' product quality is positively associated with acquisition 
premiums. However in column 2, Ind_Adjust_T_Product and Ind_Adjust_T_Employee 
are not significant. In this column, Ind_Adjust_T_Community, Ind_Adjust_T_Diversity, 
and Ind _Adjust_ T _finvironment have significant positive associations with Acq_Price _to 
BV, which supports H2(a), H2(b), and H2(C). 
[Table 25] 
7.2.3 Target Firms' Environmental Strengths and Concerns 
Table 26 reports the regression results for targets' component-specific CSR 
analysis in which targets' environmental component is reported as T_Environment_ 
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Strength (the total number of environmental strengths) and T _Environment_ Concern (the 
total number of environmental concerns). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 26 suggest that 
environmental strengths are positively, and environmental concerns are negatively 
associated with acquisition premiums. In addition, the results reported in Table 26 show 
that the coefficient on T _Environment_ Concern is the largest one (both is statistically and 
economically) among all the interest variables. This finding implies that the acquirers 
impose the most emphasis on the environmental disputes of the target firms since the 
environmental concerns could result in future liabilities and litigation costs in the post-
M&A periods. 
[Table 26] 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I examine whether target firms' CSR performance is associated with 
the acquisition premiums paid by acquirers. I hypothesize that target firms with superior 
quality CSR are more likely to receive greater acquisition premiums. I proxy for the 
acquisition premiums by estimating the ratio of acquisition price per share to the target 
firms' market value per share 30 days prior to the first acquisition announcement and 
acquisition price per share to the target firms' book value per share. 
By examining 419 U.S. public M&A deals from 1992 to 2013, my findings 
support the premise that acquisition premiums increase with a target firm's perceived 
CSR quality, an effect incremental to previously documented drivers of such premiums. 
This finding is robust to using four different proxies for the targets' CSR performance. 
Component-specific analysis reveals that the targets' environmental performance has the 
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strongest effect on the acquisition premiums. In addition, the targets' superior-quality 
community and diversity attributes influence acquisition premiums positively. However, 
there is no evidence of a significant association between the target firms' product 
attributes and their acquisition premiums. More strikingly, this investigation also reports 
a significant negative association between the targets' employee attributes and the 
acquisition premiums. 
Additional analysis reveals that the observed positive association between the 
acquisition premium and the targets' CSR quality is stronger for high-CSR acquirers 
compared with low-CSR acquirers. Interestingly, this study also demonstrates that the 
positive association between target firms' CSR and their acquisition premiums is more 
prevalent among large targets, and the findings are not consistent for small target firms. 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that various dimensions of CSR play an 
important role in determining acquisition premiums, after controlling for several 
economic factors. 
This study contributes to both the CSR and the M&A literature, and it extends the 
CSR literature by documenting the value of CSR in an unconventional way, through the 
acquisition premiums. The findings of this study complement the narrowly focused target 
firms' gain-related research in the M&A literature. This is one of the first studies that 
demonstrates the direct link between CSR and its impact on M&A deals. Complementing 
the findings of two recent studies (Deng et al., 2013 and Hawn, 2013), this study also 
provides the first empirical evidence that acquirers as well as target firms can realize 
gains from their superior CSR performance in the M&A market. The findings of this 
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study have practical implications for acquirers, whether they choose to create or purchase 
CSR. The findings also supplement anecdotal evidence that demonstrates that, in recent 
years, acquirers have rigorously investigated target firms' CSR quality, and deals are 
frequently restructured following social and environmental due diligence. 
As is the case with other studies, these results must be interpreted with caution 
due to the study's limitations. First, I focus only on U.S. public deals. Thus, the findings 
in this study may not be generalized for private or foreign targets. Second, the sample 
size is small (n = 419) due to the unavailability of the target firms' CSR data. This may 
result in low explanatory power related to the regression model. The earlier period of the 
sample is biased towards large targets since from 1991 to 2002 the MSCI ESG 
(previously known as KLD) data only include the 1,000 largest U.S. companies and the 
MSCI ESG Social Index firms. Third, M&A deals in the fmancial and utility industries 
are not excluded from the study. However, the robustness tests suggest that the exclusion 
of the fmancial industries does not change the results. These caveats notwithstanding, this 
study opens new research avenues by documenting the value of CSR in an 
unconventional way. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Criteria No. ofDeals 
Initial sample consists of the U.S. M&A deals (public targets and 
public acquirers) for the period of 1991 to 2013 from the Securities 
Data Commission (SDC) Platinum© database a 5,932 
Deals excluded due to the unavailability of the target firms' CSR 
related information in the MSCI ESG STATS [previously known as 
Kinder, Lynderberg, Domini (KLD) Research and Analytics, Inc.] 
database b (5,374) 
Deals excluded due to the unavailability of the target firms' financial 
statement variables and stock price information in the Compustat and 
CRSP databases (18) 
Deals excluded due to the missing values of the M&A-related control 
variables in the SDC Platinum database (121) 
Final Sample 419 
a. This sample excludes the deals that do not disclose the deal value. 
b. For the years from 1991 to 2001, the MSCI ESG dataset provides social 
performance information only for S&P 500 and social index (Domini 400, and Russell 
1000) firms. Unavailability of the targets' CSR information in the MSCI ESG 
database results in a significant reduction in sample size. 
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TABLE2 
Sample Distribution 
This table presents the distribution of the sample used in this study. The sample 
consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from the year 1992 to 2013. The sample includes 
the deals that are subject to the following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the 
SDC database; (2) both the acquirer and the target are publicly traded, and have 
stock price and financial data in the CRSP and Compustat; (3) both the acquirer 
and the target fmns have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) the deals 
have M&A related required information in the SDC Platinum database. Panel A 
reports the distribution by year. Panel B and Panel C represent the distribution by 
targets' industry and acquirers' industry, respectively. 
Panel A: Distribution of the Sample by Year 
Year No. of Deal % ofSample Cumulative % 
1992 4 1.0% 1.0% 
1993 6 1.4% 2.4% 
1994 8 1.9% 4.3% 
1995 5 1.2% 5.5% 
1996 7 1.7% 7.2% 
1997 9 2.1% 9.3% 
1998 11 2.6% 11.9% 
1999 9 2.1% 14.1% 
2000 13 3.1% 17.2% 
2001 8 1.9% 19.1% 
2002 6 1.4% 20.5% 
2003 12 2.9% 23.4% 
2004 33 7.9% 31.3% 
2005 37 8.8% 40.1% 
2006 41 9.8% 49.9% 
2007 42 10.0% 59.9% 
2008 50 11.9% 71.8% 
2009 34 8.1% 80.0% 
2010 26 6.2% 86.2% 
2011 25 6.0% 92.1% 
2012 21 5.0% 97.1% 
2013 12 2.9% 100.0% 
Total 419 100.0% 
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Panel B: Distribution of the Sample by Targets' Industry 
Two Digit Number %of Cumulative 
Industry SIC of Deal Sample % 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 4 0.95% 0.95% 
Mining 10-14 22 5.25% 6.21% 
Manufacturing 20-39 141 33.65% 39.86% 
Transportation, communication, and utility 40-49 51 12.17% 52.03% 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 26 6.21% 58.23% 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 116 27.68% 85.92% 
Services 70-89 59 14.08% 100.00% 
Total 419 100% 
Panel C: Distribution of the Sample by Acquirers' Industry 
Two Number %of Cumulative 
Industry Digit SIC of Deal Sample % 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 6 1.43% 1.43% 
Mining 10-14 21 5.01% 6.44% 
Manufacturing 20-39 139 33.17% 39.62% 
Transportation, communication, and utility 40-49 67 15.99% 55.61% 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 35 8.35% 63.96% 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 96 22.91% 86.87% 
Services 70-89 55 13.13% 100.00% 
Total 419 100% 
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Panel D: Comparison between Sample Targets and Compustat Firms 
Sample Std. 
n Mean Min Ql Median Q3 Max 
Targets Dev 
T Size 419 8.350 1.839 2.195 6.722 7.179 9.039 13.860 
T_Leverage 419 0.194 0.176 0.000 0.111 0.124 0.392 1.548 
T ROA 419 0.018 0.158 0.004 0.011 0.015 0.052 0.614 
T Growth 419 3.055 4.262 1.187 1.291 3.046 4.973 9.861 
Compustat Std. 
n Mean Min Ql Median Q3 Max 
Firms Dev 
Size 222387 4.970 2.821 -6.901 3.154 5.034 6.834 15.142 
Leverage 222168 0.299 8.259 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.285 2176.000 
ROA 221104 -2.008 23.508 -137.000 -0.090 0.011 0.056 2369.430 
Growth 221894 1.029 16.049 -3.147 -0.014 0.876 6.515 4717.194 
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TABLE3 
Descriptive Statistics for Targets' CSR Score 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for target firms ' CSR performance data obtained from the MSCI ESG 
database. The target-firm sample consists of 419 U.S. public M&A deals from the year 1992 to 2013. Panel A 
represents target firms ' net CSR scores (latest CSR scores prior to M&As), and average CSR scores (average of the last 
two years' scores prior to M&As). CSR scores are the aggregate of five components: community, diversity, employee, 
environment and product. Panel B presents the mean distributions of the decomposed CSR scores of these five 
attributes. Panel C presents a year-wise mean statistics for the target firms ' decomposed CSR scores. Panel D and Panel 
E report target firms' and MSCI ESG's all firm-years' industry-wise mean distributions for net and decomposed CSR 
scores, respectively. Appendix B provides the details on the MSCI ESG ratings, and Appendix C provides the variable 
definitions. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Targets' Net CSR Scores 
Variables of Interest n Mean Std. Dev Min Ql Median Q3 Max 
T CSR 419 0.003 2.012 -8.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 11.000 
T _Average_ CSR 419 -0.035 2.061 -7.000 -1.500 0.000 1.000 10.000 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Targets' Decomposed CSR Scores 
Decomposition of T_ CSR Score n Mean Std. Dev Min Ql Median Q3 Max 
T _Community 419 0.134 0.693 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.000 
T _Diversity 419 0.263 1.131 -2.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 6.000 
T_Employee 419 -0.063 0.883 -4.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 
T Environment 419 -0.141 0.773 -5.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.000 
T Product 419 -0.250 0.662 -3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 
Panel C: Year-Wise Distribution of Targets' Mean CSR Scores 
Year n T CSR T_ Community T_ Diversity T_ Employee T Environ. T Product 
1991 4 -0.286 0.143 0.286 -0.429 -0.086 -0.042 
1992 6 1.221 0.601 0.600 0.200 -0.040 -0.200 
1993 8 -0.143 -0.143 0.143 -0.286 -0.429 0.000 
1994 5 1.036 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.140 0.333 
1995 7 0.333 0.667 0.250 -0.083 -0.667 0.000 
1996 9 -0.125 0.625 0.750 0.125 0.046 -0.375 
1997 11 0.612 0.413 0.204 0.217 0.047 -0.200 
1998 9 0.103 0.308 0.231 -0.308 -0.154 -0.385 
1999 13 -0.308 -0.250 0.500 -0.250 -0.583 -0.583 
2000 8 0.257 0.621 1.404 0.817 -0.816 0.437 
2001 6 0.102 0.058 0.500 0.016 -0.560 -1.280 
00 2002 12 -0.714 0.033 1.204 -0.333 -0.517 -0.333 VJ 
2003 33 0.250 0.071 0.107 -0.107 0.108 -0.321 
2004 37 -0.286 0.112 0.212 -0.341 -0.111 -0.444 
2005 41 -0.500 0.001 0.370 -0.333 -0.333 -0.185 
2006 42 -0.143 0.086 0.371 -0.314 -0.171 -0.114 
2007 50 0.054 0.132 0.263 -0.105 -0.105 -0.447 
2008 34 -0.175 -0.100 0.100 -0.133 -0.100 -0.100 
2009 26 -0.435 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.261 
2010 25 0.174 0.027 -0.091 -0.318 0.571 -0.136 
2011 21 -0.347 0.124 -0.018 -0.006 0.213 -0.034 
2012 12 -0.021 0.210 -0.014 0.001 0.149 -0.049 
Panel D (a): Industry-Wise Means of Targets' Different CSR Attributes 
Industry 2-Dig. n T_CSR T_Commun. T_Divers. T_Employe. T_Environ. SIC T_Product 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 4 -1.000 0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 0.000 
Mining 10-14 22 -0.800 -0.133 -0.467 -0.067 -0.200 0.067 
Manufacturing 20-39 141 -0.151 0.143 0.235 -0.050 -0.235 -0.244 
Transportation, communication, utility 40-49 51 -0.016 0.031 0.469 -0.016 -0.234 -0.266 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 26 0.455 0.455 0.318 -0.227 0.136 -0.227 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 116 0.373 0.233 0.367 -0.033 0.000 -0.333 
00 Services 70-89 59 -0.079 0.051 0.128 -0.103 -0.026 -0.231 ~ 
Total 419 
Panel D (b): Industry-Wise Distributions of Targets' Net CSR Scores 
Industry 2-Dig. SIC n %of Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 4 0.95% -1.000 1.414 -7.000 1.000 
Mining 10-14 22 5.25% -0.800 1.699 -8.000 3.000 
Manufacturing 20-39 141 33.65% -0.151 2.459 -5.000 10.000 
Transportation, communication, utility 40-49 51 12.17% -0.016 2.081 -6.000 7.000 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 26 6.21% 0.455 2.425 -4.000 9.000 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 116 27.68% 0.373 1.660 -3.000 5.000 
00 
Vl 70-89 59 14.08% Services -0.079 1.554 -3.000 4.000 
Total 419 100% 
Panel E (a): Industry-Wise Means ofthe Net CSR Scores for All Firm-Years' in the MSCI ESG Database a 
n= 
Mean Industry 2-Dig. Firm- Community Diversity Employee Environmt. Product SIC CSR Year 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 87 -1.429 -0.057 -0.271 -0.300 -0.343 -0.457 
Mining 10-19 1,676 -1.194 -0.038 -0.498 -0.144 -0.401 -0.113 
Manufacturing 20-39 12,722 -0.014 0.129 0.047 -0.076 -0.013 -0.100 
Transportation, communication, 40-49 3,246 -0.389 0.018 0.229 -0.150 -0.213 -0.273 
utility 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 2,992 0.025 0.140 0.267 -0.314 0.048 -0.116 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-69 6,384 0.055 0.147 0.062 -0.003 0.034 -0.185 
00 
0\ 70-93 4,382 -0.088 0.050 0.060 -0.136 0.055 -0.117 Services 
Total 31,489 
Panel E (b): Industry-Wise Distributions of the Net CSR Scores for All Firm-Years' in the MSCI ESG Database 
n= 
Industry 2-Dig. SIC Firm- %of Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min CSR Max Year 
01-09 87 0.28% -1.429 1.758 -8.000 3.000 Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
Mining 10-19 1,676 5.32% -1.194 1.708 -9.000 5.000 
Manufacturing 20-39 12,722 40.40% -0.014 2.421 -8.000 18.000 
Transportation, communication, utility 40-49 3,246 10.31% -0.389 2.195 -9.000 9.000 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 2,992 9.50% 0.025 2.106 -7.000 12.000 
00 Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-69 6,384 20.27% 0.055 1.910 -6.000 14.000 
-...J 
Services 70-93 4,382 13.92% -0.088 2.084 -6.000 15.000 
Total 31,489 100% 
TABLE4 
Descriptive Statistics of the Selected Variables for Full Sample 
The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013 . The sample includes the deals subject to the following 
criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have 
stock price and financial data available in the CRSP and Compustat; (3) both the acquirers and the target firms have 
coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and ( 4) deals have M&A related required information in the SDC database. All the 
variables are defmed in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Dependent Variables (Acq_Premium) n Mean Std. Dev Min Ql Median Q3 Max 
Acq_Price_ to_MV 419 1.438 1.833 0.927 1.121 1.464 4.828 10.458 
Acq_Price_ to_jJV 419 4.156 11.739 1.438 1.724 3.722 51.264 199.329 
Variables of Interest 
T CSR 419 0.003 2.012 -8.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 11.000 
T _Average_ CSR 413 -0.035 2.061 -7.000 -1.500 0.000 1.000 10.000 
Control Variables 
00 T Size 419 8.350 1.839 2.195 6.722 7.179 9.039 13.860 00 
T J_,everage 419 0.194 0.176 0.000 0.111 0.124 0.392 1.548 
T ROA 419. 0.018 0.158 0.004 . 0.011 0.015 0.052 0.614 
T Growth 419 3.055 4.262 1.187 1.291 3.046 4.973 9.861 
A Size 419 10.254 2.721 1.257 8.201 9.312 12.888 15.466 
A ROA 419 0.038 0.130 0.001 0.017 0.034 0.075 0.384 
A Growth 419 1.297 2.438 0.531 1.497 1.682 2.364 7.877 
A CSR 419 0.950 3.163 -8.000 -1.000 0.000 3.000 14.000 
A_ Average_ CSR 419 0.827 3.848 -6.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 12.000 
Pay_ Method (dummy) 419 0.559 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hostile (dummy) 419 0.071 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Divers_Motive (dummy) 419 0.714 0.438 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Comp Bid 419 1.115 0.551 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 4.000 
00 
\0 
TABLES 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficients among different variables. The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals 
from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC 
database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial data in CRSP and 
Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals 
have M&A related required data in SDC database. Panel A presents the correlations among targets' net CSR scores and 
their five different attributes. The CSR attributes are: community, diversity, employee, environment and product. Panel 
B presents the correlation coefficients among target firms' CSR scores, different measures for acquisition premiums, 
acquirers' CSR scores, and target firms' and acquirers' financial variables. All the variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients between T CSR and Different CSR Attributes 
Variable T CSR T_Avg_CSR T _Community T_Diversity T_Employee T Environ. T Product 
T CSR 1 
T_Avg_CSR 0.958*** 1 
T _Community 0.497*** 0.468*** 1 
T _Diversity 0.584*** 0.578*** 0.296*** 1 
T_Employee 0.483*** 0.455*** 0.121 *** -0.011 *** 1 
T Environment 0.448*** 0.461 *** 0.248*** 0.022*** 0.211 *** 1 
T Product 0.235*** 0.199*** -0.045*** -0.150*** -0.073*** 0.075*** 1.000 
***,**,*Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
Dependent and fmancial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
\0 
0 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients between T_ CSR, Acquisition Premiums, Targets- and Acquirers' Specific Criteria 
Acq Pr. Acq Pr. 
- - T _ CSR T _Size T _ Levrg T ROA T Grow A CSR A Size A ROA A Grow 
Variable Ito MV to B V 
Acq_Price _to_ MV 1 
Acq_Price _to _BV 0.315*** 1 
T CSR 0.113*** 0.221 *** 1 
T Size 0.101*** 0.163*** 0.153*** 1 
T_Leverage -0.106*** -0.004* -0.091 *** 0.186*** 
T ROA -0.027 0.168*** 0.049** 0.126*** -0.009 1 
• 
T Growth 0.192*** 0.087* -0.063 -0.011 -0.032* -0.171** 1 
A CSR -0.002 0.0514* 0.067*** -0.051 * -0.030 -0.033* 0.082* 1 
A Size -0.045 0.025* 0.132*** 0.131 *** 0.035 0.105*** 0.019 0.189*** 1 
A ROA 0.011* 0.047 -0.008 0.082** 0.004 0.019 -0.015* 0.089*** 0.013* 1 
A Growth 0.037 0.039* -0.011 * -0.031 ** 0.003 -0.047** 0.034 0.074* 0.007 -0.027* 
***, **, *Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
Dependent and fmancial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. · 
1 
TABLE 6 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Performance a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T CSR + 0.051 (2.97)*** 0.862 (3.56)*** 
T _Average_ CSR + 0.055 (3.51)*** 0.912 (4.31)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.045 (1.69)* 0.011 (1.73)* 0.821 (2.49)*** 0.817 (2.46)*** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.861 (-3.75)*** -0.821 (-3.47)*** -0.112 (-1.96)** -1.341 (-1.98)** 
T ROA + 0.438 (1.79)* 0.376 (1.92)* 3.565 (3.45)*** 2.657 (4.12)*** 
T Growth + 0.124 (4.29)*** 0.116 (4.27)*** 0.019 (1.09) 0.032 (2.05)** 
A Size + -0.036 ( -1.94)* -0.023 (-1.74)* 0.068 (1.28) 0.081 (0.34) 
A ROA + 0.047 (1.74)* 0.032 (1.90)* 0.721 (1.74)* 0.046 (0.102) 
\0 A Growth ? -0.033 (-3.34)*** -0.052 (-2.71)*** 1.070 (1.02) -0.036 ( -1.04) 
...... A CSR ? 0.027 (1.65)* 0.023 (1. 72)* 0.242 (1.57) 0.345 (1.61) 
Motive + 0.161 (1.91)* 0.221 (2.36)*** - 0.096 (-4.08)*** -0.268 ( -2.96)*** 
Pay_Method + -0.063 ( -4.55)*** -0.062 (-3.41)*** 1.682 (2.21)** 1.522 (2.16)** 
Hostile + -0.019 (-0.25) -0.145 (-0.66) 0.954 (2.42)*** 0.923 (2.47)** 
Comp__Bid + 0.175 (0.12) 0.118 (0.93) -1.650 (-0.82) -1.244 (-0.92) 
Wave + 0.095 (1.77)* 0.192 (1.68)* -0.121 (-0.07) -0.483 ( -0.28) 
Intercept 1.068 (5.12)*** 2.030 (6.41)*** 2.395 (3 .98)*** . 3.623 (4.01)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 8.32% 9.18% 11.50% 12.16% 
n 419 413 419 413 
\0 
N 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and fmancial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3)both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _CSR + {31 T _Size + {32 T _Leverage + {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave 
+ I Yi Year _Dummy + I Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is either (1) the target firms' most recent CSR score before the 
M&A announcement date or (2) the average of the target firms' latest two years' CSR scores before the M&A announcement date. 
The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCl ESG's main five social rating areas: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-
specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the 
variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial 
statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE7 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' Component-Wise CSR Performance a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price to MV Acq Price to BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T _Community + 0.063 (1.67)* 0.573 (3.96)*** 
T _Diversity + 0.027 (1.85)* 0.493 (1.87)* 
T_Employee + -0.012 (-1.98)** 0.663 (0.06) 
T Environment + 0.112 (3.89)*** 0.609 (4.66)*** 
T Product + 0.102 (1.39) 0.376 (0.83) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.017 (1.82)* 0.958 (4.29)*** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.934 (-3.91)*** -0.234 (-2.47)*** 
T ROA + 0.497 (1.67)* 3.157 (4.41)*** 
T Growth + -0.043 (-0.87) 0.079 (0.47) 
A Size + -0.034 (-1.87)* -1.587 (-0.58) 
\0 A ROA + 0.004 (1.73)* 0.008 (1.85)* VJ 
A Growth ? 0.079 (0.31) 0.074 (0.45) 
A CSR ? 0.017 (1.68)* . 0.021 (2.47)*** 
Motive + 0.171 (2.65)** 0.014 (0.05) 
Pay_Method + -0.118 (-1.78)* -1.628 (-3.49)*** 
Hostile + -0.125 (-0.71) 0.679 (0.34) 
Comp_Bid + 0.058 (0.37) 0.712 (0.91) 
Wave + 0.171 (1.81)* 1.489 (0.09) 
Intercept 1.588 (5.68)*** 6.841 (4.39)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 11.57% 13.78% 
n 419 419 
\0 
~ 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-
statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following 
criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock 
and financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG 
database; and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_Community + a 2 T_Diversity + a 3 T_Employee + a 4 T_Environment +' a 5 T_Product 
+ {J1 T _Size + {J2 T _Leverage + {J3 T _ROA + {J4 T _Growth + Ps A_Size + {J6 A_ROA + {J7 A_ Growth 
+ {J8 A_CSR + {J9 Motive + {J10 Pay_Method + {J11 Hostile + {J12 Comp_Bid + {J13 Wave 
+ L Yi Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 
days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The 
main explanatory variables are target firms' decomposed CSR performance, which is target firms' most recent scores in five 
major CSR attributes in the MSCI ESG database, before the M&A announcement date. The attributes of target firms' CSR 
performance are: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The scores in each category is estimated 
as the total strengths minus total concerns in those five social rating areas. The model includes four groups of control variables: 
target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially explain 
the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported 
financial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
\0 
VI 
TABLES 
Mean Differences of the Selected Variables for High- and Low-CSR Acquirers a 
This table represents the mean statistics and the mean differences between the selected variables of the high- and low-
CSR acquirers. The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject 
to the following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are 
publicly traded and have stock and financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the 
targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC. All the 
variables are defmed in Appendix C. 
High-CSR-Acquirers Low-CSR-Acquirers Mean 
Variables n= 194 n=225 Difference t-stat 
Acq_Price _ to_ MV 1.569 1.376 0.193 1.742 ** 
Acq_Price_ to_BV 4.687 3.187 1.500 8.341 *** 
T CSR 1.146 -0.127 1.273 5.334 *** 
T _Average_ CSR 0.276 -0.589 0.865 6.819 *** 
T Size 9.923 9.016 0.907 2.131 ** 
T_Leverage 0.205 0.069 0~136 4.202 *** 
T ROA 0.006 0.216 -0.210 -3.210 *** 
T Growth 3.897 3.615 0.282 0.519 
A Size 10.501 9.394 1.107 4.418 *** 
A ROA 0.057 0.062 -0.005 -0.643 
A Growth 1.072 1.912 -0.840 -1.661 * 
A CSR 3.949 -2.443 6.392 12.092 *** 
A Average CSR 3.726 -2.339 6.065 10.081 *** 
a A high-CSR (low-CSR) acquirer is defined as an acquirer who has a CSR score above (equal or below) the median 
CSR score of the sample acquirers. The median CSR score for the sample acquirers is zero. 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 9 Panel A 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Quality (Sub Sample Analysis - Acquirers' CSR) a 
High-CSR Acquirers b Low-CSR Acquirers b 
Variable c Expt. Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_ Price_ to _BV Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_ Price_ to _B V Sign 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T CSR§ + 0.074 (3.19)*** 0.446 (4.87)*** 0.015 (1.82)** 0.351 (1.71)* 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 1.026 (0.39) -1.105 (-1.76)* -0.158 (-0.26) -0.871 (-1.66)* 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.985 (-5.92)*** -1.891 (-4.73)*** -0.683 (-4.78)*** -1.984 (-1.64)* 
T ROA + 0.046 (1.73)* 0.751 (3.13)*** 0.525 (1.82)* 0.406 (2.81)** 
T Growth + 0.027 (1.39) 0.607 (0.47) -0.013 (-0.57) 0.032 (0.27) 
A Size + 0.021 (1.72)* 1.021 (2.64)*** -0.054 (-2.01)** -0.143 (-0.16) 
A ROA + 0.379 (3 .96)*** 0.571 (0.24) 0.417 (2.17)** 1.025 (0.28) 
\0 
A Growth ? -2.014 (-0.89) 0.871 (0.89) -0.815 (-0.39) 0.179 (1.09) 0\ 
A CSR ? 0.007 (1.72)* 0.434 (2.41)*** 0.019 (0.19) -0.687 (-1.67)* 
Motive + 0.063 (1.74)* -0.778 (-0.31) 0.054 (2.28)** -0.950 ( -0.86) 
Pay_Method + -0.059 (-2.69)*** 0.214 (4.15)*** -0.011 (-0.23) -0.240 (-0.23) 
Hostile + -0.246 (-1.15) 1.619 (0.96) -0.038 ( -0.09) 1.252 (0.18) 
Comp_Bid + -0.562 (-0.37) 1.403 (0.84) 0.087 (0.61) 1.710 (0.47) 
Wave + 0.031 (2.72)*** 1.670 (1.66)* 0.410 (3.05)*** 2.171 (1.71)* 
Intercept 2.231 (8.19)*** 6.426 (7.21)*** 3.630 (8.61)*** 5.133 (6.29)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 14.36% 9.23% 10.02% 12.41% 
n 194 194 225 225 
\0 
-..) 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
§ F-test for equality: p-values are< 0.001 (column 1 vs. column 3) and <0.027 (column 2 vs. column 4) respectively. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: (1) 
deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial data 
in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and ( 4) deals 
have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _CSR + {31 T _Size + {32 T _Leverage + {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth+ · {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + f38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave 
+ L Yj Year _Dummy+ L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is target firms' most recent CSR score before the M&A 
announcement. The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating 
areas: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: 
target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the 
variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial 
statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. A high-CSR acquirer is defmed as an acquirer who has a CSR score above the median CSR score of the sample acquirers or who 
has a positive net CSR score. A low-CSR acquirer is defined as an acquirer who has a CSR score equal to or below the median CSR 
score ofthe sample acquirers or who has a zero or negative CSR score. The median CSR score for the sample acquirers is zero. 
c. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 9 Panel B 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR (Role of Acquirers' CSR) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T CSR + 0.018 (1.98)** 0.050 (3.98)*** 
High_ CSR _A (Dummy) ? 0.047 (0.29) 0.152 (3.93)*** 
T_ CSR X High_ CSR _A + 0.059 (2.48)** 0.820 (3.14)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? -0.014 (-0.44) -0.614 (-1.87)* 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.820 (-3.22)*** -1.792 (-5.13)*** 
T ROA + 0.355 (1.65)*** 0.756 (3 .26)*** 
T Growth + 0.014 (1.66)* 0.214 (0.66) 
A Size + 0.021 (2.64)** 0.001 (1.66)** 
A ROA + 0.529 (1.68)* 0.907 (0.68) 
10 -
00 A Growth ? 0.058 (1.25) 0.149 (0.89) 
A CSR ? 0.012 (1.14) -0.217 (-0.97) 
Motive + 0.150 (2.93)*** 0.456 (3.41)*** 
Pay_Method + -0.061 (-1.75)* 0.002 (1.86)** 
Hostile + -0.127 (-0.87) -0.201 (-0.55) 
Comp_Bid + 0.028 (0.24) 0.119 (0.31) 
Wave + 0.229 (2.68)** 1.416 (3.73)*** 
Intercept 1.586 (4.16)*** 3.297 (6.47)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 18.35% 13.61% 
n 419 419 
1.0 
1.0 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The 
t-statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the 
following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly 
traded and have stock and financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have 
coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, 
Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_premium = a0 + a 1 T_CSR + a 2 High_CSR_A + a 3 T_CSR X High_CSR_A + {31 T_Size + {32 T_Leverage 
+ {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA + {37 A_ Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive 
+ {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave + LYj Year _Dummy 
+ L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price 
(30 days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per 
share. The explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is the target firms' most recent CSR score 
before the M&A announcement date. The variable of interest in this Table is the interaction terms of targets' CSR 
socres and a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirers have superior quality CSR performance. The.CSR score 
is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-
specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain 
the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently 
reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 10 
Multi~le Rewessions of Acguisition Premium on Targets' Different CSR Scores {Sub Sam~le Anal!sis- Acguirers' CSR} a 
High-CSR Acquirers b Low-CSR Acquirers b 
Variable c Expt. Sign Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_Price_to~BV Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T _Community + 0.074 (1.87)* 0.163 (2.83)*** 0.029 (1.83)* 0.015 (1.65)* 
T _Diversity + 0.115 (1.99)** 0.053 (1.71)* 0.068 (2.05)** 0.085 (3.05)*** 
T ___ftmployee + -0.186 (-1.68)* 0.147 (0.13) -0.115 (-2.08)** 0.197 (0.27) 
T Environment + 0.434 (2.53)*** 0.791 (2.38)*** 0.349 (3.74)*** 0.538 (2.63)*** 
T Product + 0.145 (1.11) -0.963 (-0.38) 0.153 (1.52) -0.786 (-0.81) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.961 (0.18) -0.973 (-1.66)* -0.147 (-0.61) -0.854 (-3.21)*** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.679 ( -2.36)*** -0.794 (-3 .71)*** -0.264 (-2.01)** -0.673 (-3.10)*** 
T ROA + 0.039 (1.68)* 0.617 (2.61)*** 0.612 (1.66)* 0.314 (1.71)* 
........ T Growth + 0.149 (1.93)* 0.513 (1.06) -0.014 (-1.08) 0.961 (1.21) 0 
0 A Size + 0.016 (1.77)* 1.331 (1.69)* -0.069 ( -1.88)* 0.961 (0.34) 
A ROA + 0.491 (2.01)** 0.961 (2.11)** 0.014 (1.65)* 1.210 (3.68)*** 
A Growth ? -0.236 ( -0.17) 0.913 (1.16) 0.147 (0.03) 0.168 (0.12) 
A CSR ? 0.016 (1.90)* 0.463 (2.13)** 0.069 (1.19) 0.294 (1.41) 
Motive + 0.051 (2.09)** -0.639 (-0.47) 0.273 (2.41 )*** -0.464 (-0.75) 
Pay_Method + -0.049 (-2.63)*** 0.193 (2.13)** -0.189 (-0.67) 0.072 (1.67)* 
Hostile + 0.014 (0.61) 0.610 (0.19) 0.169 (1.08) 0.961 (0.14) 
Comp_Bid + -0.631 (-0.31) 0.110 (0.03) -0.249 (-0.91) 0.009 (0.02) 
Wave + 0.011 (1.83)* 0.967 (1.08) 0.019 (2.15)** 0.875 (1.70)* 
Intercept 1.456 (3.41)*** 6.394 (6.241)*** 1.659 (3.96)*** 7.468 (4.97)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-0 
-
AdjustedR2 
n 
18.02% 
194 
13.19% 
194 
12.09% 
225 
11.81% 
225 
*, **, ***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following · 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _Community + a 2 T _Diversity + a 3 T _Employee + a4 T _Environment + a 5 T _Product 
+ {11 T _Size + {12 T _Leverage + {13 T _ROA + {14 T _Growth+ {J5 A_Size + {16 A_ROA + {J7 A_ Growth + {18 A_CSR 
+ {J9 Motive + {110 Pay_Method + {111 Hostile + {112 Comp_Bid + {113 Wave +I Yj Year_Dummy 
+ I Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variables are target firms' decomposed CSR performance, which is target firms' most recent scores in five major CSR 
attributes in the MSCI ESG database, before the M&A announcement date. The attributes of target firms' CSR performance are: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The scores in each category is estimated as the total strengths 
minus total concerns in those five social rating areas. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, 
acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition 
premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of 
the M&A announcements. 
b. A high-CSR acquirer is defined as an acquirer who has a CSR score above the median CSR score of the sample acquirers or who 
has a positive net CSR score. A low-CSR acquirer is defined as an acquirer who has a CSR score equal to or below the median 
CSR score of the sample acquirers or who has a zero or negative CSR score. The median CSR score for the sample acquirers is 
zero. 
c. Variables are defined in Appendix C. D~endent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
...... 
0 
N 
TABLE 11 
Mean Differences of the Selected Variables for Large and Small Targets a 
This table represents the mean statistics and the mean differences of the selected variables for large and small targets. 
The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the 
following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly 
traded and have stock and financial data in CRSP and Compustat; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage 
in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals have the M&A related required data in SDC. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix C. 
Large Targets Small Targets Mean 
Variables n=210 n=209 Difference t-stat 
Acq_Price _ to_ MV 1.461 1.420 0.041 3.462 *** 
Acq_Price_ to_BV 3.226 4.550 -1.325 -1.058 
T CSR 1.195 -0.301 1.496 6.217 *** 
T _Average_ CSR 0.408 -1.545 1.953 8.771 *** 
T Size 9.268 6.502 2.765 9.617 *** 
T_Leverage 0.241 0.213 0.029 0.186 
T ROA 0.016 -0.014 0.030 1.110 
T Growth 2.756 3.431 -0.675 -0.120 
A Size 10.942 9.063 1.879 6.974 *** 
A ROA 0.021 0.069 -0.048 -0.009 
A Growth 0.985 1.540 -0.555 -0.021 
A CSR 1.430 -0.978 2.408 2.485 ** 
A_Average CSR 1.192 -0.313 1.505 1.786 * 
a A large target (small target) is defined as a target that is equal or falls above (below) the median size of the targets. 
Target size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets of the target. 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
Dependent and fmancial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 12 Panel A 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Performance (Sub Sample Analysis- Targets' Size) a 
Large Targets b Small Targets b 
Variable c Expt. Sign Acq_ Price_ to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_ Price_ to_ BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T CSR + 0.062 (2.30)** 0.895 (3.14)*** 0.018 (1.36) 0.366 (3.02)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.158 (1.74)* 0.169 (2.01)** -0.057 (-0.72) -0.512 (-0.69) 
T_Leverage - -0.879 (-2.56)*** -1.935 ( -3.32)*** -0.774 ( -2.18)** -1.204 (-1.97)** 
T ROA + 1.048 (1.96)* 0.648 (2.36)*** 0.056 (0.12) 0.467 (1.69)* 
T Growth + 0.012 (2.04)** 0.155 (1.32) 0.115 (1.06) 0.972 (1.75)* 
A Size + 0.027 (0.87) -0.089 (-0.21) 0.053 (1.70)* 0.107 (1.92)* 
A ROA + 0.087 (1.65)* 0.791 (0.32) 0.062 (1.66)* 0.079 (0.09) 
-
A Growth ? -0.035 (-1.72)* -0.025 (-0.36) -0.079 ( -0.07) -0.726 (-0.34) 0 
w A CSR ? 0.021 (1.66)* 0.213 (0.90) -0.013 (-0.57) 0.193 (0.33) 
Motive + 0.152 (1.65)* 1.845 (1.77)* 0.436 (2.66)*** 1.273 (1.66)* 
Pay_Method + 0.878 (2.96)*** 1.213 (1.95)** 0.706 (2.03)** 1.017 (2.84)*** 
Hostile + -0.069 (-0.34) 1.531 (0.94) -0.304 (-0.85) -0.212 (-0.37) 
Comp_Bid + -0.016 (-0.08) 1.579 (0.91) -0.095 (-0.37) 0.562 (0.77) 
Wave + 0.146 (1.98)** 0.236 (1.11) 0.275 (1.72)* -0.468 (-0.70) 
Intercept 1.683 (2.43)*** 3.012 (4.03)*** 3.129 (4.59)*** 4.732 (3.39)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 6.17% 8.27% 5.04% 7.41% 
n 210 210 209 209 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
3 The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subjectto the following criteria: (1) 
deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial data 
in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals 
have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _CSR + {31 T _Size+ {32 T _Leverage+ {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth+ {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave 
+I Yj Year _Dummy +I Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
o before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
~ 
explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is the target firms' most recent CSR score before the M&A 
announcement date. The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social 
rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control 
variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially 
explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported 
financial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. A large target is defined as a target firm that falls above the median or is equal to the median size of the targets. A small target is 
defined as a target firm, which falls below the median size of the targets. Target size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total 
assets of the target. 
c. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and fmancial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 12 Panel B 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR (Role of Targets' Size) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price_to_MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T CSR + 0.065 (3.99)*** 0.796 (4.29)*** 
Large_Targets (Dummy) + 0.068 (1.46) 0.029 (1.76)* 
T _ CSR X Large_ Targets + 0.128 (1.98)** 1.497 (2.96)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.002 (1.71)* 0.162 (1.84)* 
T_Leverage - -0.797 (-2.05)** -1.573 (-3.93)*** 
T ROA + 0.387 (3.09)*** 0.519 (4.19)*** 
T Growth + 0.128 (1.06) 0.001 (0.06) 
A Size + 0.090 (0.72) 0.029 (0.62) 
A ROA + 0.013 (1.80)* 0.029 (2.21)** 
....... 
-
0 A Growth ? -0.016 (-0.53) 0.290 (1.90)* Vl 
A CSR ? 0.587 (1.75)* 0.017 (0.99) 
Motive + 0.135 (1.66)* 1.826 (1.73)* 
Pay_Method + -0.055 (-0.49) 1.612 (0.61) 
Hostile + -0.116 (-0.59) 1.094 (0.59) 
Comp_Bid + 0.062 (0.34) 0.009 (1.07) 
Wave + 0.204 (1.97)** -0.569 (-1.01) 
Intercept 2.369 (6.34)*** 4.617 (4.09)*** 
A_Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 8.23% 11.32% 
n 419 419 
-0 
0'1 
*, **, ***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The 
t-statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013 . The sample includes the deals subject to the 
following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly 
traded and have stock and financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have 
coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, 
Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_premium = a0 + a 1 T _CSR + a 2 Large_Targets + a 3 T _CSR X Large_Targets + {31 T _Size 
+ {32 T _Leverage + {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth+ {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA + {37 A_ Growth + {38 A_CSR 
+ {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave 
+ L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' marketprice 
(30 days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per 
share. The explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is the target firms' most recent CSR score 
before the M&A announcement date. The variable of interest in this Table is the interaction terms of targets' CSR 
socres and a dummy variable indicating whether the is a large firm. The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths 
minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-
specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the variability in 
acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the · firms' most · recently reported financial 
statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 13 
Component-Specific Mean Difference Analysis between Large and Small Targets 
Panel A: Component-Wise Mean Difference: Large vs. Small Targets a 
Large Targets b Small Targets b 
Variablec Mean Median Mean Median Mean diff. t-stat 
T_ Community 0.171 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.098 (1.46) 
T_ Diversity 0.445 0.000 -0.091 0.000 0.536 (4.14)*** 
T_Employee 0.028 0.000 -0.236 0.000 0.265 (2.89)*** 
T Environment -0.204 0.000 -0.018 0.000 -0.186 (-2.66)*** 
T Product -0.336 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.264 (-3.43)*** 
- Panel B: Industry Distribution: Large vs. Small Targets a 0 
-...) 
Two-Digit Large Targets Small Targets 
Industry SIC n % ofsample n % ofsample 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 1 0.48% 3 1.44% 
Mining 10-14 6 2.86% 16 7.66% 
Manufacturing 20-39 87 41.43% 54 25.84% 
Transportation, communication, and utility 40-49 27 12.86% 24 11.48% 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 9 4.29% 17 8.13% 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 65 30.95% 51 24.40% 
Services 70-89 15 7.14% 44 21.05% 
Total 210 100.00% 209 100.00% 
Panel C: Industry- and Com~onent-Wise Mean Difference: Large vs. Small Targets a 
Large Targets 2-Dig. SIC T Comm T Divers T Employ T Environ T Prod 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 1.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 
Mining 10-14 0.343 -0.501 0.333 -0.167 0.217 
Manufacturing 20-39 0.277 0.646 0.108 -0.385 -0.354 
Transportation, communication and utility 40-49 0.001 0.547 0.002 -0.302 -0.340 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 0.455 0.636 -0.273 0.091 -0.455 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 0.255 0.333 0.006 0.024 -0.373 
Services 70-89 0.042 0.083 0.003 -0.042 -0.292 
Small Targets 2-Dig. SIC T Comm T Divers T Employ T Environ T Prod 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 0.000 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 
Mining 10-14 0.520 -0.444 -0.633 -0.222 0.046 
Manufacturing 20-39 -0.019 -0.259 -0.241 -0.056 -0.111 
...... Transportation, communication and utility 40-49 0.182 0.081 -0.091 0.076 0.011 0 
00 Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 0.445 0.057 -0.182 0.072 0.046 
· Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 0.111 0.556 -0.222 0.007 -0.111 
Services 70-89 0.067 0.012 -0.267 0.006 -0.313 
Mean Differences (Large vs. Small) 2-Dig. SIC T Comm T Divers T Employ T Environ T Prod 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 01-09 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000 
Mining 10-14 -0.177 -0.057 0.967 0.056 0.171 
Manufacturing 20-39 0.295 0.905 0.348 -0.329 -0.243 
Transportation, communication and utility 40-49 -0.181 0.466 0.093 -0.378 -0.351 
Wholesale trade and retail trade 50-59 0.010 0.579 -0.091 0.019 -0.501 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 60-67 0.144 -0.222 0.228 0.017 -0.261 
Services 70-89 -0.025 0.071 0.270 -0.048 0.022 
a This table presents component-wise and industry-wise mean differences for the different CSR attributes of the large and small 
....... 
0 
\0 
targets. The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following 
criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and 
fmancial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; 
and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. 
Panel A represents the means of five CSR attributes, arid the mean differences between large and small targets. The five CSR 
attributes are community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. For each attribute, the scores are estimated as the 
total strengths minus total concerns in each area in the MSCI ESG's social rating database. 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the mean differences. Panel B shows the industry distribution of the large and small targets. 
Targets' industries are classified based on the two-digit SIC codes. Panel C presents industry- and component-wise means, and 
mean-differences between large and small targets. 
b A large target is defined as a target firm that falls above the median or is equal to the median size of the targets. A small target is 
defmed as a target firm, which falls below the median size of the targets. Target size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total 
assets of the target. 
0 Variables are defined in Appendix C. 
TABLE 14 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premium on Targets' Decomposed CSR Scores (Sub Sample Analysis- Targets' Size) a 
Large Targets b Small Targets b 
Variable c Expt. Sign Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV Acq_ Price_ to_ MV Acq_Price _to_ B V 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T _Community + 0.128 (1.99)** 0.696 (1.72)* 0.739 (0.43) 0.288 (2.05)** 
T _Diversity + 0.076 (1.67)* 0.085 (2.41 )*** 0.077 (1.87)* 0.186 (1.80)* 
T _fimployee + -0.138 (-2.45)*** 0.497 (0.57) -0.066 (-1.65)* 0.015 (1.61) 
T Environment + 0.656 (3.40)*** 0.740 (1.96)** 0.183 (1.37) 0.198 (1.41) 
T Product + 0.051 (0.64) -0.319 (-0.24) 0.488 (0.53) -0.541 (-1.30) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.006 (1.68)* 0.063 (1.97)** 0.197 (0.65) -0.149 (-0.51) 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.929 (-3.20)*** -0.147 (-2.28)** -0.549 (-1.74)* -0.961 (-1.82)* 
T ROA + 0.355 (2.81 )*** 2.010 (3.15)*** 0.076 (1.82)* 0.467 (1.67)* 
...... T Growth + -0.058 ( -1.42) 0.254 (0.61) 0.541 (0.96) 0.961 (0.06) ...... 
0 A Size + 0.046 (1.69)* 0.064 (1.68)* -0.169 (-1.80)* 0.742 (0.97) 
A ROA + 0.004 (0.05) 0.778 (0.18) 0.067 (2.99)*** 0.691 (1.02) 
A Growth ? 0.071 (0.34) 0.071 (0.91) 0.461 (0.17) 0.479 (1.03) 
A CSR ? 0.018 (1.83)* 0.014 (1.76)* 0.493 (0.10) 0.197 (1.07) 
Motive + -0.057 (-0.46) -0.496 (-0.78) 0.699 (2.46)*** 0.490 (1.69)* 
Pay_Method + -0.016 (-1.67)* -2.781 (-2.83)*** -0.367 ( -2.93)*** -0.579 (-3.69)*** 
Hostile + 0.025 (0.47) 0. 789 (0.64) 0.461 (3.21)*** 0.910 (0.16) 
Comp_Bid + 0.945 (1.09) 0.431 (1.09) 0.249 (0.46) 0.004 (0.01) 
Wave + 0.255 (1.75)* -1.601 ( -U)7) 0.008 (0.99) 0.671 (1.07) 
Intercept 1.280 (3.89)*** 7.891 (1.69)* 1.903 (2.47)*** 6.368 (2.39)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-
-
-
AdjustedR2 
n 
18.24% 
210 
21.67% 
210 
11.69% 
. 209 
9.48% 
209 
*, **, ***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _Community + a 2 T _Diversity + a 3 T _Employee + a 4 T _Environment + a 5 T _Product 
+ {31 T _Size + {32 T _Leverage + {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth+ {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA + {37 A_ Growth + {38 A_CSR 
+ {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave +I Yi Year_Dummy 
+ I Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variables are target firms' decomposed CSR performance, which is target firms' most recent scores in five major CSR 
attributes in the MSCI ESG database, before the M&A announcement date. The attributes of target firms' CSR performance are: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The scores in each category is estimated as the total strengths 
minus total concerns in those five social rating areas. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, 
acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition 
premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of 
the M&A announcements. 
b. A large target is defined as a target firm that falls above the median or is equal to the median size of the targets. A small target is 
defmed as a target, which falls below the median size of the targets. Target size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total 
~ssets of the target. 
c. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 15 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums (Based on Average Market Price) on Targets' CSR Performance a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price_to_Average_MV (-35 to -25 days) 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T CSR + 0.038 (2.37)*** 
T _Average_ CSR + 0.053 (3.61)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.037 (1.72)* 0.034 (1.67)* 
T_Leverage - -0.950 (-4.11)*** -1.021 (-3.75)*** 
T ROA + 0.342 (1.68)* 0.337 (1.70)* 
T Growth + 0.075 (0.24) 0.046 (0.85) 
A Size + -0.055 (-3.89)*** -0.067 (-3.15)*** 
A ROA + 0.058 (1.09) 0.975 (0.96) 
A Growth ? -0.012 (-1.71)* -0.007 (-1.66)* 
-
A CSR ? 0.004 (1.74)* 0.006 (1.68)* 
-
-
N Motive + 0.158 (2.04)** 0.213 (2.11)** 
Pay_Method + -0.103 (-1.71)* -0.106 (-1.79)* 
Hostile + 0.002 (0.04) 0.014 (0.07) 
Comp_Bid + 0.044 (0.48) 0.056 (0.53) 
Wave + 0.255 (2.94)*** 0.174 (2.98)*** 
Intercept 1.756 (3.43)*** 1.079 (3.76)*** 
A_Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 12.30% 11.07% 
n 419 413 
...... 
...... 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and 
financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; 
and ( 4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the 
following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_CSR + {31 T_Size + {32 T_Leverage + {33 T_ROA + {34 T_Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave 
+ L Yj Year _Dummy+ L Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
w The dependent variable of this model is acquisition premium. Acquisition premium is the ratio of the acquisition price per share to 
the targets' average market price per share, 35 to 25 days prior to the first formal merger announcement. The main explanatory 
variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is either (1) the target firms' most recent CSR score before the M&A 
announcement date or (2) the average of the target firms' latest two years' CSR scores before the M&A announcement date. The 
CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific 
factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the variability in . 
acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior 
to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 16 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' Industry-Adjusted CSR Performance a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price_to_MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variable: 1 2 
Ind _Adjust_ T_ CSR + 0.043 (3.39)*** 0.773 (2.70)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.017 (1.65)* 0.698 (1.66)* 
T_Leverage - -0.897 (-3.95)*** -0.331 (-3.32)*** 
T ROA + 0.263 (1.66)* 2.598 (3.46)*** 
T Growth + 0.294 (1.69)* 0.017 (0.04) 
A Size + -0.598 (-0.52) 0.141 (1.65)* 
A ROA + 0.058 (1.71)** 0.575 (4.59)*** 
A Growth ? -0.291 (-0.61) 1.029 (0.94) 
A CSR ? 0.031 (1.79)* 0.153 (0.39) 
-
Motive + 0.135 (1.66)* 0.162 (1.69)** 
-.j:::.. Pay_Method + -0.076 (-1.67)* 0.156 (2.03)** 
Hostile + 0.007 (0.17) 0.267 (0.35) 
Comp_Bid + 0.974 (0.39) 1.439 (1.69)* 
Wave + 0.221 (1.68)* -0.897 (-0.44) 
Intercept 1.597 (4.98)*** 3.634 (3.79)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 9.11% 10.06% 
n 419 419 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: (1) 
deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial data 
in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals 
have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 Ind_Adjust_T _CSR + /11 T _Size + /12 T _Leverage + /13 T _ROA + /14 T _Growth + /15 A_Size + /16 A_ROA 
+ /17 A_Growth + f18 A_CSR + /19 Motive + /110 Pay_Method + /111 Hostile + /112 Comp_Bid + /113 Wave 
+I Yj Year _Dummy+ I Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
- The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
-v. before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is the target firms' industry adjusted CSR performance. Targets' industry-adjusted CSR performance is the 
difference between targets' most recent CSR score before the M&A announcement date and the mean CSR scores for the targets' 
industry (one-digit SIC-codes). The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five 
social rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control · 
variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially 
explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported 
fmancial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 17 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Performance (Post-2001 Impact) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price _to_ MV Acq_ Price _to_ B V 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T CSR + 0.027 (3.86)*** 0.648 (2.37)*** 
Post_2001 (Dummy) + 0.031 (1.66)* 0.042 (3.31)*** 
T CSRX Post 2001 ? 0.323 (1.01) 1.293 (1.09) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.026 (1.73)* 0.974 (2.27)** 
T_Leverage - -0.786 (-3.35)*** -0.182 (-1.75)* 
T ROA + 0.329 (1.68)* 2.719 (3.48)*** 
T Growth + 0.061 (3.89)*** 0.015 (1.92) 
A Size + -0.015 (-0.45) 0.042 (1.69)* 
A ROA + 0.059 (1.35)** ' 0.881 (0.43) 
....... 
-
....... A Growth ? -0.042 (-2.76)** 0.973 (1.09) 0\ 
A CSR ? 0.012 (1.73)* 0.267 (1.49) 
Motive + 0.139 (0.95) -0.089 (-0.36) 
Pay_Method + -0.054 (-1.96)** 0.872 (1.96)** 
Hostile + -0.364 (-0.28) 0.934 (1.65)* 
Comp_j3id + 0.394 (0.14) 1.294 (1.05) 
Wave + 0.589 (0.25) 1.718 (2.63)*** 
Intercept 1.629 (4.32)*** 4.691 (3.981)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 14.34% 16.67% 
n 419 419 
-
-.l 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The 
t-statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
8 The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the 
following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly 
traded and have stock and financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have 
coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and ( 4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, 
Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a 0 + a 1 T_CSR + a 2Post_2001 + a 3 T_CSR X Post_2001 + {11 T_Size + {12 T_Leverage 
+ {13 T _ROA + {14 T _Growth + {15 A_Size + {16 A_ROA + {17 A_ Growth + {18 A_CSR + {19 Motive 
+ {110 Pay_Method + {111 Hostile + {112 Comp_Bid + {113 Wave + L Yj Year_Dummy 
+ L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price 
(30 days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per 
share. The explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is the target firms' most recent CSR score 
before the M&A announcement date. The variable of interest in this Table is the interaction terms of targets' CSR 
socres and a dummy variable indicating whether the deal is in pre- or post-2001 periods. The CSR score is estimated as 
the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific 
factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the 
variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported 
financial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE 18 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Performance (Excluding Financial Industry)3 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_ Price _to_ BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T CSR + 0.069 (5.37)*** 0.559 (3 .11)*** 
T _Average_ CSR + 0.054 (4.35)*** 0.691 (3.28)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.012 (1.71)* 0.014 (1.67)* 0.515 (1.65)* 0.541 (1.72)* 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.064 ( -2.40)*** -0.043 (-2.41)*** -0.214 (-2.04)** -0.197 (-1.98)** 
T ROA + 0.049 (1. 72)* 0.046 (2.31)** 1.979 (2.83)*** 2.031 (2.34)*** 
T Growth + 0.094 (3.64)*** 0.114 (3.10)*** 0.027 (1.11) 0.041 (1.73)* 
A Size + -0.026 (-1.73)* -0.017 (-2.02)** 0.067 (1.83)* 0.051 (1.65)* 
A ROA + 0.049 (1.74)** 0.067 (1.69)** 0.695 (0.74) 0.172 (0.81) 
....... A Growth ? -0.017 (-2.61)*** -0.029 ( -2.43)*** 0.714 (1.04) 0.810 (0.98) 
....... 
00 A CSR ? 0.019 (1.66)* 0.013 (1.67)* 0.178 (1.14) 0.219 (1.03) 
Motive + 0.247 (2.03)** 0.217 (2.46)*** -0.531 (-3.07)*** -0.419 (-2.41)*** 
Pay_Method + -0.002 ( -1.07) -0.004 ( -0.27) 0.214 (1.68)* 0.192 (1.65)* 
Hostile + 0.224 (1.04) 0.179 (0.84) 0.213 (1.70)* 0.301 (2.17)** 
Comp_Bid + 0.951 (0.48) 0.518 (0.07) 0.012 (0.18) 0.066 (0.46) 
Wave + 0.017 (1.98)** 0.019 (2.01)** 0.716 (1.08) 0.614 (0.02) 
Intercept 1.699 (5.64)*** 1.079 (4.19)*** 3.567 (3.49)*** 3.991 (3.81)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 7.81% 8.02% 13.87% 12.07% 
n 323 320 323 320 
...... 
...... 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of339 U.S. M&A deals from 2002 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and fmancial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and ( 4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _CSR + {J1 T _Size + {J2 T _Leverage + {J3 T _ROA + {J4 T _Growth + Ps A_Size + {J6 A_ROA 
+ {J7 A_Growth + {J8 A_CSR + {J9 Motive + {J10 Pay_Method + {J11 Hostile + {J12 Comp_Bid + {J13 Wave 
+I Yj Year _Dummy +I Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
\0 The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is either (1) the target firms' most recent CSR score before the 
M&A announcement date or (2) the average of the target firms' latest two years' CSR scores before the M&A announcement date. 
The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-
specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the 
variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial 
statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
........ 
N 
0 
TABLE 19 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Performance (Considering the Toehold Impact) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price_to_MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 
T CSR + 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 
T_Leverage -
T ROA + 
T Growth + 
A Size + 
A ROA + 
A Growth ? 
A CSR ? 
Motive + 
Pay _Method + 
Hostile + 
Comp_Bid + 
Toehold -
Wave + 
Intercept 
A _Industry Fixed Effect 
Year-Fixed Effect 
Adjusted R2 
n 
1 
0.057 (2.09)** 
0.011 (1.72)* 
-0.821 (-3.47)*** 
0.376 (1.92)* 
0.016 (4.27)*** 
-0.021 (-1.81)* 
0.034 (1.65)* 
-0.017 (-1.81)* 
0.021 (1.72)* 
0.063 (3.42)*** 
-0.135 ( -1. 76)* 
0.016 (0.92) 
-0.135 (-0.76) 
-0.058 ( -0.55) 
0.174 (1.68)* 
1.623 (6.01)*** 
Yes 
Yes 
10.41% 
376 
2 
0.761 (3.46)*** 
0.907 (2.40)** 
-0.151 (-1.98)** 
2.671 (3.39)*** 
0.003 (2.05)** 
0.078 (0.28) 
.0741 (1.65)* 
1.213 (0.96) 
0.242 (1.57) 
-0.126 (-3.31)*** 
2.522 (2.26)** 
0.831 (2.07)** 
1.744 (0.98) 
-0.313 (-0.26) 
-0.217 (-0.94) 
3.649 (3.55)*** 
Yes 
Yes 
13.02% . 
376 
...... 
N 
...... 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.1 0, 0.05, and 0.0 1levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and ( 4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _CSR + {31 T _Size + /32 T _Leverage + {33 T _ROA + {34 T _Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313Toehold 
+ {314 Wave + L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is target firms' latest CSR performance prior to M&A announcements. The CSR score is estimated as the total 
strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, 
deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the 
financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A 
announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE20 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR Performance (Changes in CSR Performance) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price_to_MV Acq_ Price_ to _B V 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
L1 T CSR + 0.075 (3.21)*** 0.961 (3.96)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.016 (1.69)* 0.835 (2.93)*** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.746 (-3.32)*** -0.091 (-1.66)* 
T ROA + 0.114 (1.81)* 1.752 (4.38)*** 
T Growth + 0.098 (3.62)*** 0.014 (1.61)* 
A Size + -0.041 (-1.71)* 0.076 (1.06) 
A ROA + 0.047 (1.98)** 0.057 (1.71)* 
A Growth ? -0.012 (-1.66)* -0.146 (-0.67) 
A CSR ? 0.061 (1.69)* 0.491 (1.01) 
-
Motive + 0.136 (1.67)* -0.219 (-2.03)** N 
N Pay_Method + -0.065 (-2.16)** 1.029 (1.96)** 
Hostile + -0.131 (-0.90) 0.841 (1.78)* 
Comp_Bid + 0.115 (0.74) 0.025 (1.67)* 
Wave + 0.148 (2.37)*** -0.152 (-1.01) 
Intercept 1.590 (4.36)*** 4.561 (4.962)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 9.51% 13.06% 
n 413 413 
........ 
N 
w 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 413 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: (1) 
deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial data 
in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals 
have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 iJ_T_CSR + {31 T_Size + {32 T_Leverage + {33 T_ROA + {34 T_Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313 Wave 
+ L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is the changes in target firms' CSR performance prior to the M&As. To estimate the changes, target firms' last 
two years, prior to the M&As, CSR score have been considered. The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total 
concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The 
model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-
economic controls, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from 
the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE21 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR (Considering the Fixed-Rating Criteria in MSCI) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price _to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 3 4 
T CSR + 0.046 (2.17)** 1.982 (5 .33)*** 
T _Average_ CSR + 0.061 (3.92)*** 1.278 (3.14)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.023 (1.79)* 0.021 (1.68)* 0.710 (3.49)*** 0.691 (3.54)*** 
T_Leverage - -0.719 (-3.32)*** -0.759 (-3.71)*** -0.108 (-1.72)* -1.041 (-1.71)* 
T ROA + 0.237 (1.68)* 0.416 (1.84)* 2.105 (2.31)** 1.217 (3.74)*** 
T Growth + 0.092 (3.52)*** 0.226 (4.42)*** 0.021 (0.64) 0.054 (2.89)*** 
A Size + -0.067 ( -1.66)* -0.020 (-1.73)* 0.071 (0.58) 0.071 (0.71) 
A ROA + 0.022 (2.74)** 0.032 (1.71)* 0.629 (1.65)* 0.045 (0.101) 
-
A Growth ? -0.047 (-3.14)*** -0.062 (-2.96)*** 1.112 (1.01) -0.041 ( -0.48) 
N 
+:>. A CSR ? 0.196 (1.65)* 0.123 (1.65)* 0.631 (1.71) 0.420 (1.01) 
Motive + 0.297 (1.31)* 0.790 (2.42)*** -0.109 (-3.08)*** -0.317 (-3.01)*** 
Pay_Method + -0.079 (-4.09)*** -0.053 (-3.69)*** 1.782 (2.11)** 1.617 (2.21)** 
Hostile + -0.021 (-0.11) -0.124 (-0.56) 1.690 (2.62)*** 0.878 (2.31)** 
Comp_Bid + 0.184 (0.15) 0.219 (0.01) -1.091 (-0.11) -1.654 ( -0.51) 
Wave + 0.117 (1.67)* 0.324 (1 .67)* -0.017 ( -0.05) -0.503 (-0.10) 
Intercept 2.613 (4.31)*** 3.614 (3.27)*** 2.047 (3.91)*** 2.047 (6.32)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 7.11% 8.32% 9.31% 11.32% 
n 419 413 419 413 
-
. N 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_CSR + /31 T_Size + /32 T_Leverage + /33 T_ROA + /34 T_Growth + Ps A_Size + /36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {31; Comp_Bid + /313 Wave 
+ L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
v. The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is the target firms' CSRperformance, which is either (1) the target firms' most recent CSR score before the 
M&A announcement date or (2) the average of the target firms' latest two years' CSR scores before the M&A announcement date. 
The CSR score is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. This analysis considers 71 (fixed-rating) out of 90 rating 
criteria in MSCI databse. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, 
deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the 
financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A 
announcements. 
h. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Table 22 Panel A 
Distribution of Targets' Governance Quality 
Governance n Mean Std. Dev Min Ql Median Q3 Max 
T Governance 419 
-0.354 0.776 -3.000 -1.000 0 0 4.000 
-N 
0'1 
TABLE 22 Panel B 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR (Considering the Targets' Governance Quality) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price_to_MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T CSR + 0.042 (2.11)** 0.894 (3.66)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.024 (1.66)* 1.247 (2.51)** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.791 (-3.69)*** -0.111 (-1.91)** 
T ROA + 0.421 (1.81 )* 1.541 (3.69)*** 
T Growth + 0.027 (3.14)*** 0.023 (2.01)** 
T_ Governance ? -0.074 (-0.12) 1.679 (1.46) 
A Size + -0.032 ( -1. 74)* 0.157 (0.78) 
A ROA + 0.051 (1.69)* 0.074 (1.68)* 
A Growth ? -0.021 (-1.73)* 1.514 (0.06) 
....... 
N A CSR ? 0.029 (1.65)* 0.261 (1.04) 
-...l 
Motive + 0.051 (3.09)*** - 0.154 (-3.47)*** 
Pay_Method + -0.310 (-1.66)* 2.671 (2.21)** 
Hostile + 0.024 (0.54) 0.749 (2.94)*** 
Comp_}Jid + -0.167 (-0.49) 1.861 (0.55) 
Wave + 0.274 (1.67)* -0.364 (-0.74) 
Intercept 2.310 (5.14)*** 4.214 (4.55)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect . Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 11 .62% 14.91% 
n 419 419 
....... 
N 
*, **, ***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.011evels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and financial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_CSR + {31 T_Size + {32 T_Leverage + {33 T_ROA + {34 T_Growth + {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA 
+ {37 A_Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay_Method + {311 Hostile + {312 Comp_Bid + {313Toehold 
+ {314 Wave + L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
00 The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 days 
before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The main 
explanatory variable is target firms' latest CSR performance prior to M&A announcements. The CSR score is estimated as the total 
strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environnient, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, 
deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the 
financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A 
announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE23 
Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' CSR (Considering Strengths & Concerns Separately) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price_ to_ MV Acq_Price_to_BV 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T _ CSR _Strengths + 0.008 (1.71)* 0.657 (2.41)*** 
T CSR Concerns - -0.098 (-3.46)*** -1.120 (-3.63)*** 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.015 (1.71)* 0.774 (2.47)** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.617 (-3.66)*** -0.141 (-1.65)* 
T ROA + 0.429 (1.65)* 2.201 (3.67)*** 
T Growth + 0.542 (3.21)*** 0.015 (1.90) 
A Size + -0.214 (-0.04) 0.032 (1.66)* 
A ROA + 0.069 (2.34)** 0.791 (0.49) 
A Growth ? -0.031 (-1.76)* 1.201 (1.01) 
-
-
N A CSR ? 0.139 (1.66)* 0.364 (1.02) '-0 
Motive + 0.214 (0.41) -0.187 (-0.31) 
Pay_Method + -0.067 (-1.72)** 0.674 (1.98)** 
Hostile + -0.417 (-0.47) 1.047 (1.67)* 
Comp_Bid + 0.426 (1.20) 1.047 (0.05) 
Wave + 0.679 (0.21) 1.617 (2.41)*** 
Intercept 2.641 (5.21)*** 4.689 (3.91)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 16.94% 18.17% 
n 419 419 
....... 
lJ.J 
0 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The 
t-statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the 
following criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly 
traded and have stock and fmancial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have 
coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, 
Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a 0 + a 1 T _CSR_Strengths + a 2 T _CSR_Concerns + {11 T _Size+ {12 T _Leverage + {13 T _ROA 
+ {14 T _Growth + {15 A_Size + {16 A_ROA + {17 A_ Growth + {18 A_CSR + {19 Motive 
+ {110 Pay_Method + {111 Hostile + {112 Comp_Bid + {113 Wave + LYj Year_Dummy 
+ L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price 
(30 days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per 
share. The explanatory variable is the target firms' CSR performance, which is the target firms' most recent CSR score 
before the M&A announcement date. The variable of interest in this Table is the interaction terms of targets' CSR 
socres and a dummy variable indicating whether the deal is in pre- or post-2001 periods. The CSR score is estimated as 
the total strengths and total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social rating areas: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, and product. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, 
acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic controls, which potentially explain the variability 
in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial 
statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE24 
Multiple Regression of Acquisition Premium (Based on Average Stock Price) on Targets' Different CSR Attributes a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price to Average MV (average market price -35 to -25 days) 
Experimental Variables: 
T _Community + 0.043 (1.81)* 
T_Diversity + 0.010 (1.66)* 
T _flmployee + -0.022 (-1.81)** 
T Environment + 0.162 (4.17)*** 
T Product + 0.602 (0.73) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.017 (1.69)* 
T_Leverage - -0.974 (-3.26)*** 
T ROA + 0.447 (1.70)* 
T Growth + 0.043 (2.67)*** 
A Size + -0.127 (-1.96)** 
........ -
~ A ROA + 0.019 (1.81)* ........ 
A Growth ? -0.083 (-1.75)* 
A CSR ? 0.029 (L65)* 
Motive + 0.319 (1.84)** 
Pay _Method + -0.298 (-1.68)* 
Hostile + -0.005 ( -0.31) 
Comp_Bid + 0.391 (0.97) 
Wave + 0.270 (1.65)* 
Intercept 2.081 (4.14)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes 
AdjustedR2 13.22% 
n 419 
...... 
V.l 
N 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-statistics 
appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
3 The sample consists of419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following criteria: 
(1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock and fmancial 
data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG database; and (4) 
deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are based on the following 
model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_Community + a 2 T_Diversity + a 3 T_Employee + a 4 T_Environment + a 5 T_Product 
+ P1 T_Size + Pz T_Leverage + P3 T_ROA + P4 T_Growth + Ps A_Size + P6 A_ROA + P7 A_Growth + P8 A_CSR 
+ P9 Motive + P10 Pay_Method + P11 Hostile + P12 Comp_Bid + P13 Wave + LYi Year_Dummy 
+ L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The dependent variable, acquisition premium is the ratio of acquisition price per share to the targets' average market price per 
share, 35 to 25 days prior to the first formal merger announcement. The main explanatory variables are target firms' decomposed 
CSR performance, which is the target firms' most recent scores in five major CSR attributes in the MSCI ESG database, before the 
M&A announcement date. The attributes of the target firms' CSR performance are: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product. The scores in each category is estimated as the total strengths minus total concerns in those five social 
rating areas. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific 
factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially explain the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial 
variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE25 
Multiple Regressions of Acquisition Premiums on Targets' Component-Wise Industry-Adjusted CSR a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_ Price to MV Acq_ Price to B V 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
Ind _Adjust_ T _Community + 0.093 (1.79)* 0.614 (3.62)*** 
Ind _Adjust_ T _piversity + 0.047 (1.65)* 0.314 (2.49)*** 
Ind _Adjust_ T_ Employee + -0.028 (-2.69)** 0.401 (0.62) 
Ind _Adjust_ T _Environment + 0.156 (3.41)*** 0.739 (1.68)* 
Ind _Adjust_ t _Product + 0.141 (2.24)** -0.533 (-0.55) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.018 (1.67)* 0.943 (2.03)** 
T_Leverage 
-
-0.898 (-3.44)*** -0.712 (-1.69)* 
T ROA + 0.535 (1.85)* 2.313 (3.84)*** 
T Growth + -0.049 (-0.3 1) 0.047 (0.16) 
A Size + -0.034 (-1.82)** 0.296 (0.91) 
........ -
w A ROA + 0.039 (1.74)** 0.006 (0.97) w 
A Growth ? 0.781 (0.14) 0.018 (0.71) 
A CSR ? 0.016 (1.93)** 0.016 (1.66)* 
Motive + 0.164 (2.41)*** -0.251 (-0.61) 
Pay_Method + -0.118 (-0.89) -1.267 (-2.91)*** 
Hostile + -0.139 (-0.85) 0.481 (0.63) 
Comp_Bid + 0.219 (0.51) 1.890 (0.94) 
Wave + 0.233 (2.61)*** 0.032 (0.37) 
Intercept 1.436 (4.18)*** 4.697 (2.77)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 14.08% 15.02% 
n 419 419 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-
statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following 
criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock 
and fmancial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG 
database; and (4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T _Community + a 2 T _Diversity + a 3 T _Employee + a4 T _Environment + a 5 T _Product 
+ P1 T _Size + P2 T _Leverage + P3 T _ROA + P4 T _Growth+ Ps A_Size + P6 A_ROA + P7 A_ Growth 
+ P8 A_CSR + P9 Motive + P10 Pay_Method + P11 Hostile + P12 Comp_Bid + P13 Wave 
+ L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy+ Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 
~ days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. 
+>-
The main explanatory variable is the target firms' industry adjusted decomposed CSR performance. Targets' industry-adjusted 
scores are the difference between the targets' most recent scores of different CSR attributes before the M&A announcement 
date and the mean scores of that attributes for the targets' industry. The attributes of target firms' CSR performance are: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The scotes in each category is estimated as the total 
strengths minus total concerns in those five social rating areas. The model includes four groups of control variables: target-
specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially explain the 
variability in acquisition premiums. All of the financial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported financial 
statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
TABLE26 
Regressions of Premiums on Targets' CSR Components (Environmental Strengths and Concerns Separately) a 
Variable b Expt. Sign Acq_Price _to_ MV Acq_ Price_ to _B V 
Experimental Variables: 1 2 
T _Community + 0.051 (1.65)* 0.598 (3.84)*** 
T _Diversity + 0.033 (2.74)** 0.487 (1.77)* 
T_Employee + -0.014 (-1.68)* 0.204 (0.51) 
T_ Environment_ Strength + 0.147 (3.02)** 0.761 (4.66)*** 
T Environment Concern 
-
-0.782 (-4.69)*** -1.642 (-4.63)*** 
- -
T Product + 0.110 (1.01) 0.316 (0.33) 
Control Variables: 
T Size ? 0.019 (1.72)* 0.798 (3.89)*** 
T_Leverage - -0.834 (-3.87)*** -0.364 (-3.47)*** 
T ROA + 0.514 (1.66)* 2.176 (4.20)*** 
T Growth + -0.053 (-0.89) 0.069 (0.47) 
....... -
w A Size + -0.049 (-1.86)* -1.647 (-0.11) Vl 
A ROA + 0.021 (1.90)* 0.079 (1.79)* 
A Growth ? 0.314 (0.52) 0.004 (0.44) 
A CSR ? 0.247 (1.66)* 0.046 (3.47)*** 
Motive + 0.196 (2.74)** 0.079 (0.05) 
Pay_Method + -0.214 (-1.78)* -1.628 (-3.52)*** 
Hostile + -0.147 (-0.61) 0.749 (0.44) 
Comp_Bid + 0.067 (0.57) 0.321 (0.94) 
Wave + 0.189 (1.69)* 1.463 (0.19) 
Intercept 2.642 (4.36)*** 4.621 (6.11)*** 
A_ Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 16.57% 14.78% 
...... 
VJ 
0"1 
n 419 419 
*, **,***Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. The t-
statistics appear in the parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. 
a The sample consists of 419 U.S. M&A deals from 1992 to 2013. The sample includes the deals subject to the following 
criteria: (1) deal value disclosed in the SDC database; (2) both the acquirers and the targets are publicly traded and have stock 
and financial data in CRSP and Compustat databases; (3) both the acquirers and the targets have coverage in the MSCI ESG 
database; and ( 4) deals have M&A related required data in SDC Research & Analytics, Inc. database. Parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: 
Acq_Premium = a0 + a 1 T_Community + a 2 T_Diversity + a 3 T_Employee + a4 T_Environment_Strengths . 
+ a 5 T_Environment_Concerns + a 6 T_Product + {31 T_Size + {32 T_Leverage + {33 T_ROA + {34 T_Growth 
+ {35 A_Size + {36 A_ROA + {37 A_ Growth + {38 A_CSR + {39 Motive + {310 Pay _Method .+ {311 Hostile 
+ {312 C omp _Bid + {313 Wave + L Yj Year _Dummy + L Yk Industry _Dummy + Et 
The model employs two measures for the acquisition premiums: (1) acquisition price per share to targets' market price (30 
days before the M&A-announcement date) per share and (2) acquisition price per share to targets' book value per share. The 
main explanatory variables are target firms' decomposed CSR performance, which is target firms' most recent scores in five 
major CSR attributes in the MSCI ESG database, before the M&A announcement date. The attributes of target firms' CSR 
performance are: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. The scores in each category is estimated 
as the total strengths minus total concerns in those five social rating areas. The model includes four groups of control variables: 
target-specific factors, acquirer-specific factors, deal-specific factors, and macro-economic factors, which potentially explain 
the variability in acquisition premiums. All of the fmancial variables are selected from the firms' most recently reported 
. fmancial statements prior to the date of the M&A announcements. 
b. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Dependent and financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Examples of Press Release with M&A Insiders' Forecasts about 
Synergistic Benefits that the M&A Participants' Expect through Acquisitions 
Source: Bernile & Lyandresy (2010) 
Example 1: Bell Atlantic, GTE Merger: Cost Synergies Within 3 Yrs. 28 July 1998, 
Dow Jones News Service: 
Bell Atlantic and GTE said based on anticipated revenue and cost synergtes, the 
transaction is expected to add to earnings per share [ ... ] The companies said in a joint 
press release Tuesday that they see the transaction producing cost synergies totaling $2 
billion within three years of the deal's completion. The merged company is also expected 
to generate an additional $2 billion in revenue synergies. 
Example 2: Newell Faces a Big Challenge in Rubbermaid Takeover. It Hopes 
Newellization Can Revitalize Household-Products Maker. 3 November 1998, The 
Wall Street Journal: 
Newell Co., renowned for squeezing costs out of acquired companies, faces a tough test 
in its proposed $5 billion acquisition of Rubbermaid Inc. [ ... ] Newell Chief Executive 
John McDonough is promising that the merger plan, announced late last month, will 
deliver $300 million to $350 million in synergies by 2000, 25% of that from selling 
Rubbermaid products to Newell customers. [ ... ] Newell hopes Rubbermaid will 
accelerate the combined company's growth. Besides the usual cost savings, Mr. 
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McDonough predicts the merger will produce $70 million to $90 million in new sales by 
2000 as Newell introduces its customers to Rubbermaid. [ ... ] 
Example 3: Food Lion Will Buy Hannaford For About $3.3 Billion, Plus Debt. 19 
August 1999, Dow Jones Business News: 
Food Lion Inc. Wednesday confmned it will acquire supermarket operator Hannaford 
Bros. Co. for about $3.3 billion in cash and stock, a deal that would create the sixth-
largest food retailer in the U.S. [ ... ] The combined Food Lion and Hannaford will have 
nearly $14 billion in pro-forma annual revenue. The combined company is expected to 
result in synergies estimated at about $40 million in the first year and about $75 million 
annually by the third year. Operations that may be affected include distribution, 
information systems, training and marketing. [ ... ] 
Example 4: Hilton to buy Promus Hotel for $4 billion. 7 September 1999, Reuters: 
Hilton Hotels Corp. on Tuesday said it would buy Promus Hotel Corp. for $4 billion in 
cash, stock and debt, creating a giant with 1, 700 hotels and operations in almost every 
segment of the industry. [. . . ] The combined company will have pro forma 2000 
EBITDA of $1.3 billion, and result in annual cost savings and operating efficiencies of 
about $55 million in the fust year and $90 million thereafter. [ ... ] 
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APPENDIX B: CSR Variable Definitions and MSCI CSR Rating Criteria 
PART A: CSR Variable Definitions and Rating Criteria for Each CSR Attribute in 
MSCI KLD Databases 
CSR Attributes Rating Criteria Variable Defmition 
- Charitable Giving T_ Community 
- Innovative Giving 
- Support for Housing It is the difference 
-= -
Support for Education between the target 
tn 
= ~ - Non-US Charitable Giving firms' total 
-
..... 
~ 00 - Volunteer Programs number of 
~ 
~ Community Engagement community ~ -
~ - Other Strengths strengths and total 
~ Total Number of Community Strengths number of 0 
u 
Investment Controversies 
community 
-
concerns. 
- Community Impact Concern 
= Community lists 7 
-
Tax Disputes ~ -
~ 
strength areas and = C> 
- Other Concerns u 3 concern areas. 
Total Number of Community Concerns 
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CSR Attributes Rating Criteria Variable Definition 
- CEO T_ Diversity 
- Promotion 
- Board of Directors - Gender It is the difference 
- Work-Life Benefits between the 
-= 
-
Minority Contracting target firms' total 
tJ> 
Employment of the Disabled number of 
= -~ 
.. 
.... Gay and Lesbian Policies diversity rJJ. -
- Employment of Underrepresented strengths and 
~ Groups total number of 
Eo-< 
"""'" Other Strengths diversity rJJ. -~ 
~ Total Number of Diversity Strengths concerns. 
~ Diversity lists 9 
- Investment Controversies strength areas and 
- Workforce Non-Diversity 6 concern areas. 
- Non-Representation 
= .. Directors - Gender Concern ~ -Cj 
= Q 
- Directors - Minorities Concern u 
- Other Concerns 
Total Number of Diversity Concern 
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CSR Attributes Rating Criteria Variable Defmition 
- Union Relations T_Employee 
- No-Layoff Policy 
- Cash Profit Sharing It is the difference 
-
Employee Involvement between the 
- Health-Care Benefits target firms' total 
- Retirement Benefits Strength number of 
~ - Employee Health and Safety employee 
= Supply Chain Labor Standards strengths and ~ -
-
..... 
rJ1 Compensation & Benefits total number of -
-
Employee Relations employee 
~ - Professional Development 
concerns. 
>= - Human Capital Management 
Employee 
0 
~ 
- Emp. Relations Other Strength relation lists 13 ~ 
~ Total Number of Employee Strengths strength areas and ~ 
6 concern areas. 
-
Union Relations Concerns 
-
Health & Safety Concerns 
- Workforce Reductions 
= -
Retirement Benefits Concern 
-
~ 
~ Supply Chain Concern 
= 
-
~ 
u Child Labor-Management -
Relations 
Total Number of Employee Concerns 
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CSR Attributes Rating Criteria Variable Definition 
- Environmental Opportunities 
- Waste Management 
- Packaging Materials & Waste 
- Climate Change 
- Hazardous Management 
.=: Property, Plant, Equipment T_ Environment ..... -btl 
= ~ Environmental Management 
.b -
00 It is the difference 
- Water Stress 
- Biodiversity & Land Use between the target 
Raw Material Sourcing firms' total number -
Other Strengths of environmental ~ -
z strengths and total ~ Total Number of Environment Strengths 
z Hazardous Waste number of ~ - Regulatory environmental - Ozone Depleting concerns. ~ -
Toxic Spills & Releases Environmental -
Agriculture criteria lists 11 -
- Climate Change 
strength areas and 12 
= 
"" 
concern areas. ~ Impact of Products & Services ~ -
= = Biodiversity & Land Use u -
- Operational Waste 
- Supply Chain Management 
- Water Management 
- Other Concerns 
Total Number of Environment Concerns 
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CSR Attributes Rating Criteria Variable Definition 
- Quality 
- R&D, Innovation 
- Social Opportunities 
-= b.cJ 
- i\ccesstoFinance 
= Q,) 
Other Strengths T Product a. -... 
-00 
Total Number of Product Strengths 
It is the difference 
E-1 between the target u 
I:J 
~ - Product Quality & Safety firms ' total number 
0 Marketing & i\dvertising of product related ~ -~ 
- i\nticompetitive Practices strengths and total 
= 
- Customer Relations number of product a. Q,) 
Other Concerns CJ - related concerns. 
= = u Total Number of Product Concerns Product criteria lists 
11 strength areas and 
12 concern areas. 
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PART B: A Details on MSCI ESG Rating Criteria 
Source: MSCI ESG STATS User Guide & ESG Ratings Definition, May 2013 
l) COMMUNITY 
STRENGTHS 
Charitable Giving 
The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings 
before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its 
giving. In 2002, MSCI ESG renamed the Generous Giving as Charitable Giving. 
Innovative Giving 
The company has a notably innovative giving program that supports nonprofit 
organizations, particularly those promoting self-sufficiency among the 
economically disadvantaged. Companies that permit nontraditional federated 
charitable giving drives in the workplace are often noted in this section as well. 
Non-US Charitable Giving 
The company has made a substantial effort to make charitable contributions 
abroad, as well as in the U.S. To qualify, a company must make at least 20% of its 
giving, or have taken notably innovative initiatives in its giving program, outside 
the U.S. 
Support (or Housing 
The company is a prominent participant in public/private partnerships that support 
housing initiatives for the economically disadvantaged, e.g., the National Equity 
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Fund or the Enterprise Foundation. 
Support for Education 
The company has either been notably innovative in its support for primary or 
secondary school education, particularly for those programs that benefit the 
economically disadvantaged, or the company has prominently supported job-
training programs for youth. In 1994, MSCI . ESG added the Support for 
Education. 
Indigenous Peoples Relations 
The company has established relations with indigenous peoples in the areas of its 
proposed or current operations that respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human 
rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous peoples. MSCI ESG began 
assigning this strength in 2000. In 2002 MSCI ESG moved this strength rating 
into the Human Rights area. 
Volunteer Programs 
The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program. In 2005, MSCI ESG 
added the Volunteer Programs Strength. 
Other Strength 
The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind g1vmg program or 
engages in other notably positive community activities. 
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CONCERNS 
Investment Controversies 
The company is a financial institution whose lending or investment practices have 
led to controversies, particularly ones related to the Community Reinvestment 
Act. 
Negative Economic Impact 
The company's actions have resulted in maJor controversies concermng its 
economic impact on the community. These controversies can include issues 
related to environmental contamination, water rights disputes, plant closings, · 
"put-or-pay" contracts with trash incinerators, or other company actions that 
adversely affect the quality of life, tax base, or property values in the community. 
Indigenous Peoples Relations 
The company has been involved in serious controversies with indigenous peoples 
that indicate the company has not respected the sovereignty, land, culture, human 
rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples. MSCI ESG began 
assigning this concern in 2000 and in 2002 it moved this into the Human Rights 
area. 
Tax Disputes 
The company has recently been involved in major tax disputes involving Federal, 
state, local or non-U.S. government authorities, or is involved in controversies 
over its tax obligations to the community. In 2005, MSCI ESG moved Tax 
Disputes from Corporate Governance to Community. 
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Other Concern 
The company is involved with a controversy that has mobilized community 
opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy community controversies. Other 
factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of 
involvement in development-related legal cases, and criticism by NGOs and/or 
other third-party observers. 
2) DIVERSITY 
STRENGTHS 
CEO 
The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a minority 
group. 
Promotion 
The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and 
minorities, particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the 
corporation. 
Board o(Directors 
Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more (with no double 
counting) on the board of directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the 
board numbers less than 12. 
Work/Life Benefits 
The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing 
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work/life concerns, e.g., childcare, elder care, or flextime. In 2005, MSCI ESG 
renamed this strength from Family Benefits Strength. 
Women & Minority Contracting 
The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, or has a demonstrably strong 
record on contracting, with women and/or minority-owned businesses. 
Employment of the Disabled 
The company has implemented innovative hiring programs; other innovative 
human resource programs for the disabled, or otherwise has a superior reputation 
as an employer of the disabled. 
Gay & Lesbian Policies 
The company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and 
lesbian employees. In particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners of 
its employees. In 1995, MSCI ESG added the Gay & Lesbian Policies Strength, 
which was originally titled the Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies strength. 
Employment o( Underrepresented Groups 
This indicator measures a firm's efforts to promote diversity in its workforce. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, its recruitment 
efforts to women and minority communities, and its participation in multi-
stakeholder diversity initiatives. 
Other Strength 
The firm has made a commitment to diversity that is not covered by other ratings. 
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CONCERNS 
Controversies 
The company has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties as a result of 
affirmative action controversies, or has otherwise been involved in major 
controversies related to affirmative action issues. 
Non-Representation 
This indicator measures the diversity of a firm's workforce. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, the percentage of women and minorities 
in senior management. 
Board o[Directors 
This indicator measures the diversity of a firm's board. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, the representation of women and 
minorities on the board, with adjustment for nation-specific demographic 
conditions. 
Other Concern 
The company is involved in diversity controversies not covered by other ratings. 
3)EMPLOYEE 
STRENGTHS 
Union Relations 
The company has taken exceptional steps to treat its unionized workforce fairly. 
MSCI ESG renamed this strength from Strong Union Relations. 
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No-Layoff Policy 
The company has maintained a consistent no-layoff policy. MSCI ESG has not 
assigned strengths for this issue since 1994. 
Cash Profit Sharing 
The company has a cash profit-sharing program through which it has recently 
made distributions to a majority of its workforce. 
Employee Involvement 
The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership through 
. stock options available to a majority of its employees; gain sharing, stock 
ownership, sharing of financial information, or participation in management 
decision making. 
Retirement Benefits Strength 
The company has a notably strong retirement benefits program. MSCI ESG 
renamed this strength from Strong Retirement Benefits. 
Health and Safety Strength 
The company has strong health and safety programs. 
Supply Chain Policies, Programs & Initiatives 
This indicator measures a firm's policy commitments and management systems 
designed to monitor the human and labor rights performance of its suppliers and 
contractors. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, the 
protection of supply chain workers' rights, including freedom of association, 
freedom from forced labor and child labor, safe working environments and other 
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rights described by the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions and 
other applicable standards, and initiatives towards improving the labor conditions 
of its supply chain workforce. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are 
not limited to, efforts to use purchasing power to improve performance, company-
led programs that improve the labor conditions and health of supply chain 
workers, and participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives. 
Other Strength 
The company has strong employee relations initiatives not covered by other 
ratings. 
CONCERNS 
Union Relations 
The company has a history of notably poor union relations. MSCI ESG renamed 
this concern from Poor Union Relations. 
Health and Safety Concern 
The company recently has either paid substantial fines. or civil penalties for willful 
violations of employee health and safety standards, or has been otherwise 
involved in major health and safety controversies. 
Workforce Reductions 
The company has made significant reductions in its workforce in recent years. 
Supply Chain Controversies 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's supply 
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chain. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of 
involvement in supply chain related legal cases, widespread or egregious 
instances of abuses of supply chain employee labor rights - including forced 
labor, supply chain employee safety, resistance to improved practices, and 
criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
Retirement Benefits Concern 
The company has either a substantially under-funded defined benefit pension 
plan, or an inadequate retirement benefits program. In 2004, MSCI ESG renamed 
this concern from Pension/Benefits Concern. 
Other Concerns 
The company is involved in an employee relations controversy that is not covered 
by other MSCI ESG ratings. 
4) ENVIRONMENT 
STRENGTHS 
Beneficial Products and Services 
This indicator measures the positive environmental impact of a frrm' s products 
and/or services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
products/services that reduce other firms ' and individuals' consumption of 
energy, production/consumption of hazardous chemicals, and overall patterns of 
resource consumption. 
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Pollution Prevention 
This indicator measures a firm's method of mitigating non-carbon air emissions, 
water discharges, and solid waste from its operations. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, initiatives to reduce a firm's non-carbon 
air emissions from its operations; to reduce the release of raw sewage, industrial 
chemicals, and other regulated substances; to reduce hazardous and non-
hazardous waste; and programs to reduce the use of packaging materials, to 
support for recycling; and to recycle old products such as televisions, refrigerators 
and other consumer electronics. 
Recycling 
This indicator measures a firm's use of recycled materials in its products/services. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to: assessment of the 
volume and recycled content of products made with recycled input materials, 
including paper, metal, plastic; and any certification of its practices by a third 
party, such as the Forest Stewardship Council for timber product companies. 
Clean Energy 
This indicator measures a firm's policies regarding climate change. Factors 
affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, acknowledgement of 
direct and/or indirect impacts on operations due to climate change and formal 
commitments to: reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and initiatives to reduce 
energy consumption and to increase the use of renewable energy. 
153 
Management Systems 
This indicator measures a firm's monitoring and management of its environmental 
practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, the 
establishment and monitoring of environmental performance targets, the presence 
of environmental training and communications programs for employees, and 
stakeholder engagement. 
Other Strength 
This indicator measures a firm's environmental management policies. Factors 
affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a stated commitment to: 
integrate environmental considerations into all operations; reduce environmental 
impact of operations, products and services; and comply with regulations. 
CONCERNS 
Regulatory Compliance 
This indicator measures firms' compliance record with environmental regulations. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, fmes/sanctions for 
causing environmental damage, and/or violations of operating permits. 
Substantial Emissions 
This indicator measures a firm's emission of toxic chemicals according to data 
from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) database of information on toxic chemical releases and waste 
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management activities. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not 
limited to, how the firm compares to its industry peers. 
Climate Change 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's climate 
change related policies and initiatives. Factors affecting this evaluation include, 
but are not limited to, a history of involvement in greenhouse gas (GHG)-related 
legal cases, widespread or egregious impacts due .to corporate GHG emissions, 
resistance to improved practices, and criticism by non-governmental 
organizations (NdOs) and/or other third-party observers. In addition, factors 
cover whether a company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil 
and its derivative fuel products, or whether the company derives substantial 
revenues indirectly from the combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel 
products. 
Negative Impact of Products & Services 
This indicator measures the negative environmental impact of a firm's products 
and/or services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
products/services that involve regulated substances, the production/consumption 
of hazardous chemicals, and controversial products such as those that use 
genetically modified organisms or nanotechnology. 
Land Use & Biodiversity 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's use or 
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management of natural resources. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but 
are not limited to, a history of involvement in natural resource-related legal cases, 
widespread or egregious impacts due to the firm's use of natural resources, 
resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other observers. 
·Non-Carbon Emissions 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's non-GHG 
emissions. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a 
history of involvement in land, air, or water emissions-related legal cases, 
widespread or egregious impacts due to corporate non-GHG emissions, resistance 
to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
Other Concerns 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's 
environmental impact. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not 
limited to widespread or egregious environmental impacts, resistance to improved 
practices, criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers, and any other 
environmental controversies not covered by other environmental ratings. 
S)PRODUCT 
STRENGTHS 
Quality 
This indicator measures a firm's efforts to improve the safety and health effects of 
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its products/services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited 
to, customer health and safety policies, participation in industry or multi-
stakeholder initiatives, and openness to third party oversight of its practices. 
Benefits to Economically Disadvantage 
This indicator measures the positive community impact of a firm's operations. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include bottom-of-the-pyramid efforts that 
benefit the disadvantaged such as access to medicine initiatives, access to 
education, and appropriate technology products. 
R&D/Innovation 
The company is a leader in its industry for research and development (R&D), 
particularly by bringing notably innovative products to market. 
Access to Capital 
This indicator measures the positive impact of a firm's products. Factors affecting 
this evaluation include, but are not limited to, strong commitment to 
microfinance, and community development loans and investments. 
Other Strength 
The company's products have notable social benefits that are highly unusual or 
Unique for its industry. 
CONCERNS 
Product Safety 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to the quality/safety 
of a firm's products and services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are 
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not limited to, a history of involvement in product safety-related legal cases, 
widespread or egregious instances of recalls or fines due to defective or unsafe 
products and services, resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs 
and/or other third-party observers. 
Marketing/Contracting Concern 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's marketing 
and advertising practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not 
limited to, widespread or egregious instances of false, discriminatory, or improper 
marketing/advertising, marketing targeted at disadvantaged groups, resistance to 
improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third party observers. 
Antitrust 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's anti-
competitive business practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are 
not limited to, a history of involvement in anti-trust legal cases, widespread or 
egregious instances of price-fixing, collusion, or bid-rigging, resistance to 
improved practices, and evidence-based criticism by NGOs and/or other third-
party observers. 
Customer Relations Concern 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm's customer 
relations. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history 
of involvement in customer-related legal cases, predatory lending, widespread or 
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egregiOus instances of discrimination, fraud or unfair treatment, resistance to 
improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
Other Concern 
The company has major controversies with its franchises, is an electric utility with 
nuclear safety problems, defective product issues, or is involved in other product-
related controversies not covered by other MSCI ESG ratings. 
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APPENDIX C: A Detailed List of the Definitions of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Depended Variable Variable Definitions Data Source 
(1) Acquisition price per share to target's stock price per share. 
Acq_Price _to_ MV Targets' stock price is the stock price 30 days prior to the first SDCandCRSP 
merger announcement. 
(2) Acquisition price per share to target's average stock price per 
Acq_Price _to_ Average_ MV 
share. Targets' average stock price is estimated based on the 10- SDC andCRSP days (-35,-25) average of the target's stock price per share prior 
to the first merger announcement. 
(3) Acquisition price per share to target's book value per share. 
Book value is estimated based on the target firms' most recently SDC and 
Acq_ Price _to_ B V 
reported financial statements prior to the date of the M&A COMPUSTAT 
announcements. 
Explanatory Variables Expected Signs and Defmitions Data source 
Target Firms' Net CSR Scores 
The target firms' most recent net CSR score before the 
M&A announcement date. The net CSR score is estimated 
T_CSR + as the total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI MSCIESG 
ESG's main five social rating areas: community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. 
--
-0'1 
-
Explanatory Variables 
T _Average_ CSR 
Ind _Adjust_ T _ CSR 
L1 T CSR 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
Expected Signs and Definitions Data source 
The average of the target firms' latest two years' net CSR 
scores before the M&A announcement date. The net CSR 
score for each year is estimated as the total strengths 
MSCIESG 
minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main five social 
rating areas: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product. 
Targets' industry-adjusted net CSR performance is the 
difference between targets' most recent CSR score before 
the M&A announcement date and the mean CSR scores MSCIESG 
for the targets' industry. Targets' industry is defined by 
the one-digit SIC-codes. 
Target firms' changes in net CSR performance prior to the 
M&A announcements. To estimate the changes, target 
firms' last two years, prior to the M&As, CSR score have 
been considered. The CSR score is estimated as the total MSCIESG 
strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's main 
five social rating areas: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, and product. 
I 
....... 
0'1 
N 
Explanatory Variables 
Targets' Decomeosed CSR Scores 
T _Community + 
T_Diversity + 
T_Employee + 
T Environment + 
T_Product + 
Expected Signs and Definitions Data source 
It is the difference between the target firms' total number 
of community strengths and total number of community MSCIESG 
concerns. Community lists 7 strength and 3 concern areas. 
It is the difference between the target firms' total number 
of diversity strengths and total number of diversity MSCIESG 
concerns. Diversity lists 9 strength and 6 concern areas. 
It is the difference between the target firms' total number 
of employee relation strengths and total number of 
MSCIESG 
employee relation concerns. Employee relation lists 13 
strength areas and 6 concern areas. 
It is the difference between the target firms' total number 
of environmental strengths and total number of 
MSCIESG 
environmental concerns. Environmental criteria lists 11 
strength areas and 12 concern areas. 
It is the difference between the target firms' total number 
of product related strengths and total number of product 
MSCIESG 
related concerns. Product criteria lists 11 strength areas 
and 12 concern areas. 
--
........ 
0'1 
VJ 
Explanatory Variables 
Target-S12.ecific Controls 
T Size 
T_Leverage 
T ROA 
T Growth 
Acq_uirer-S12.ecific Controls 
A Size 
A ROA 
A Growth 
A_CSR 
? 
-
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
Expected Signs and Definitions Data source 
Natural logarithm of targets' total market value CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
Target firms' total liabilities divided by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Target firms' net income divided by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Target firms' market price per share to book value per CRSP and 
share COMPUSTAT 
Natural logarithm of acquirers' market value of equity CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
Acquirers' net income divided by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Acquirers' market price per share to book value per share CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
Acquirers' most recent net CSR score before the M&A 
announcement date. The net CSR score is estimated as the 
total strengths minus total concerns in the MSCI ESG's MSCIESG 
main five social rating areas: community, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, and product. 
....... 
01 
~ 
Explanatory Variables Expected Signs and Definitions 
Deal-Seeciflc Controls 
Dummy variable (a value of one if the acquirer has a 
Motive + 
diversification motive, zero otherwise). Diversification 
motive is defined if the target and the acquirer have 
different two-digit SIC codes. 
Pay_Method + 
Dummy variable (a value of one if it is a cash-financed 
acquisition and zero otherwise) 
Hostile + 
Dummy variable (a value of one if it is hostile takeover 
and zero otherwise) 
CompBid + Natural logarithm of number ofbidders 
Toehold 
Number of the target's share already held by the acquirer 
- divided by the targets' total shares 
Macroeconomic Control and Other Variables 
Wave + 
Four-year indicator variables for the high merger periods 
of 1997 to 2000 and 2005 to 2008. 
Post 2001 ? 
Dummy variable is (a value of one if the time period of 
the deal is from 2002 to 2013 and zero otherwise) 
T_CSRX Post_2001 + 
The interaction term ofT_ CSR and the dummy variable 
Post 2001 
----- - -
Data source 
COMPUSTAT 
SDC 
SDC 
SDC 
SDC 
BffiLIOGRAPHY 
Abbott, W. F. and Monsen J. R. 1979. On the measurement of corporate social 
responsibility: Self-reported disclosures as a method of measuring corporate 
social involvement. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 22(3): 501-515. 
Aktas, N., de Bodt, E., and Cousin, J. G. 2011. Do financial markets care about SRI? 
Evidence from mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
35(7): 1753-1761. 
Albuquerque, R., Durnev, A., and Koskinen, Y. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and 
firm risk: Theory and empirical evidence. Working Paper. 
Alexander, G. J., and Buchholz, R. A. 1978. Corporate social performance and stock 
market performance. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 21: 4 79-486. 
Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K. P., Terhaar, L. and Travlos, N. G. 2013. Deal Size, 
Acquisition Premia and Shareholder Gains. Journal of Corporate Finance. Vol. 
20: 1-13. 
Al-Tuwaijri, S. A., T. E. Christensen, and K. E. Hughes, II. 2004. The relations among 
environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and economic 
performance: A simultaneous equations approach. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society. Vol. 29: 447-471. 
Anderson, J. C., and A. W. Frankie. 1980. Voluntary social reporting: An iso-beta 
portfolio analysis. Accounting Review. Vol. 55: 467-479. 
Appelbaum, S. H., Roberts, J. and Shapiro, B. T., 2009. Cultural strategies in M&As: 
Investigating ten case studies. Journal of Executive Education, Vol. 8 (1): 33-58. 
Asquith, P. 1983. Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns, Journal of Financial 
Economics. Vol. 11: 51-83. 
Aupperle, K. E., Carroll, A. B., and Hatfield. J.D. 1985. An empirical examination of the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. 28: 446-463. 
165 
Ayers, B. C., Lefanowicz, C. E. and Robinson, J. R. 2003. Shareholder taxes in 
acquisition premiums: The effect of capital gains taxation. Journal of Finance. 
Vol. LVIII (6): 2783-2801. 
Banaszak-Holl J, Berta WB, Bowman DM, Baum JAC, Mitchell W. 2002. The rise of 
human service chains: antecedents to acquisitions and their effects on the quality 
of care in U.S. nursing homes. Managerial and Decision Economics Vol. 23: 261. 
Banker, R. D., and Mashruwala, R. 2007. The moderating role of competition in the 
relationship between nonfmancial measures and future financial performance. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 24 (3): 763-93. 
Banker, R. D., Potter, G., and Srinivasan, D. 2000. An empirical investigation of an 
incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting 
Review. Vol. 75, (1): 65-92. 
Barnea, A., and Rubin, A. 2010. Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between 
shareholders. Journal of Business Ethics. Vol. 97: 71-86. 
Barnett, M. L. 2007. Stakeholder influence capacity and the variability of financial 
returns to corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management Review. Vol. 
32: 794-816. 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, Vol. 17: 771-792. 
Bartkus, B., Morris, S., and Seifert, B. 2002. Governance and corporate philanthropy. 
Business and Society, Vol. 41: 319-344. 
Bazerman, Max H. and Samuelson, William. F. 1983. I won the auction but I don't want 
the prize, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27: 618-34. 
Bear, S., Rahman, N., and Post, C. 2010. The impact of board diversity and gender 
composition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of 
Business Ethics. Vol. 97: 207-221. 
Becker, B. E. 1996. Union rents as a source of takeover gains among targets 
Shareholders. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 49 (1): 3-19. 
166 
Becker-Olsen, K. L., Cudmore, B. A., and Hill, R. P. 2006. The impact of perceived 
corporate social responsibility on consumer behavior. Journal of Business Ethics. 
Vol. 59 (1): 46-53. 
Belkaoui, A., 1980. The impact of socio-economic accounting statements on the 
investment decision: An empirical study. Accounting, Organizations and Society 
Vol. 5 (3): 263-283. 
Berchicci, L., Dowell, G., and King, A. A. 2012. Environmental capabilities and 
corporate strategy: Exploring acquisitions among US manufacturing firms. 
Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 33: 1053-1071. 
Berkovitch, E. and Narayanan, M. P. 1993. Motives for takeovers: an empirical 
investigation. Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis. Vol. 28 (03): 347-
62. 
Bemile, G., and Lyandresy, E. 2010. Merger synergies along the supply chain. European 
Winter Finance Summit. 
Berrone, P. and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2009. Environmental performance and executive 
compensation: An integrated agency-institutional perspective. Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. 52 (1): 103-126. 
Betton, S. and Eckbo. B. E. 2000, Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoff in takeovers. 
Review of Financial Studies. Vol. 13 (4): 841-882. 
Bird, F. and Smucker, J. 2007. The social responsibilities of international business firms 
in developing areas. Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 73: 1-9. 
Bloom, P. N., Hoeffler, S., Keller, K. L., and Meza, C. E. B. 2006. How social-cause 
marketing affects consumer. MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 47: 49-55. 
Boatsman, J.R., Gupta, S., 1996. Taxes and corporate charity: empirical evidence from 
micro-level panel data. National Tax Journal, Vol. 49: 193-213. 
Boutilier, R. and I. Thomson. 2009. Establishing a social license to operate in mining. 
EduMine. Professional Development and Training for Mining. [Online course] 
from http/ /:www.edumine.com 
167 
Boutin-Dufresne, F., and P. Savaria. 2004. Corporate social responsibility and financial 
risk. Journal of Investing Vol. 13: 57-66. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A. and Kim, E. H. 1988. Synergistic gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring 
firms. Journal ofFinancial Economics. Vol. 21: 3-40. 
Brammer, S., and Millington, A. 2005. Corporate reputation and philanthropy: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of Business Ethics. Vol. 61: 29-44. 
Brown, D. T. and Ryngaert, M.D. 1991. The mode of acquisition in takeovers: Taxes and 
asymmetric information. Journal of Finance. Vol. 46 (2): 653-669. 
Brown, T. J. and Dacin, P.A. 1997. The company and the product: corporate associations 
and consumer product responses. The Journal of Marketing. Vol. 61 (1): 68-84. 
Brown, W., E. Helland, and J. Smith. 2006. Corporate philanthropic practices. Journal of 
Corporate Finance. Vol. 12 (5): 855-877. 
Bruner, R. 2002. Does M&A pay? A survey of evidence from the decision-maker. 
Journal of Applied Finance. Vol. 12: 48-68. 
Cai, Y., Jo, H. and Pan, C. 2011. Vice or virtue? The impact of corporate social 
responsibility on executive compensation. Journal of Business Ethics. Vol. 
104:159-173. 
Campbell, D. 2008. Nonfinancial performance measures and promotion-based incentives. 
Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 46 (2): 297-332. 
Campbell, J. L. 2007. Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An 
institutional theory of corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management 
Review. Vol. 32: 946-967. 
Capron, L. and N. Pistre. 2002. When do acquirers earn abnormal returns? Strategic 
Management Journal. Vol. 23 (9): 781-794. 
Carroll, A.B. 1999. Corporate social responsibility- evolution of a definitional 
construction. Business & Society. Vol. 38 (3): 268-295. 
168 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., and Simpson, W. G. 2003. Corporate governance, board 
diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, Vol. 38 (1): 33-53. 
Chan, C.C.C., Milne, M.J., 1999. Investor reactions to corporate environmental saints and 
sinners: an experimental analysis. Accounting and Business Research. Vol. 29 
(4): 265-279. 
Chatterji, A., D. Levine, and Toffel, M. 2009. How well do social ratings actually 
measure corporate social responsibility? Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy. Vol. 18 (1): 125-169. 
Cheng, B., Ioannou, I. and Serafeim, G. 2014. Corporate social responsibility and access 
to finance. Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 35 (1): 1-23. 
Cheng, L., and Chan, K. 1995. A comparative analysis of the characteristics of 
international takeovers. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. Vol. 22(5): 
637-657. 
Chih, H., C. Shen, and Kang, F. 2008. Corporate social responsibility, investor 
protection, and earnings management: Some international evidence. Journal of 
Business Ethics. Vol. 79 (1/2): 179-198. 
Cho, C. H., Guidry, R. P. Hageman, A.M. and Patten, D. M. 2012. Do actions speak 
louder than words? An empirical investigation of corporate environmental 
reputation. Accounting, Organizations and Society. Vol. 37: 14-25. 
Cho, C. H., Roberts, R. W., and Patten, D. M. 2010. The language of US corporate 
environmental disclosure. Accounting, Organizations and Society. Vol. 35(4): 
431--443. 
Christmann, P. 2000. Effects of ''best practices" of environmental management on cost 
advantage: The role of complementary assets. Academy of Management Journal. 
Vol. 43 (4), 663-680. 
Clacher, I and Hagendorff, J. 2012. Do announcements about corporate social 
responsibility create or destroy shareholder wealth? Evidence from the UK. 
Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 106: 253-266. 
169 
Clark, S.E., 1990. How to survive in the environmental jungle. Institutional Investor. Vol. 
24 (16): 89-91. 
Cochran, P. L., and Wood, R. A. 1984. Corporate social responsibility and fmancial 
performance. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 27: 42-56. 
Cooper, S. 2004. Corporate social performance: A stakeholder approach. Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate. 
Cormier, D., and Magnan, M.1999. Corporate environmental disclosure strategies: 
. determinants, costs and benefits. European Accounting Review. Vol. 14: 4429-
451. 
Cotter, J. F., Shivdasani, A. and Zenner, M. 1997. Do independent directors enhance 
target shareholders wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics. 
Vol. 43: 195-218. 
Datta, D.K., Pinches, G.E. and Narayanan, V.K. 1992. Factors influencing wealth 
creation from mergers and acquisitions: A meta-analysis. Strategic Management 
Journal. Vol. 13: 67-84. 
De Bondt, W. F. M and Thompson, H. E. 1992. Is economic efficiency the driving force 
behind mergers? Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 13. (1): 31--44. 
De1oitte. 2009. How green is the deal? The growing role of sustainability in M&A. 
https :/ /www .deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/US _ MA _How_ Green_ Is_ the_ Deal_J a 
n09.pdf 
Deloitte. 2010. Does sustainability add value to M&A deals? 
https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us _consulting_ doessustainabilityaddva 
luetoM&Adealsdebate 012511.PDF 
Deng, X., Kang, J., and Low, B.S. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
value maximization: Evidence from merger. Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 
110 (1): 87-109. 
170 
DesJardins, J. 1998. Corporate environmental responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics. 
Jun. 17, Vol. 8: 825-838. 
Devinney, T. M. 2009. Is the socially responsible corporation a myth? The good, the bad, 
and the ugly of corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management 
Perspectives. May: 44-56. 
Dhaliwal, D. S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A., and Yang, Y. G. 2012. Nonfinancial 
disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. Accounting Review, Vol. 87(3): 723-759. 
Dhaliwal, D. S., Tsang, 0. Z. Li, A. and Yang, Y. G. 2011. Voluntary nonfinancial 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social 
responsibility reporting. Accounting Review. Vol. 86 (1): 59-100. 
Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D., Richardson, S. and Teoh, S. H. 2006. Does investor 
misevaluation drive the takeover market? Journal of Finance. Vol. LXI (2): 725-
762. 
Eccles, R. G., Ioannou, I. and Serafeim, G. 2013. The impact of a corporate culture of 
sustainability on corporate behavior and performance. HBS Working Paper. 12-
035. 
Eckbo, E.B. and Langohr, H. 1989, Information disclosure, method of payment, and 
takeover premiums: Public and private tender offers in France. Journal of 
Financial Economics. Vol. 24: 363-404. 
Edmans, A. 2011. Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction 
and equity prices. Journal ofFinancial Economics. Vol. 101 (3): 621-640. 
Erhardt, N. L., Werbeland, J.D., and Shrader, C. B. 2003. Board of director diversity and 
firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 
Vol. 11 (2): 102-111. 
Erickson, M. M. and Wang. S. 2007. Tax benefits as a source of merger premiums in 
acquisitions of private corporations. Accounting Review. Vol. 82 (2): 359-387. 
171 
Eun, C. S., Kolodny, R., and Scheraga, C. 1996. Cross-border acquisitions and 
shareholder wealth: Tests of the synergy and internalization hypotheses. Journal 
ofBanking and Finance. Vol. 20 (9): 1559-1582. 
Fairfax, L. M. 2008. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on non-shareholder 
constituents: A silver lining, but will it endure? Journal of Business and 
Technology Law. Vol. 3 (2): 417--425. 
Ferraro, P. J., Uchida, T., and Conrad, J. M. 2005. Price premiums for eco-friendly 
commodities: Are 'green' markets the best way to protect endangered 
ecosystems? Environmental and Resource Economics. Vol. 32 (3): 419--438. 
Florida, R., and Davidson, D. 2001. Gaining from green management: Environmental 
management systems inside and outside the factory. California Management 
Review. Vol. 43 (3): 64--84. 21. 
Fluck, Z., and Lynch, A. 1999. Why do firms merge and then divest? A theory of 
fmancial synergy. Journal ofBusiness. Vol. 72 (3): 319-346. 
Fombrun, C., and Shanley, M. 1990 What's in a name? Reputation building and 
corporate strategy. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. (33): 233-258. 
Freedman, M., and Stagliano, A. J. 1991. Differences in social-cost disclosures: A market 
test of investor reactions. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 
(4): 68-83. 
Friedman, M. 1970. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. New 
York Times Magazine, September Vol. (13): 32-33, 122, 124, 126. 
Godfrey, P. C. 2005. The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder 
wealth: A risk management perspective. Academy of Management Review. Vol. 
(30): 777-798. 
Goss, A., and Roberts, G. 2009. The impact of corporate social responsibility on cost of 
bank loans. Working paper. 
Griffm, J. J., and Mahon, J. F. 1997. The corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance debate: Twenty-five years of incomparable research. 
Business and Society, Vol. (36): 5-31. 
172 
Grow, B., S. Hamm, and Lee, L. 2005. The debate over doing good. BusinessWeek 3947: 
76. 
Gunningham, N., Kagan, R. A., and Thornton, D. 2004. Social license and environmental 
protection: Why businesses go beyond compliance. Law & Social Inquiry. Vol. 
(29) (2): 307-341. 
Hamid, F. 2004. Corporate social disclosure by banks and finance companies: Malaysian 
evidence. Corporate Ownership & Control I, Vol. no. (4): 118-30. 
Hansen, R. G. 1987. A theory for the choice of exchange medium in mergers and 
acquisitions. Journal ofBusiness. Vol. (60): 75-96. 
Harper, P. J. 2013. Two essays on firm strategy and corporate social responsibility. PhD 
Dissertation. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 
Harrison, J. S. and R. E. Freeman: 1999. Stakeholders, social responsibility, and 
performance: Empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives. Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. 42 (5): 479--485. 
Hart, S. L. 1995. A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management 
Review. Vol. (20): 986-1014. 
Hawn, 0. 2013. Strategic role of corporate social responsibility in international expansion 
of emerging market multinationals. Working Paper. 
Hayward, M. L.A., and Hambrick, D. C. 1997. Explaining the premiums paid for large 
acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 
(42): 103-127. 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G. and Ruback, R.S. 1992. Does corporate performance improve 
after mergers? Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. (31): 135-175. 
Henderson, H., and Gart, A. 1999. Key variables explaining acquisition premiums for 
large commercial banks. Bank Accounting & Finance. Vol. 12 (4): 29-33. 
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1995. The determinants of firms that formulate environmental 
plans. in Collins, D. and Starik, M. (eds.). Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press. 
173 
Higgins, R. C. and Schall, L. D. 1975. Corporate bankruptcy and conglomerate merger. 
Journal ofFinance. Vol. 30 (1): 93-113. 
Hirsch, B. T., and Morgan, B. A. 1994. Shareholder risk and returns in union and 
nonunion firms. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 47 (2): 302-318. 
Huang, Y. and R. Walkling. 1987, Target abnormal returns associated with acquisition 
announcements, payment, acquisition form and managerial resistance, Journal of 
Financial Economics Vol. 19: 329-349. 
Hung, H. 2011. Directors' roles in corporate social responsibility: A stakeholder 
perspective. Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 10 (3): 385-402. 
Huseynov, F. and Klamm, B. K. 2011. Tax avoidance, tax management and corporate 
social responsibility. Journal of Corporate Finance. Vol. 18: 804-827. 
Husted, B. 2005. Risk management, real options, and corporate social responsibility. 
Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 60 (2): 175-183. 
llinitch, A. Y., Soderstrom, N.S. and Thomas, T. E. 1998. Measuring corporate 
environmental performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. Vol. 17: 
383-408. 
Ingham, H., Kran, 1., and Lovestam, A. 1992. Mergers and profitability: A managerial 
success story? Journal ofManagement Studies. Vol. 29 (2): 195-209. 
Ingram, R. W., and Frazier, K. B. 1983. Narrative disclosures in annual reports. Journal 
ofBusiness Research. Vol. 11: 49-60. 
Jarrell, G. A., and Poulsen, A. B. 1989, The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers: 
Evidence from three decades, Financial Management. 18: 12-19. 
Jennings, R. H. and Mazzeo, M.A. 1993, Competing bids, target management resistance, 
and the structure of takeover bids. Review of Financial Studies. Vol. 6: 883-909. 
Jensen, M. C. 2001. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function. In "Breaking the Code of Change, Michael Beer and Nithan 
Norhia", eds., Harvard Business School Press. 
174 
Johnson, R. A. and Greening, D. W. 1999. The effects of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. 42: 564-576. 
Kim, E. H. and McConnell, J. J., 1977. Corporate mergers and the co-Insurance of 
corporate debt, Journal ofFinance Vol. 32 (2): 349-363. 
Kim, Y., Park, M. S. and Wier, B. 2012. Is earnings quality associated with corporate 
social responsibility? Accounting Review. Vol. 87 (3): 761-796. 
King, D.R., Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M. and Covin, J.G. 2004. Meta-analyses of post-
acquisition performance: Indications of unidentified moderators, Strategic 
Management Journal. Vol. 25 (21): 87-200. 
Klassen, R. D. and McLaughlin, C. P. 1996. The impact of environmental management 
on firm performance. Management Science. Vol. 42: 1199-1214. 
Klassen, R. D. and Whybark, D. C. 1999. The impact of environmental technologies on 
manufacturing performance. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 42: 599-615. 
KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. (KLD). 2006. Getting started with KLD Stats and 
KLD's ratings defmitions. Boston, MA: KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 
KPMG. 2011. International survey of corporate responsibility reporting 2011. KPMG. 
http:/ /www.kpmg.com/ global/ en/issuesandinsights/ articlespublications/ corporate-
responsibility/pages/20 11-survey.aspx 
Langetieg, T. C. 1978. An application of a three-factor performance index to measure 
stockholder gains from merger. Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 6: 365-383. 
Lev B, and Zarowin P .1999. The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend 
them. Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 37 (2): 353-385. 
Lev, B., Petrovits, C. and Radhakrishnan, S. 2010. Is doing good good for you? How 
corporate charitable contributions enhance revenue growth. Strategic 
Management Journal. Vol. 31 (2): 182-200. 
175 
Lin, C., Yang, H. and Liou, D. 2008. The impact of corporate social responsibility on 
financial performance: evidence from business in Taiwan. Technology in Society. 
Vol. 30: 1-8. 
Linthicum, C., Reitenga, A. and Sanchez, J. 2010. Social responsibility and corporate 
reputation: The case of the Arthur Andersen Enron audit failure. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy. Vol. 29 (2): 160-176. 
Loderer, C. and Martin, K. 1992. Post- acquisition performance of acquiring firms, 
Financial Management. (21): 69-79. 
Loughran, T, and Vijh, A. M. 1997. Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate 
acquisitions? Journal ofFinance. Vol. 55 (5):1765-90. 
Lubatkin, M. 1987. Merger strategies and stockholder value. Strategic Management 
Journal. Vol. 8: 39-53. 
Luo, X. and Bhattacharya, C.B. 2009. The debate over doing good: Corporate social 
responsibility, strategic marketing levers and firm idiosyncratic risk. Journal of 
Marketing. Vol. 73: 198-213. 
Maignan, I. and Ralston, D.A. 2002. Corporate social responsibility on Europe and the 
U.S.: Insights from business' self-presentations. Journal of International Business 
Studies. Vol. 33: 497-514. 
Malatesta, P. H. 1983. The wealth effect of merger activity and the objective functions of 
merging firms. Journal ofFinancial Economics. Vol. 11: 155-81. 
Manaktola, K., and Jauhari, V. 2007. Exploring consumer attitude and behavior towards 
green practices in the lodging industry in India. International Journal of 
Contemporary Hospitality Management. Vol. 19 (5): 364-377. 
Manne, H. G. 1965. Merger and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol. 73: 110-120. 
Margolis, J. D., and Walsh, J. P. 2003. Misery loves companies: Rethinking social 
initiatives by business. Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 48: 268-305. 
176 
Mattingly, J. E., and S. Berman. 2006. Measurement of corporate social action: 
Discovering taxonomy in the Kinder L ydenburg Domini ratings data. Business 
and Society. Vol. 45 (1): 1-27. 
May, S., Cheney, G., and Roper, J. 2007. The debate over corporate social responsibility. 
Oxford University Press. 
McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A., and Schneeweis, T. 1988. Corporate and social 
responsibility and firm financial performance. Academy of Management Journal. 
Vol. (31): 854-872. 
McWilliams, A., and Siegel, D. 2000. Corporate social responsibility and fmancial 
performance: Correlation or misspecification? Strategic Management Journal. 
Vol. 21: 603-609. 
McWilliams, A., Siegel, D., and Wright, P. M. 2006. Corporate social responsibility: 
Strategic implications. Journal ofManagement Studies. Vol. 43: 1-18. 
Menon, S., and Kahn, B. E. 2003. Corporate sponsorships of philanthropic activities: 
When do they impact perception of sponsor brand? Journal of Consumer 
Psychology. Vol. 13 (3): 316-327. 
Miller, T., and Triana, M. D. C. 2009. Demographic diversity in the boardroom: 
mediators of the board diversity-firm performance relationship. Journal of 
Management Studies. Vol. 46 (5): 755-786. 
Minow, N. and Deal, M. 1991. Corporations, shareholders and the environmental agenda, 
Cardozo Law Review. Vol. 12: 1359-1370. 
Mitchell, M. L. and Mulherin, J. H. 1996, The impact of industry shocks on takeover and 
restructuring activity. Journal ofFinancial Economics 41: 193-229. 
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P. and Stulz, R. M. 2004. Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions. Journal ofFinancial Economics. Vol. 73: 201-28. 
Mohan, N., Ainina, M. F., Kaufman, M., and Winger, B. J. 1991. Acquisition/divestiture 
valuation practices in major U.S. firms. Financial Practice and Education. Vol. 1 
(1): 73-82. 
177 
Moore, G. 2001. Corporate social and fmancial performance: An investigation in the UK 
supermarket industry. Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 34 (3/4): 299-315. 
Morek, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. 1990. Do managerial objectives drive bad 
acquisitions? Journal ofFinance. Vol. 45 (1): 31-48. 
MSCI ESG STATS user guide & ESG ratings defmition, May 2013 
Mueller, D. C., and Sirower, M. L. 2003. The causes of mergers: tests based on the gains 
to acquiring firms' shareholders and the size of premia. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, Vol. 24 (5): 373-391. 
Mukherjee, T. K., Kiymaz, H., and Baker, H. K. 2003. Merger motives and target 
valuation: A survey of evidence from CFOs. Working paper. University of 
Houston - Clear Lake. 
Murray, B. K., and Vogel, M. C. 1997. Using a hierarchy-of-effects approach to gauge 
the effectiveness of corporate social responsibility to generate goodwill toward 
firm: Financial versus nonfmancial impacts. Journal of Business Research, Vol. 
38: 141-159. 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. 1984. Corporate fmancing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics. Vol. 13 (2), June: 187-221. 
Nehrt, C. 1996. Timing and intensity effects of environmental investments. Strategic 
Management Journal. Vol. 17: 535. 
Nguyen, H., and Faff, R. 2007. Impact of board size and board diversity on firm value: 
Australian evidence. Corporate Ownership & Control. Vol. 4 (2): 24-32. 
Nielsen, J. F and Melicher, R. W. 1973. A financial analysis of acquisition and merger 
premiums. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Vol. 8 (2) March: 139-
148. 
O'Dwyer, B. 2011. The case of sustainability assurance: constructing a new assurance 
service. Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 28 (4):1230-1266. 
178 
Officer, M. 2003. Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics. Vol. 69: 431-467. 
Ogden, S., and Watson, R. 1999. Corporate performance and stakeholder management: 
balancing shareholder and customer interests in the U.K. privatized water 
industry. Academy ofManagement Journal, Vol. 42 (5): 526-538. 
Oliff, M.D., and Vandermerwe, S. 1990. Customers drive corporations. Long Range 
Planning. Vol. 23 (6): 10-16. 
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., and Rynes, S. L. 2003. Corporate social and financial 
performance: A meta-analysis. Organization Studies. Vol. 24: 403--441. 
Ostergaard, C. R., Timmermans, B., and Kristinsson, K. 2011. Does a different view 
create something new? The effect of employee diversity on innovation. Research 
Policy. Vol. 40: 500-509. 
Padgett, R. C. and Galan, J. I. 2010. The effect of R&D intensity on corporate social 
responsibility. Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 93:407--418. 
Palepu, Krishna G. 1986. Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical 
analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 8, 3-35. 
Perry, J. S. and Herd, T. J. 2004. Reducing M&A risk through improved due diligence. 
Strategy & Leadership, Vol. 32: 12- 19. 
Porter, M. E. 1985. From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard Business 
Review. Vol. 5: 43-59. 
Porter, M. E., and Kramer, M. 2002. The competitive advantage of corporate 
philanthropy. Harvard Business Review Vol. 80 (12): 56-68, 133. 
Porter, M. E., and Linde, C. van der. 1995. Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate. 
Harvard Business Review. Vol. 73. (5): 119-134. 
Powell, R.G. and Stark, A.W. 2005. Does operating performance increase post-takeover 
for UK takeovers? A comparison of performance measures and benchmarks, 
Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 11: 293-317. 
179 
Raad, E. 2012. Why do acqumng firms pay high premiums to takeover target 
shareholders: An empirical study. Journal of Applied Business Research. 
July/August. Vol. 28, No. 4. 
Ramanathan, K. V. 1976. Toward a theory of corporate social accounting. The 
Accounting Review. Vol. L1 (3) July: 971-976. 
Ravenscraft, D. J. and Scherer, F. M. 1987. Life after takeover. Journal of Industrial 
Economics. Vol. 36: 220-233. 
Renneboog, L., Horst, J. T. and Zhang, C. 2008. The price of ethics and stakeholder 
governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds. Journal of 
Corporate Finance Vol. 14: 302-322. 
Rhoades, S. A. 1987. Determinants of premiums paid in bank acquisitions. Atlantic 
Economic Journal. Vol. 15 (1): 20-30. 
Richard, 0. C. 2000. Racial diversity, business strategy, and firm performance: A 
resource-based view. Academy of Management. Vol. 43 (2): 164-177. 
Richardson, A., and Welker, M. 2001. Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost 
of equity capital. Accounting, Organizations and Society. Vol. 26: 597-616. 
Roberson, Q. M., and Park, H. J. 2007. Examining the link between diversity and firm 
performance: The Effects of Diversity Reputation and Leader Racial Diversity. 
Group Organization Management. Vol. 32 (5): 548-568. 
Roberts, J. 2003. The manufacture of corporate social responsibility: constructing 
corporate sensibility. Organization. Vol. 1 0(2): 249-265. 
Roberts, P. W., and Dowling, G. R. 2002. Corporate reputation and sustained superior 
financial performance. Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 23 (12): 1077-1093. 
Rodgers, W., Choy, H. L, and Guiral, A. 2008. Do investors value a firm's commitment 
to social activities? The moderating role of intangibles and the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Working Paper. 
Roe, B., Teisl, M. F., Levy, A., and Russell, M. 2001. US consumers' willingness to pay 
for green electricity. Energy Policy. Vol. 29 (11): 917-925. 
180 
Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, Journal of Business. Vol. 59 
(2): 197-216. 
Roman, R. M., Hayibor, S. and Agle, B. R. 1999. The relationship between social and 
financial performance. Business and Society. Vol. 38: 109-125. 
Rowley, T. and Berman, S. 2000. A brand new brand of corporate social performance. 
Business and Society. Vol. 39: 397-418. 
Rupley, K. H., Brown, D. and Marshall, R. S. 2012. Governance, media and the quality 
of environmental disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. Vol. 31 
(6): 610-640. 
Russo, M. V. and Fouts, P. A. 1997. A resource-based perspective on corporate 
environmental performance and profitability. Academy of Management Journal. 
Vol. 40: 534-559. 
Sankar Sen, C.B. Bhattacharya. 2001. Does doing good always lead to doing better? 
consumer reactions to corporate social responsibility. Journal of Marketing 
Research. Vol. 38: 225-243. 
Savor, P.G., and Lu, Q. 2009. Do stock mergers create value for acquirers? Journal of 
Finance. Vol. 64: 1061-1097. 
Schoenberg, R., and Reeves, R. 1999. What determines acquisition activity within an 
industry? European Management Journal, Vol. 17. (1): 93-98. 
Schwert, G. W. 2000, Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder. Journal of 
Finance. Vol. 55: 2599-2640. 
Seifert, B., Morris, S. A., and Bartkus, B. R. 2004. Having, giving, and getting: slack 
resources, corporate philanthropy, and firm fmancial performance. Business and 
Society, Vol. 43 (2): 135-161. 
Seth, A. 1990. Value creation in acquisitions: A reexamination of performance issues. 
Strategic Management JournaL Vol. 11 (2): 99-115. 
181 
Seth, A., Song, K. P. and Pettit, R. 2000. Synergy, managerialism or hubris? An 
empirical examination of motives for foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. Journal 
of International Business Studies. Vol. 31 (3): 387-405. 
Shane, P. B., and Spicer, B. H. 1983. Market response to environmental information 
produced outside the firm. Accounting Review. Vol. 58: 521-538. 
Shawky, H. A., Kilb, T. and Staas, F. W. 1996. Determinants of bank merger premiums. 
Journal ofEconomics and Finance. Vol. 20. (1) Spring. P 117-131. 
Shawver, T. J. 2002. Determinants of bank merger premiums. What financial 
characteristics of the target bank and the acquiring bank are significant in 
determining merger premiums? Bank Accounting and Finance. Vol. 15 ( 6). 
October: 26-29. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 70: 295-311. 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. 1989. Management entrenchment: The case ofmanager-
specific investments. Journal ofFinancial Economics, Vol. 25: 123-139. 
Shrivastava, P. 1995a. Environmental technologies and competitive advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 16 (Summer), 183-200. 
Singh, J., Sanchez, M. S., and Bosque, I. R. 2008. Understanding corporate social 
responsibility and product perceptions in consumer markets: A cross-cultural 
evaluation. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, Vol. 80: 597-611. 
Solomon, R. C., and Hanson, K. R. 1985.1t's good business. New York: Athenaeum. 
Spicer, B. H. 1978. Investors, corporate social performance and information disclosure: 
An empirical study. Accounting Review. Vol. 53: 94-110. 
Srivastava, R. K., Shervani, T. A. and Fahey, L. 1988. Market-based assets and 
shareholder value: A framework for analysis, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 62 
(January): 2-18. 
182 
Starks, L. T. 2009. Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: What do 
investors care about? What should investors care about? EF A keynote speech. 
The Financial Review. Vol. 44 (4): 461--468. 
Stead, W. E. and Stead, J. G. 1995. An empirical investigations of sustainability strategy 
implementation in industrial organizations, in Collins, D. and Starik, M. (eds.). 
Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press. 
Sudarsanam, S., Roll, P. and Salami, A. 1996. Shareholder wealth gains in mergers: 
Effects of synergy and ownership structure. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, Vol. 23(5), 0306-686. 
Szwajkowski, E., and Figlewicz, R. 1999. Evaluating corporate performance: A 
comparison of the Fortune reputation survey and the Socrates social ranking 
database. Journal ofManagerial Issues. Vol. 11 (2): 137-154. 
Taneja, S. S., Taneja, P. K. and Gupta, R. K. 2011. Researches in corporate social 
responsibility: A review of shifting focus, paradigms, and methodologies. Journal 
ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 101: 343-364. 
Trautwein, F. 1990. Merger motives and merger prescriptions. Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 11: 283-295. 
Trevino, L. K., and Nelson, K. A. (2004). Managing business ethics: Straight talk about 
how to do it right (3rd ed.). New York: John Wiley and Sons, Publishers. 
Turban, D. B. and Greening, D.W. 1997. Corporate social performance and 
organizational attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy of Management 
Journal. 40: 658-672. 
Tuzzolino, F. and Armandi, B. R. 1981, A need-hierarchy framework for assessing 
corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management Review. 6(1): 21-28. 
Udayasankar, K. 2008. Corporate Social responsibility and firm size. Journal of Business 
Ethics. Vol. 83 (2), 167-175. 
Valentine, S. and Fleischman, G. 2008. Ethics programs, perceived corporate social 
responsibility and job satisfaction. Journal ofBusiness Ethics. 77: 159-172. 
183 
Verschoor, C. 2005. Is there financial value in corporate values? Strategic Finance. 87 
(1): 17-18. 
Waddock, S. A., and Graves, S. B. 1997. The corporate social performance-financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal. 18: 303-319. 
Waddock, S. and Graves, S. B. 2006. The impact of mergers and acquisitions on 
corporate stakeholder practices. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 22: 91-109. 
Walter, G. A. and Barney, J. B. 1990. Management objectives in mergers and 
acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 11 (1): 79-86. 
Wang, M., Qiu, C. and Kong, D. 2011. Corporate social responsibility, investor behaviors 
and stock market returns: Evidence from a natural experiment in China. Journal of 
Business Ethics. Vol. 101:127-141. 
Wang, W., and Qian, C. 2011. Corporate philanthropy and corporate fmancial 
performance: the roles of stakeholder response and political access. Academy of 
Management Journal. Vol. 54, (6), 1159-1181. 
Webb, L. H., Cohen, J. R., Nath, L. and Wood, D. 2009. The supply of corporate social 
responsibility disclosures among U.S. firms. Journal of Business Ethics. 84: 497-
527. 
Weber, Y. 1996. Corporate culture fit and performance in mergers and acquisitions. 
Human Relations. Vol. 49 (9): 1181-202. 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 5: 171-180. 
Wickramanayake, J. and Wood, A. 2009. Determinants of acquisition premiums: 
Empirical evidence from mining industry in Australia and Canada. EFMA Annual 
Meetings Paper. 
Williams, R. J., and Barrett, J. D. 2000. Corporate philanthropy, criminal activity, and 
firm reputation: Is there a link? Journal ofBusiness Ethics. Vol. 26 (4): 341-350. 
Wiseman, J. 1982. An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in corporate annual 
reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society. Vol. 7 (1): 53-63. 
184 
Wokutch, R. E. and McKinney, E. W. 1991. Behavioral and perceptual measures of 
corporate social performance. In J. E. Post (ed.). Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy. 12: 309-330. Greenwich. 
Wood, D. J., and Jones, R. E. 1995. Stakeholder mismatching: A theoretical problem in 
empirical research on corporate social performance. International Journal of 
Organizational Analysis. 3: 229-267. 
Y e, K. and Zhang, R. 2011. Do lenders value corporate social responsibility? Evidence 
from China. Journal ofBusiness Ethics. 104:197-206. 
Zollo, M., and Singh, H. 2004. Deliberate learning in corporate acqmsttlons: post-
acquisition strategies and integration capability in U.S. bank mergers. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(13): 1233-1256. 
Zondorak, V. A. 1991. A new face in corporate environmental responsibility: The Valdez 
Principles. Boston College. Environmental Affairs Law Review. Vol. 18, (3): 
457-500. 
185 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
